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1.1 Team BIOCOUNTER 
    The Gemstone Program at the University of Maryland is a four year 
multidisciplinary research program for select honors students who are interested in 
pursuing and conducting research that aims to make an impact in the community 
regarding the interconnected fields of science, technology, and society. 
     Team BIOCOUNTER, or Bioweapon Inhibition and Organized Containment 
Operating Unit for the Negation of Terrorist Actors and Radicals, was formed by six 
students of varying academic focuses including Computer Science, Biology, Physics, 
Education, and Government and Politics under the mentorship of Dr. Jeffrey Herrmann. 
From the broad scope of public health and emergency preparedness, this 
multidisciplinary team formed in order to assemble and propose a research plan that 
delineated a research problem, hypothesis, and methodology. From conducting 
preliminary interviews, modeling an aerosolized anthrax attack, and compiling a 
literature review, Team BIOCOUNTER identified target issues and submitted a proposal 
for a four-year research project culminating in the publication and presentation of a 
thesis. Team BIOCOUNTER aims to examine and scrutinize the processes of detecting, 
investigating, and decision-making that would occur following an aerosolized anthrax 
attack in Washington, D.C. The response would require the cooperation of the entire 
National Capital Region (NCR), as the potential harm of an anthrax attack would affect 
the entire region. The ultimate objective of the research is to contribute to the safety of 
the NCR as well as the growing field of preparedness and emergency management 
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research by using the NCR as a case study, with results including recommendations 
relevant to many other communities. 
1.2 Threat of Anthrax 
       Bioterrorism has been receiving more attention as a possible national threat in the 
past decade, according to those in the public health community and researchers alike. 
Anthrax especially is a threat discussed repeatedly in scholarly literature. Aerosolized 
anthrax has been studied from a homeland security standpoint from its development as a 
biological weapon in Iraq in the 1980s (Ziliniskas, 1997) to its current threat as a 
potentially disastrous terrorist weapon (Inglesby et al., 2002). In the counterterrorism 
community, it has been said that anthrax presents the greatest biological warfare danger 
out of all other agents (Cieslak & Eitzen, 1999). 
Anthrax is an acute disease caused by an infectious dose of Bacillus anthracis, a 
gram-positive bacterium capable of forming endospores (Cieslak & Eitzen, 1999). 
Although the disease is not contagious (Inglesby et al., 2002), the pathogens are very 
persistent in their spore form and can survive in a wide spectrum of climates and in the 
soil (Cieslak & Eitzen, 1999). The spores, ranging from 2 to 6 micrometers in diameter, 
are able to be inhaled into the human respiratory pathway, and cause infection when 
8,000-10,000 spores are inhaled (Cieslak & Eitzen, 1999). 
      The incubation period for inhalational anthrax typically varies from 1 to 6 days 
with flu-like symptoms developing followed by a second stage of symptoms that may 
include cyanosis, dyspnea, edema, and hemorrhagic meningitis (Cieslak & Eitzen, 1999). 
If treatment begins after 48 hours after symptoms appear, death is as frequent as 95% of 
the cases (Cieslak & Eitzen, 1999). Those that have inhaled the spores must either take 
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oral doxycycline or oral ciprofloxacin antibiotics even if the threat has not yet been 
verified. Thus, rapid treatment with prophylactic antibiotics is paramount for those have 
inhaled the aerosol. However, responders and physicians alike must have some acute 
awareness to conduct blood film tests to correctly diagnose the infection in the view of 
only its flu symptoms (Cieslak & Eitzen, 1999). 
 More background on the fatality and urgency of anthrax will be expounded in 
Chapter 2.1. 
1.3 NCR Network 
Officials and policy makers have created initiatives, protocols, and plans that are 
in place to prepare for a potential aerosolized anthrax attack. The NCR has an extensive 
network of such plans. This area, sometimes referred to as metropolitan Washington, 
D.C., includes Washington, D.C., northern Virginia (Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, and 
Prince William counties), and Maryland (Frederick, Montgomery, and Prince George’s 
counties). This network of response therefore encompasses multiple geographic 
jurisdictions at the federal, state, and local levels of government.  
Within each level of government, the planning process involves numerous federal 
agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as well as many local departments such as county 
emergency management agencies. In addition to government agencies and departments, 
other actors involved in the bioterrorism response include the Medical Reserve Corps 
(MRC) and the local hospitals in the region. Furthermore, officials within each 
organization have various roles that come with their own set of protocols or 
responsibilities that are separate from those of their colleagues. All of these actors and 
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parties must collaborate and communicate with each other during the processes of 
detecting, investigating, and responding to an aerosolized anthrax attack in Washington, 
D.C. 
       The government agencies, private sector actors, and other parties involved in the 
response to an attack will hereafter be referred to as “actors.” Different actors have 
specific roles during subsequent stages of the response. From their roles and 
responsibilities, the actors will make their decisions and execute their response including 
information sharing, containment, prophylactic antibiotic distribution, resource 
allocation, and decontamination. We will elaborate such processes, initiatives, protocols, 
and guidelines in more detail in Chapter 2. 
1.4 The Problem 
Because aerosolized anthrax has such a high mortality rate in the absence of 
immediate treatment, actors need to carry out their responsibilities quickly and 
efficiently. However, with so many actors involved in such an effort, it can be 
overwhelming for these joint operations to proceed without discrepancies. As no large-
scale aerosolized anthrax attack has ever occurred, case studies do not exist to appreciate 
or scrutinize the processes during such a large-scale scenario. 
As shown in Figure 1.4, the response can be split into several distinct 
components. First, the anthrax is released and people are exposed to the pathogen. Next, 
the attack is detected and confirmed. Once detected, information is gathered in a 
collaborative investigative effort before the actors involved are able to decide on the 
appropriate response.  The detection, investigation, and decision-making phases can be 
grouped together into the Critical Analysis Period (CAP). Once the actors decide on how 
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to respond to the attack, it will take more time before the plan can be fully implemented. 
For example, it should take a maximum of 48 hours to set up a point of distribution 
(POD) for prophylaxis dispensing according to the Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI, 
2004). The delay between deciding on the solution and implementing the solution has 
been dubbed the Response Delay. Finally, the response is executed in what has been 
labeled the Solution. 
 
Figure 1.4 – Critical Analysis Period 
 
We intend to limit the length of the CAP and the Response Delay, as well as 
rearrange the current system so as to make the path to the Solution more methodical and 
less ambiguous. The state of the CAP and Response Delay is something that was 
researched further in the literature review. 
There are some existing studies and reviews that indicate an imperfect system. 
These studies largely show failures to communicate, failures of leadership, and a general 
sense of unpreparedness, all three of which could lead to needlessly delayed CAP. 
  In 2010, the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh held a 
conference entitled The State of Biopreparedness: Lessons from Leaders, Proposals for 
Progress. The conference’s goals were to analyze and review the multiple advances made 
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in biosecurity from 2001 to 2010 and to develop a growing understanding of future 
directions for improvement. The speakers, including major health officials and members 
of the Cabinet, discussed a range of topics, from new technologies and surveillance to 
improving medical response and situational understanding. 
One such speaker, Bob Graham, former governor and senator from Florida, 
served as chairman of the WMD Commission. He noted many similarities in the response 
to oil spills and the outlook on the financial industry (Graham, 2010). Notably, he spoke 
of the “diminution of threat,” which includes the dismissal of warning signals, something 
that Graham has taken attention to and opposes. His commission found that terrorists 
have been quickly adapting to any security measures taken, that terrorists would likely 
use a WMD before the year 2013, and that this weapon would most likely be biological 
instead of nuclear. The Commission’s non-profit successor, the WMD Policy Center, 
gives an annual report card on WMD interdiction for the United States. In 2010, that 
report card administered failing grades of “F” in three categories under “national 
security,” one of which included  “prepared and quick response to bioterrorism” (Graham 
& Talent, 2010). The Center referred to a failure to “recognize, respond, and recover 
from a biological attack.” 
Another study, by the Research and Development (RAND) Defense Institute, 
investigated and analyzed the performance of the Department of Defense (DoD) in 
responding to three anthrax-related incidents (Kelly et al., 2006). Using primary 
documents and interviews, the study thoroughly scrutinized the system in place, the way 
that the system should be designed, and recommended specific improvements. The 
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results revealed uncertainty, poor communication and coordination, and noncompliance 
with the framework guidelines of the National Incident Management System (NIMS).  
In 2005, the Department of Defense commissioned the RAND Defense Institute 
to review responses to possible anthrax-related incidents at three of the department’s mail 
facilities, namely those at the Pentagon, the TRICARE Management Agency’s Skyline in 
Fairfax, Virginia, and the Defense Intelligence Agency’s remote delivery facility in 
Washington, D.C. These responses were compared to existing plans and already 
established guidelines. The study noted that response at the facilities was conducted 
separately, leading to further problems (Kelly et al., 2006). Most importantly, each 
separate response was conducted without compliance to then-existing NRP and NIMS 
guidelines, which led to improvised responses from DoD officials and poor inter-agency 
coordination. This showed that the DoD had failed to adopt the systems fully, and the 
authors recommended that full compliance be completed in the case of a real attack. 
However, although there were problems with the DoD in NRP/NIMS compliance, the 
roles themselves were not clearly defined in the plans at the time either. 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) sent agents to investigate the five 
Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) laboratories in the United States. Three of the five labs were 
considered to be in good standing, meeting thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen of the fifteen 
security categories, respectively. The two low-scoring BSL-4 labs met only three and 
four, respectively, of the fifteen categories. Nevertheless, both of these labs met the 
standards of the Division of Select Agents and Toxins of the CDC (Graham et al., 2008). 
The Homeland Security Council also stated that, in a hypothetical aerosolized anthrax 
attack, initial cases would not arrive in emergency rooms until thirty-six hours after the 
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release, with the number of people with symptoms increasing quickly over time (Ibid.). 
An aerosolized anthrax attack released by truck in an urban city is estimated to result in 
328,848 exposures, 13,208 untreated fatalities, and 13,342 total casualties (Ibid.). In 
response to the many findings with regards to biosecurity, the commission called for the 
following action: 
“The next administration should, as a priority, work 
with a consortium of state and local governments to 
develop a publicly available checklist of actions each level 
of government should take to prevent or ameliorate the 
consequences of WMD terrorism.  Such a checklist could 
be used by citizens to hold their governments accountable 
for action or inaction (Graham et al., 2008, p. 109).” 
 
       The report covers a wide range of subtopics from international bioweapons 
prevention to reform of American governmental oversight of biosecurity. The thirteen 
recommendations address both biological and nuclear risks and security issues. 
In accordance to the above recommended action, the public has made assessments 
of the United States’ emergency preparedness. The New York Times Magazine reported 
as recent as October, 2011, discrepancies in ideology between the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) (Hylton, 2011, p. 
9). The article also states that there had been a single biodefense director in the 1990s and 
early 2000s with the purpose of coordinating government response, but this position has 
since been replaced with four officials with “partial responsibility” (Ibid.). A Rutgers 
University professor familiar with biosecurity noted that safety is based in part on 
peoples' personal feelings, explaining as an example that people felt more secure about 
airplane travel before September 11th than afterward. Additionally, actors may be in 
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conflict because of role interests, in which each single actor wants to play the role of the 
“hero” (Ibid.). 
Notably, a project by Dr. Caron Chess, Director of Environmental 
Communication at Rutgers University, offered further information on risk 
communication in a crisis. The study’s methodology heavily relied on interviews of 
health officials and local responders and analyzed the organizational aspects of the 
response to the 2001 Amerithrax crisis (Chess & Clarke, 2007). The project found that 
the actors involved in the response faced organizational uncertainties such as confusion 
over the distribution of authority and responsibility. Organizational networks, including 
local and informal networks, were found to be crucial to the operations of response. 
Prioritization of communication (e.g. ensuring that the most important recipients receive 
the most important information through the most important channels) was found to be a 
major problem. Time delays occurred in response to the crisis from factors such as 
hesitation to sharing information with certain partner agencies in addition to the 
confusion regarding chain of command. The study also addressed the relationship 
between actors, whom Dr. Chess calls “elites,” in response and panic, including elites 
fearing and causing panic, and even the panic of elites themselves (Ibid.).  
Elaine Vaughan, at the University of California, Irvine, has studied risk 
communication with certain ethnic and social classes in the United States, especially 
lower-income minority groups. Factors of note included distrust of government within 
these communities, ill perceived subtext in official statements and announcements 
attempting to assuage any panic, and delay of communication to these communities. The 
dichotomy between false positives and false negatives was also an interesting topic 
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discussed, with the study concluding that false negatives were far more detrimental to 
risk communication and public perception of responder agencies than false positives 
(Vaughan, 2009). 
An additional study examining risk communication in New Jersey revealed a list 
of discrepancies and cases of ambiguity in times of public health emergencies. Interviews 
with professionals and officials of involved agencies identified frustration regarding lack 
of communication, coordination, and at times, trust, as the foremost causes of 
disorganization in a variety of cases. Medical practitioners even cited politics as an 
aggravating pressure on their decision-making for dispensing prophylaxis. The study 
revealed that sharing information between agencies might cause misconstrued 
communication, which has led to public confusion and prolonged response times. The 
study called for more systematic research to be done regarding this interagency 
uncertainty (Chess & Clarke, 2007). 
In the NCR, risk communication and response can potentially be more complex 
than what was examined in New Jersey. With the incorporation of various jurisdictions as 
well as the centralization of federal agencies in the NCR, roles and guidelines must be 
clearly defined with correct boundaries and responsibilities. As a result, the system 
should be studied as a “mess”, or an interconnected problem across a complicated society 
that cannot be distinguished easily through immediate analysis, rather than as a simple 
response plan. 
 The summation of these studies reveals that various factors lead to an ambiguity 
that might occur following an aerosolized anthrax attack, between the detection of the 
pathogen and the execution of a response. Such factors responsible for ambiguity include 
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the processes of inter-agency coordination (Bush, 2004) and the proper determination of 
a course of action according to one of our public health contact. This resulting ambiguity 
would increase the response time in the event of an aerosolized anthrax attack, leading to 
increased deaths as a result of the attack. 
1.5 Objectives 
         The research questions that guided this study were: (1) what are the inefficiencies 
and disorganization within the CAP after an aerosolized anthrax attack, and (2) what 
framework can be developed and implemented to improve the overall response system so 
as to reduce the overall response time of the actors? 
         Reducing the response time is critical to minimizing the number of casualties. As 
described in Chapter 1.2, anthrax has a very high mortality rate for those who are 
exposed but do not receive prophylaxis. However, the population is unable to receive 
prophylaxis until much of the response system is completed (see Figure 1.4). Another 
effect to consider are hospitalization surges that could delay patients from immediate 
treatment if the hospitals are over-capacitated. Hupert et al. used computer simulations to 
model the number of potential hospitalizations based on estimated response time 
following a release of anthrax. As described in its results, each additional hour of the 
response time increases the number of casualties significantly (Ibid.). 
           Our research began with the acquisition of knowledge on all relevant topics. We 
then investigated the factors could the ambiguity of the procedures that follow an 
aerosolized anthrax attack, and subsequently developed recommendations for relevant 
agencies such as the CDC and DHS to improve the system and thus decrease the response 
time following an attack. Although none of the research performed here involved 
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classified information, we have chosen to omit some of our results and recommendations 
for security and classified purposes. The results are included in the conceptual models 
found in Chapter 5. The decrease in response time will attribute to a decrease in the 
number of potential contacts and casualties following an attack. Our methodology will be 
further explained in Chapter 3. 
1.6 Method Framework 
We implemented Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) as the basis of our 
methodology. SSM is primarily implemented to systematically evaluate complex systems 
and messes (Checkland, 2000). SSM will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
The first component of SSM involves acquiring information about the problem. 
This was achieved by conducting an extensive literature review, as well as interviews of 
over 20 individuals representing the actors involved with planning and response to an 
attack. 
Next, we created visual representations of the problem. To do this, the flow of 
information among the actors was represented in an adjacency matrix, and the results 
were displayed using the program NodeXL. The graph shows the complexity of the 
system while also revealing patterns and connections. Using this graph, as well as 
information obtained from the literature review and interviews, we developed rich 
pictures. The purpose of rich pictures is to visually display our understanding of the 
problem so we could then determine if it agrees with the perspectives of the officials 
involved in the response (Checkland, 2000).   
Our next step was to create models of interaction, which showed the sequence and 
timing of events that should occur in an idealized response to an anthrax attack. This was 
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modeled using the Critical Path Method (CPM), which allowed us to determine the path 
of a response from the release of anthrax to the dispensing of prophylaxis. 
For the models of interaction, we wanted to a sample, computerized anthrax 
attack on which we could base the response. Although there are descriptions of 
aerosolized anthrax simulations, no simulation was found to give an hour-by-hour map of 
the location of people who would likely exhibit symptoms of anthrax. Consequently, we 
designed our own simulations. For our sample anthrax attack, we modeled the dispersion 
of the anthrax using the NOAA HYSPLIT (HYbrid Single-Particle Lagrangian Integrated 
Trajectory) program, and based on this dispersion, computed where and when people 
would likely exhibit symptoms. The model that we used for our simulations is described 
in Section 3.9.2. Our methodology will be detailed in Chapter 3. 
1.7 Contributions to Community and Research 
This research will have a direct contribution to the community by providing 
recommendations that would reduce the response time to an aerosolized anthrax attack. 
This, in turn, would save lives if an attack were to occur. In addition to the 
recommendations, the rich pictures and models of interaction we have constructed are 
useful pieces of information that provide new ways for understanding the structure and 
coordination of a response. 
Although the focus of this thesis is on the response to an anthrax attack in 
Washington, D.C., the methodology used could be adapted for analyzing a wide range of 
emergency response situations. Some recommendations are also directly applicable to 
similar threats in the NCR, such as other biological outbreaks. 
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The anthrax dispersion simulation provides its own contributions to the literature, 




2 Literature Review 
2.1 Anthrax Background 
Before the Amerithrax case of 2001, the most recent American incident involving 
inhalational anthrax was in 1957. That year, five employees at a large goat-hair 
processing mill in Manchester, New Hampshire, exhibited anthrax-related symptoms 
over a ten-week period, resulting in four fatalities (Brachman et al., 1966). Although 
anthrax posed a legitimate threat in the wool and animal product industries during the 
early 1900s, a combination of improved animal breeding, better processing of products, 
and the development of anthrax vaccines as early as the 1950s mitigated adverse effects 
(Sternbach, 2003). In the decades following the 1957 incident, military researchers 
learned how to weaponize anthrax and release it as a tactic of biological warfare. 
Previous terrorist use of anthrax is scant but well documented. In 1981, a terrorist 
group in the United Kingdom, known only by the name of “Dark Harvest,” collected 
samples of the still contaminated soil and distributed them, first to the grounds of the 
Chemical Defence Establishment in Wiltshire, England, and then to a meeting of the 
Conservative Party. Dark Harvest’s purpose was to bring attention to the germ and 
chemical warfare tests undertaken by the British Army. Although no lives were lost and 
the plot was ultimately a failure (especially with the lack of anthrax spores in the second 
container), the attacks nevertheless spurred the British government to begin efforts to 
decontaminate the island. 
The use of anthrax as a biological weapon was again found to be a feasible tactic 
when an investigation of Iraq’s bio-weapons program in the mid-1990s showed that the 
Iraqi military was able to develop and test anthrax as such. The weapon was comprised of 
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four components: a payload (a chemical agent), a munition (a container for the virulent 
payload), a delivery system (an aircraft or missile), and a dispersal mechanism (a force or 
machine that weaponizes the agent as an aerosol spore for release on a target population) 
(Zilinskas, 1997). Scholars have stressed that a well-funded terrorist group could procure 
these means of bioterrorism or hire the expertise needed to develop such tools (Inglesby 
et al., 2002). 
Anthrax spores are resistant to desiccation, ultraviolet light, heat, and various 
disinfectants (Cieslak & Eitzen, 1999). Spores can persist in nutrient-rich soil for decades 
until contact is made with a living host (Hugh-Jones & Blackburn, 2009). Interestingly, it 
is noted that antibiotics only successfully kill the anthrax bacteria, and leave behind the 
fatal toxin left by the bacteria (Croft et al., 2005, p. 693). An aerosolized dispersal of this 
agent along a 100-km line under optimal climate conditions could cause a 50% lethality 
rate throughout a 160 km span of land.  
In the 1979 outbreak in Sverdlovsk, a Soviet military compound accidently 
released anthrax spores into the outside environment, causing over 66 deaths (Meselson 
et al., 1994).  The majority of the victims resided in the narrow path directed south from 
the military compound, towards Sverdlovk’s border. This information allowed officials to 
identify the spread’s origin. Government officials reported livestock contamination with 
96 cases of human infection with initial symptoms arising from April 4 to May 18. In 
1990, interviewed Sverdlovsk officials said they had been developing an improved 
vaccine but were unaware of the escape of anthrax pathogens. The report itself gives 
tabulated statistics of the infected persons, from gender to survivors and other 
information about the victims. The statistics include mention of the symptoms reported: 
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fever, dyspnea, cough, headache, vomiting, chills, weakness, and abdominal and chest 
pain. These are common symptoms associated with anthrax. Also included are tables 
showing number of deaths versus time (Meselson et al., 1994). 
In addition to physical harm, an aerosolized anthrax attack would produce 
psychological and social effects (Wyatt, 2002), such as population disorganization and 
unsustainable family incomes due to forced leave. (Hunter, 2007). Hultgren shows that, 
due to these factors, even in a scenario in which it takes three days after detection to treat 
with prophylaxis and 90% compliance, as many as 10% of the affected population could 
die three weeks after exposure (2007). If detection occurs at as long as 15 days after 
exposure, then even with the same timeliness and compliance, nearly 90% of the affected 
population could die within three weeks after exposure (Ibid.). Researchers believe that a 
100-kilogram release of anthrax in Washington, D.C., could kill as many as 3 million 
people (Yung et al., 2007). All of these aspects contribute to anthrax serving as a likely 
agent for bioterrorism. 
The most recent anthrax incident in the United States was in March, 2005, at the 
Pentagon. A routine test detected trace amounts of anthrax spores in the building, the 
same day that an air-handling equipment alarm went off in a DoD office in a privately 
owned building complex in Fairfax County, Virginia. The Northern Virginia Regional 
Team (NVRT) provided personnel, determined prophylaxis logistics, prepared reports, 
and maintained contact with the NCR as well as with the Virginia Department of Health 
(VDH) and CDC (Stoto & Morse, 2008). In both the Amerithrax and the 2005 cases, the 
NCR required a response. If a large-scale anthrax attack occurs in the region, all relevant 
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agencies must have a sound set of responsibilities and efficient methods for achieving 
them. 
Studies of weaponized anthrax have been conducted by the public, academia, and 
government, and have ranged from assessments to simulations. Among the most 
significant of these assessments is World at Risk: A Report of the Commission on the 
Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, published in December, 2008, under 
the guidance of former Senators Bob Graham and Jim Talent. The report included 
information compiled from interviews with over 250 government officials, eight major 
commission meetings, and one public hearing (Graham et al., 2008). This report asserted 
that, without proper global action, terrorists could execute an attack with a weapon of 
mass destruction (WMD) by the end of 2013. In addition, biological weapons were a 
more likely threat than nuclear weapons and the margin of safety was shrinking rather 
than growing (Ibid.). Although the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 prohibited 
development, production, and acquisition of biological weapons, violations and a lack of 
an international strategy have negated the original intentions (Ibid.). The report went so 
far as to explicitly state, “The President should create a more efficient and effective 
policy coordination structure by designating a White House principal advisor for WMD 
proliferation and terrorism and restructuring the National Security Council and Homeland 
Security Council” (Recommendation 8, Graham et al., 2008). 
Certain academic studies have also evaluated the protocols of detection, 
investigation, decision-making, and response. Nan D. Hunter, at Georgetown University, 
assessed three hypothetical approaches to governance of public health law: dominant 
state authority, public-private model for administrative governance, and governmentality 
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theory (Hunter, 2007). Hunter’s analysis concerned the legal obligations of employers 
and economic recommendations for individuals in the event of a bioterorrism incident. 
The study suggested that employers should revise their policy on employees’ leave of 
absence (Hunter, 2007). 
Researchers have also conducted simulations of hypothetical aerosolized anthrax 
attacks in order to understand the logistics of the response. With the knowledge that a 
one-kilogram release of anthrax could result in 100,000 deaths and that as many as 
10,000 people could die as a result of delayed prophylaxis, Croft et. al (2005) conducted 
simulations to analyze the stages of symptoms and treatment. The simulation accounted 
for amount of release, wind, release height, breathing rate, zone population, biosensors, 
symptoms, and a wide variety of other parameters. The simulation also accounted for the 
incubation, prodromal, and fulminant stages of anthrax among patients. The study 
analyzed the effects of overwhelmed hospitals and delays in response. Such observations 
provide insight on what potential problems could occur in an actual response. 
2.2 Current Policies 
2.2.1 Background on Response Protocols 
The National Response Framework (NRF), which was created and published in 
2008, is the culmination and reorganization of former response plans, especially the 
National Response Plan (NRP) formulated in the years following the September 11, 
2001, attacks. The NRF was specifically designed to be an all-hazards approach to any 
disaster, from naturally occurring disasters to large-scale terrorist attacks (NRF, 2008). 
The document divides and explains the work of preparation and response from all levels 
of government, federal, state, and local, as well as appropriate actions to be undertaken 
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by non-governmental actors and private sector stakeholders. The document outlines the 
provisions of the NIMS as well as the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). 
Beginning in Fiscal Year 2005, in accordance to Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive #5 (HSPD-5), NIMS became a required set of protocols for local, state, and 
federal agencies involved in emergency preparedness in order to receive federal funding 
(HSEMA, 2011). NIMS attempts to standardize training, awareness, communication, and 
coordination among agencies throughout different levels of government, and across 
multiple jurisdictions. Washington, D.C., established a NIMS Advisory Group in 
accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive #8 (HSPD-8) in order to 
implement NIMS in an orderly and feasible fashion (HSEMA, 2011). NIMS can be 
divided into the Incident Command System (ICS), Multi-Agency Coordination Systems 
(MACS), and Public Information Systems. The ICS has already been developed to assign 
responsibilities to relevant agencies during any natural disaster or emergency. MACS 
involves the proper coordination and use of facilities, equipment, and people in order to 
best respond to an emergency, while the Public Information Systems addresses 
communication protocols (HSEMA, 2011). Both HSPD-5 and HSPD-8 were issued in 
2003 and began this process of attempting to standardize multi-jurisdictional emergency 
preparedness and response. 
The ICS, one of the guiding set of protocols that became a part of NIMS, was first 
developed in the 1970s in response to fires in urban California (FEMA, 2008). This 
system attempts to designate specific roles to local, tribal, state, and federal governments 
in order to coordinate an appropriate response. The ICS addresses standardization, 
command, planning/organizational structure, facilities and resources, 
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communications/information management, and professionalism. The system has 
established a specific organization of actors in the following format: incident commander 
or unified command, command staff, operation section, planning section, logistics 
section, and finance/administration section. Some incidents may require a unified 
command in order to address the full complexity. In the event of bioterrorism, both public 
health and law enforcement would need to contribute their respective expertise. 
Attempts at coordinating actors have led to quite a few more actors specifically 
organized for coordination. The National Response Coordinator Center (NRCC) is 
delegated within the Federal Emergency Response Management Agency (FEMA) and 
acts to initially implement emergency operations and carry out communication channels 
between DHS and emergency response teams. The Regional Response Coordination 
Center (RRCC) is a more local arm of FEMA that works with the NRCC to initiate 
emergency protocols in specific areas. Joint Field Offices (JFO) are mobilized 
coordination actors that take over much of the roles of the RRCC and NRCC following 
an emergency.  The Joint Operations Center (JOC) is a homeland security and defense 
multi-agency command post that helps to coordinate actors in emergencies. The specific 
JOC, the Joint Force Headquarter National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR), is a military 
entity not part of the DC government and is part of the Military District of Washington 
for the US Army, which is now a component of the US Northern Command. The Joint 
All-Hazards Operation Center is a coordination post within the DC government that helps 
to spread communication among government actors, which becomes an Emergency 
Operations Center (EOC) when mobilized. 
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One of the most fruitful documents in specifically describing the federal 
government’s response to an aerosolized anthrax attack is the Aerosolized Anthrax 
Concept of Operations, or ConOps (PHE, 2012). This document was sponsored by the 
DHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response and offers a brief 
yet telling list of actions that would occur in the event of an attack. The ConOps begins 
with four “trigger events”: credible intelligence of a plan to conduct a biological attack 
using aerosolized anthrax, notification of a Biowatch Actionable Result (BAR), 
confirmed cases of inhalation anthrax, and a decision to demobilize. The last scenario, 
decision to demobilize, succinctly describes the requirements for demobilization 
subsequent to an alleged attack. The ConOps acted as a framework from which we could 
trace the path of response, and also encouraged us to analyze an attack in multiple 
scenarios. 
The National Contingency Plan (NCP), fully known as the National Oil and 
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, is the national plan for oil spills and 
hazardous material release. It is coordinated by the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), the National Response Team (NRT), and FEMA. The NCP includes biological 
and chemical hazards in their list of hazardous materials. The plan also includes 
guidelines for testing water and air for pollutants and hazards and for decontamination. 
Although it was written primarily to provide contingencies for pollution, especially on a 
massive scale, the plan can be applied to an aerosolized anthrax attack, especially in 
consideration of decontamination. 
The ESFs were created in line with NIMS in order to provide guidelines for the 
allocation of resources and the coordination of multiple related federal agencies. Each 
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ESF specifies one or more primary actors that provide the majority of staff, support, and 
resources. Each one also has multiple support agencies that provide additional support 
and improve response. There are fifteen ESFs and each one is assigned to a specific area 
of expertise. For example, there are individual ESFs for Communications, Firefighting, 
Public Health and Medical Services, and Long-Term Community Recovery. Activated 
ESFs authorize actions by the relevant agencies so that they can address all aspects of the 
response. 
ESF #8 in particular discusses Public Health and Medical Services. It is the most 
directly related ESF to our scenario.  In agreement with unified command, the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the lead federal agency of this 
function. The HHS Emergency Medical Group (EMG) increases the number of people on 
duty when the NRCC activates the function, and in collaboration with the DHS, sends 
appropriate personnel to determine the specific needs of the affected population. As the 
HHS increases its scrutiny of surveillance and investigation of bioterrorism, it also 
instructs personnel such as the DoD, VA, and MRC to work on scene as responders. In 
addition to the SNS, the function grants the authority to request additional supplies from 
the DoD and VA. If evacuation is necessary as a result of symptoms or other appropriate 
conditions, this function can instruct the DoD, VA, and FEMA to transport patients. All 
of these actions require standardization across actors. The HHS EMG, via the HHS 
Secretary's Operations Center (SOC), communicates with the National Operations Center 
(NOC). All necessary information sharing occurs between the relevant actors and the 
NRCC, RRCC, or JFO. JIC coordinates information sharing with the general public upon 
approval from the HHS. 
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The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), 
under the auspices of HHS, released their Online Performance index for Fiscal Year 
2012. The purpose of this document is to gauge the performance of the ASPR in multiple 
fields, from ensuring that public health and responder officials are capable and 
strengthening the healthcare infrastructure to measuring and relating with international 
efforts. The document also examined the office’s budgeting and logistical issues. In 
looking at the agency’s performance, the report carefully examined certain programs 
instituted to aid the office in its goals, e.g., the Hospital Preparedness Program and the 
Medical Countermeasure program. Of note is Measure 2.4.4.A, which examined the 
medical countermeasures for anthrax. In past years, ASPR has worked with the 
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority to provide contracts to 
support the development of anthrax vaccines. However, in recent years, the organization 
has either not reported if its target goals have been met or failed to meet its goals. 
Nevertheless, HHS increased its budget on emergency preparedness and response by over 
46% from FY 2011 to FY 2012 (Holland et al., 2012). 
The federal government has stressed the need to prevent bioterrorist attacks 
before technological surveillance is needed. The government has established coordination 
and an effective basis to impede shipments and delivery systems of biological weapons 
among suspicious actors that are in line with the United Nations Security Council (DoS, 
2003). There is a new stress on rapid communication and global coordination. Ensured 
security may require allowing other countries to investigate vessels and searching oceanic 
regions (DoS, 2003). The stress on searching foreign imports comes from the possibility 
of anthrax leaving a potentially natural environment to a region in the country where it 
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can cause casualties. These concerns have led to the creation of the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI), an international effort to end weapons trafficking. The principles of the 
PSI rely on interdiction, halting the trade of weapons of mass destruction in general, in 
line with domestic authorities and international law (DoS, 2003). The PSI calls on all 
nations involved to take effective measures against WMD trade, to adopt streamlined 
procedures for communication, to strengthen national authorities in training for these 
objectives, and to take a proactive approach in interdiction. The PSI shows that the need 
and concern for ease of communication and coordination of response are also emphasized 
on the international level. 
The District Response Plan (DRP) incorporates NIMS within the NCR. The plan 
outlines specific roles for NCR jurisdictions related to operations, EOCs, consequence 
management team structure, activation of the D.C. National Guard, federal partners, and 
recovery operations (Gray & West, 2008). The mayor of Washington, D.C., has a specific 
set of responsibilities pertaining to funds and orders, as well as communication with other 
relevant officials on multiple levels of government. The consequence management team 
(CMT) contains officials associated with operations authorized by all of the ESFs as well 
as the mayor and the HSEMA, and it operates the EOCs. The DRP, NIMS, and NRF 
outline a number of ideal responsibilities for tribal, local, state, and federal government 
agencies in the event of a large-scale emergency. 
Future measurements of NIMS compliance and self-assessments will show 
whether identified discrepancies are addressed. In 2006, the District of Columbia 
Emergency Management Agency (DCEMA) developed an implementation plan for 
NIMS compliance in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 
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(HSPD-5) The plan ensured that responsibilities were explained thoroughly and 
delineated clearly, especially the roles of the Mayor and the directors of different 
agencies. Also, in line with NIMS compliance, there are also very specific instructions 
regarding points of contact and identification of key personnel. The majority of the 
document explains the specifics of implementation. It first describes the seven phases of 
implementation, from initial recognition to institutionalization of the Incident Command 
System (DCEMA, 2006). Furthermore, the plan has a set timetable for NIMS adoption. 
Training of staff, mentioned in Phase Two of implementation, is also key to the plan, 
including identification of required training courses, which include introductions to ICS, 
NIMS, and the then-existent NRP. The plan goes on to discuss adoption self-assessment 
using NIMCAST and documentation of compliance. Even further, the plan describes the 
modification of the existing plans to fit NIMS requirements, including testing and 
refinement. Resource management, which the plan pairs with certification and 
credentialing of D.C. employees and equipment, and NIMS Integration Center standards, 
which are in line with the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 
(HSEEP), are the final topics discussed. The document provides a loose understanding of 
current procedures of implementation and a better look into primary adoption of NIMS 
guidelines in the past. 
Actors within the Washington, D.C. government include the Health Emergency 
Preparedness and Response Agency (HEPRA) within the DC Department of Health 
(DCDOH) and the Homeland Security Management Agency (HSEMA). The primary 
purpose of HEPRA is to survey for, protect against, and act against biological threats, 
especially bioterrorism. The primary purpose of HSEMA is to manage any situation, 
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under the Mayor of D.C., that relates to homeland security, by keeping in touch with all 
relevant actors and the public. Other regional government actors include the FBI Field 
Office and FBI WMD Coordinator and the RRCC. 
2.2.2 Surveillance and Detection 
The United States first implemented the concept of surveillance to protect public 
health in 1878 to monitor cholera, smallpox, plague, and yellow fever (Fedorowicz & 
Gogan, 2009). The means of detecting anthrax can be divided into two categories: 
technological and syndromic. Technological surveillance uses detection systems and 
central computers to identify bioterrorist attacks, whereas syndromic surveillance 
involves analysis of health patients’ symptoms by doctors and epidemiologists to 
determine if there is an instance of bioterrorism. The United States government has 
developed methods for both forms of surveillance. 
The primary technological surveillance system, known as BioWatch, received 
initial funding in spring of 2003 (Fedorowicz & Gogan, 2009). BioWatch is essentially a 
network of air filters, placed throughout large cities. The process begins with an airborne 
pathogen landing on filters mounted on EPA air quality monitoring stations. The filters 
are collected every 24 hours and analyzed at laboratories associated with the national 
Laboratory Response Network for Bioterrorism (LRN). The CDC initially oversaw the 
analysis of the filters, while local jurisdictions and the FBI determine the proper solution 
(Shea & Lister, 2003). In recent years, however, the labs have had virtually full 
jurisdiction over the analysis. Early detection and a short CAP allow for an early 
warning, in which simple protocols such as closing windows and remaining relatively 
inactive can prevent exposure to a large-scale attack (Wyatt, 2002). Proper analysis of 
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BioWatch requires strong understanding of wind patterns as well as strategic location of 
detectors. An aerosol cloud appears only when released, has heterogeneous 
concentration, and is susceptible to further distribution variability due to the high altitude 
of release (Wyatt, 2002). Additionally, BioWatch’s sensitivity must be taken into 
account, as some pathogens are naturally present in the atmosphere at background levels 
in certain parts of the United States. The Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information 
System (BASIS) uses the same concept of filters that automatically rotate on an hourly 
basis, and the used filters are manually removed for testing Although the process of 
removing the filters and analyzing the agents requires manual labor, BASIS has less than 
0.005% false positives per filter measurement (Shea & Lister, 2003). 
Currently, there are discussions and attempts to improve technological 
surveillance. The DHS has announced that BioWatch must be a quicker, autonomous 
system that can reduce the analysis period from between ten and thirty-four hours down 
to between four and six hours (Garza, 2009). The LA Times reported throughout 2012 in 
several articles that BioWatch is unreliable due to false alarms, delays, and even a lack of 
recognition of actual pathogens (Williams, 2012). The federal government has allotted 
funding in recent years for Generation 3 BioWatch, which will be fully autonomous with 
analysis capabilities  three to six times per day, detect smaller attacks than the original 
BioWatch program, and have a per unit operational cost of less than 25% of the current 
system (Hultgren, 2007). However, in late 2012, Generation 3 BioWatch was put on hold 
due to lack of progress. Currently, options are being explored again for continuing 
research for Generation 3 (Perera, 2013). 
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Other technologies independent of BioWatch have been tested as well. The 
anthrax smoke detector (ASD) is an automated front-end monitor that uses air samples 
and low-cost chemical tests that reduce security costs by an estimated two orders of 
magnitude (Yung et al., 2007). Simulated anthrax attacks revealed that the ASD could 
detect as few as sixteen spores per liter of air within a 250 liter sample (Yung et al., 
2007). Similarly, the autonomous pathogen detection system (APDS) has the capacity to 
test 3000 liters per minute, and the samples it tests are archived (Hindson et al., 2004). 
The APDS can run initial tests of samples for anywhere from thirty and sixty minutes, 
and if the results are positive, it can indicate the need for a response. Additional testing 
for up to eighty minutes can determine the need for a more involved response (Hindson et 
al., 2004). The system has undergone tests in a Washington, D.C., subway and an 
Albuquerque, New Mexico, airport, and the DHS has conducted field operations and 
overseen commercialization (Hindson et al., 2004). In addition to these varying forms of 
technological surveillance, a vast number of syndromic surveillance systems have been 
developed. 
Although many different technologies have been developed to detect anthrax and 
share information, there has not been a comprehensive review of which ones are most 
effective. Part of the problem is making the connection between the clinicians and public 
health officials’ informational needs and the capabilities of the existing technologies 
(Bravata et al., 2004). In an attempt to provide some form of evaluation, Bravata and 
colleagues evaluated 341 reports of 217 existing information technologies and decision 
support systems. The researchers developed evaluation criteria by reviewing the 2001 
anthrax cases, TOPOFF and the Dark Winter bioterrorism preparedness exercises, the 
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1993 Cryptosporidium parvum outbreak in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the 1999 West Nile 
Virus outbreak in New York City, and a number of clinical guidelines, emergency 
preparedness standards, and security protocols. The study also identified roles for 
clinicians and public health officials as well as identified the stages of decision-making. 
Clinicians must correctly diagnose the biothreat agent, rapidly manage the care of 
potentially exposed patients, take precautions to prevent additional spread, and report 
both suspicions and confirmations of cases to public health officials on all levels. Public 
health officials must gather and analyze surveillance data, when and how to perform an 
epidemiological investigation, determine logistics of necessary outbreak control 
measures, and communicate with first responders, clinicians, other public health officials, 
and the general public. Decision-making could be identified in three stages: clinicians 
make diagnostic, management, prevention, and reporting decisions of initial cases; public 
health officials make surveillance, investigative, control, and communication decisions 
regarding initial cases; and clinicians determine the course of action for additional cases. 
In 2004, DHS adopted a detailed defense program in compliance with Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive #10 (HSPD-10, 2004). With regards to threat awareness, 
biological warfare related intelligence, assessments, and anticipation of future threats are 
kept up-to-date and the department pays special attention to time and accuracy in order to 
help all sectors of society be best prepared (Ibid.). Prevention and protection are rooted in 
the secrecy regarding biological agents and how to use them. Additionally, detection 
technologies and decontamination methods require constant updating. Surveillance and 
detection plans on a national level will allow for some form of uniformity to prevent 
social disruption, but it must be balanced with local, state, and international plans 
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(HSPD-10, 2004). The early-warning system must track the dynamics of the aerosol 
cloud, classify initial agents, and provide a time frame for protective action (Wyatt, 
2002). Analysis extends to finding the perpetrator, and the response involves 
coordinating between the NRF and local and state plans (HSPD-10, 2004). DHS would 
oversee transportation and law enforcement while HHS would run the response and both 
departments would work alongside with the EPA, the Attorney General, and the 
Secretaries of Defense, Agriculture, and Labor to devise the best plan for 
decontamination (Ibid.). Directives #5, #8, and #10 have influenced and in some cases 
initiated all of the preceding plans. 
Syndromic surveillance detects bioterrorist attacks and natural disease outbreaks 
through the local and state health departments’ analyses of hospital reports and 
pharmaceutical purchases. The CAP starts on the local (county) level, and, if symptom 
patterns occur among different communities, the state health department investigates on a 
broader scale. The system of the “observant doctor” takes effect when a patient exhibits 
odd symptoms or the doctor notices an unusual increase in a certain symptom. According 
to our public health contact, physicians can alert the CDC within a day. Epidemiologists 
analyze the incoming cases and look for patterns. Over the course of anthrax’s varying 
incubation period (ranging from 1 day to 17 days), the health department can conclude 
whether or not an attack has occurred. 
Two specific surveillance efforts sparked the possibility for improved monitoring. 
In 1999, both the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center and Harvard Medical School 
developed independent syndromic surveillance systems based primarily on patient chief 
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complaint data (Fedorowicz & Gogan, 2009). Such data allowed the analysts to take 
symptoms and associate them with anthrax before a doctor’s confirmation.  
The federal government’s BioSense program relates patients’ symptoms to a set 
of syndrome groups that help epidemiologists and other health officials identify clusters 
of systems (Fedorowicz & Gogan, 2009). On a federal level, BioSense integrates the 
Department of Defense, Veterans Affairs facilities, and hospitals throughout multiple 
states (10 as of 2008) to quickly and accurately identify a bioterrorist attack (Ibid.). The 
program has since changed to detect natural outbreaks of diseases. In 2005, the CDC 
established direct connections with hospitals in order to receive cycles of data on a 15 to 
20 minute basis (Rolka & O’Connor, 2011). This current system works independently of 
the BioWatch program. 
The Real-time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance (RODS) is a high-tech 
approach to syndromic surveillance. As of 2003, RODS uses a computerized public 
health surveillance system in accordance with the CDC’s National Electronic Disease 
Surveillance System (NEDSS) (Tsui et al., 2003). RODS has a Web-based interface for 
temporal and spatial analyses that can automatically classify chief complaints from 
hospitals into seven syndrome categories. The system connects to over 500 hospital 
emergency departments across the country and tracks chief complaints such as 
respiratory, gastrointestinal illness, botulinic, constitutional, neurologic, rash, 
hemorrhagic, and others (Chen et al., 2010). RODS also accounts for absenteeism and 
over-the-counter pharmacy sales. 
The Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-
based Epidemics (ESSENCE) also facilitates the detection of anthrax. The system is used 
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throughout the country and compares the international classification of diseases, 
pharmaceutical sales, emergency room chief complaints (primary symptoms), and 
demographics to determine earlier detection (Foster, 2004). It also evaluates military 
ambulatory visits, school-absenteeism, and veterinary health records (Chen et al., 2010). 
As of 2003, ESSENCE functions in the NCR and 300 military clinics around the world 
(Chen et al., 2010). ESSENCE II also functions in the NCR and performs similar 
functions. This system collects, analyzes, and reports data to all NCR jurisdictions while 
allowing hospitals to share information with local and state health departments via secure 
nodes linked to a central node at Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (Stoto & 
Morse, 2008). ESSENCE II can also display historic disease trends, provide inter- and 
intra-jurisdictional disease surveillance, and allow user communication (Stoto & Morse, 
2008). 
Chen et al. (2010) have reviewed other surveillance systems. The Rapid 
Syndrome Validation Project (RSVP) enables epidemiologists and health-care providers 
to communicate via Internet and review syndromes and make judgments of severity in 
order to perform spatial and temporal analysis. The National Bioterrorism Syndromic 
Surveillance Demonstration Program analyzes electronic records of over 20 million 
patients via participating health-care actors. Bio-event Advanced Leading Indicator 
Recognition Technology (BioALIRT) uses data from various patient records and attempts 
to improve detection speed by searching for unusual spikes in illnesses among military 
and civilian patient records, and near the NCR, it is used for monitoring purposes in 
Norfolk, Virginia. Other programs such as BioDefend, the Biological Spatio-Temporal 
Outbreak Reasoning Module (BioStorm), and Bio-Surveillance Analysis, Feedback, 
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Evaluation and Response (B-SAFER) serve as additional technological tools for 
surveillance data collection and analysis. Georgetown University’s Argus uses Internet 
technologies to gather information from World Health Organization (WHO) disease 
reports or ProMED unofficial reports, and the multilingual analysts involved can 
investigate a wide range of reports. The general public can also access databases 
dedicated to outbreak surveillance. The HealthMap website allows anyone to search a 
particular pathogen and view both official and unofficial reports around the world. 
DHS has continued to improve surveillance as a result of Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 10 (HSPD-10). The National Biosurveillance Information System 
(NBIS) continues to develop in the hopes of being a common operating picture (cop) of 
live information for Homeland Security and other relevant agencies to use (Rolka & 
O’Connor, 2011). This system aims to enable interoperability among agencies through 
information gathering and data analysis for the purpose of a unified response to 
bioterrorism. 
Clinical testing and diagnosis is another mechanism at the forefront of post-
exposure detection of a biological outbreak attack. The problem with these methods lies 
within the delay for the cultures to incubate or the assays to completely process which 
can take up to 2 days (Rao et al., 2010). 
Some studies claim that syndromic surveillance is not a reliable means of early 
detection. A study shows that when presented with information outlining early B. 
anthracis symptoms, most physicians misdiagnosed the disease as pneumonia and 
influenza and only a few reported that they would order blood cultures which would 
imminently lead to the correct diagnosis  (Stephens & Marvin, 2010). 
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Kong et al. (2008) presented an algorithm that can determine if an anthrax attack 
has occurred based on syndromic, meteorological, and geographical data. However, since 
this algorithm does not work until people begin to display symptoms of respiratory 
disease, this algorithm still takes between 48 and 58 hours to identify an anthrax 
outbreak. For a comparison, “a single hour of improvement in timeliness of detecting an 
aerosol release of [Bacillus] anthracis could save as much as $250 million of economic 
cost” as well as significantly decrease the number of casualties. 
Additionally, there have been efforts by federal agencies to test the monitoring of 
potential aerosolized anthrax attacks within individual buildings. The EPA released a 
study in 2008 that compared multiple parameters to understand the primary reasons for 
the spread of anthrax throughout a building. The study analyzed cumulative exposure 
after thirty minutes and the amount of time for the agent to reach critical exposure within 
small and large buildings by multiple HVAC (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning) 
systems. The EPA looked at filtration efficiency, leakage, system recirculation, and 
building size in relation to room release to determine which parameters had the most 
significance to anthrax spreading as well as how each parameter affected the impact of 
the others. Large buildings were impacted primarily by the leakage rate between rooms, 
although the recirculation of air had indirect effects. Small buildings had similar results, 
except that when the filtration efficiency was low, this filtration had the most direct 
impact. The study concluded after additional testing that in-room air cleaners could 
reduce the amount of the agent within a room (Hawkins et al., 2008). 
Michael A. Stoto, at Georgetown University, and Lindsey Morse, from Harvard 
University, assessed public health preparedness in the NCR by analyzing surveillance 
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efforts. The study noted that several programs are in place in the region to survey for 
diseases, including ESSENCE II, a regional surveillance system developed by the Johns 
Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL); the NCR Syndromic 
Surveillance Network, composed of epidemiological information from Maryland, 
Virginia, and Washington, D.C.; and the Regional Incident Communication and 
Coordination System developed by the COG. Despite these numerous attempts for 
interoperability, the study found is still a tendency for D.C. officials to only contact state 
health departments when attempting to spread information, while other nearby local 
health departments contact whichever health departments are relevant (Stoto & Morse, 
2008). The wide array of systems and designated regions and actors makes a single, 
standard chain-of-command difficult to establish, although standardization is encouraged. 
The CDC manages the LRN, a nationwide system of laboratories with pathogen-
testing capabilities. Prior to 2001, the CDC, FBI, and Association of Public Health 
Laboratories assembled the LRN, which now incorporates state and local labs testing 
BioWatch (Shea & Lister, 2003). The LRN includes roughly 150 laboratories and can 
provide presumptive, but not confirmed, results for anthrax testing in about four hours. 
LRN personnel maintain communication with the CDC and other overseeing agencies in 
order to quickly relay results, in which case HHS and FBI pass on the information to 
numerous officials. 
On the local level, the Maryland Board of Public Works approved design of a new 
state public health laboratory by the state’s Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 
(MD DHMH) in January, 2010 (Dance, 2010). This and other lab developments can be 
incorporated into the response protocols. 
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In 2001, perception of the threat of anthrax increased with the Amerithrax attacks, 
the distribution of multiple letters with traces of anthrax spores to targets in American 
government and media. Performed in the wake of the September 11 attacks, the 2001 
anthrax attacks further fueled fear of terrorism committed by religious extremists. 
Though there were only five envelopes sent out during this time, the attacks infected 22 
people and claimed the lives of 5 of them. Another 31 people tested positive for exposure 
and 10,000 more underwent prophylaxis for the bacteria. Seven buildings on Capitol Hill 
and 35 mail facilities were contaminated. The FBI launched an extensive investigation 
into the attacks, analyzing everything from the spores to the handwriting of the letters. 
The FBI eventually pinpointed Dr. Bruce Edwards Ivins, a biodefense researcher at Fort 
Detrick, as a primary suspect. Even with warning signs of psychological and mental 
health problems, Dr. Ivins still had access to dangerous biochemical agents. Even though 
the investigation was inconclusive, evidence shows that there was a lack in security and 
psychological examination in government and military employment, leading to possible 
security leaks (DoJ, 2010). 
Alexander Garza, Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs and Chief Medical 
Officer at DHS and former Director of Military Programs for the ER One Institute at the 
Washington Hospital Center, presented the biodefense programs of DHS. He stressed the 
importance of both experience and preparation, especially considering the number of 
lives that could be lost and the easy access to weapons (Garza, 2010). He noted that 
although the H1N1 virus was not very lethal, it did much to affect various industries and 
operations, from travel to workforce protection. Garza outlined three specific aspects of 
the DHS strategy. Technological advancement and innovation was the first component. 
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Special attention was given to the BioWatch program. Although it has done much to 
improve detection, the necessary testing must be streamlined. Garza then brought up the 
importance of expanding partnerships, especially partnering with FEMA and holding 
drills and annual discussion meetings. His final point was the combination of the former 
two, the synthesis of technology and partnerships. He noted that networks for plant, 
animal, and environmental health are all independent, and that they must complement 
each other and work together for researchers. This synthesis must be continued on down 
even to the state level. 
2.2.3 Determination of a Response 
An anthrax attack can be suspected through many possibilities. The first pathway 
would be that of direct observation, where an attack would be witnessed, and thus the 
authorities would immediately be contacted. The second pathway is a BAR, in which 
LRN directors, HEPRA, and local authorities part of the BioWatch Advisory Committee 
deem a BioWatch result a threat. The third is by the “astute physician,” when a doctor 
recognizes that a patient may be infected with anthrax, and tests the patient for the 
pathogen. Finally, the last pathway is syndromic surveillance. All of these possibilities 
lead to various paths to decision-making, as we have covered in our Models of 
Interaction in Appendix B.  
Ultimately, if an attack is suspected, a conference call is initiated that occurs 
among several health, emergency, and law enforcement authorities. It is on that 
conference call that a course of action is decided. In all likelihood, ESF #8 would be 
activated, leading to a full activation of emergency response by both the federal and local 
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governments. The phase surrounding this conference call is filled with ambiguity and 
issues with chain of response, as the studies above have alluded.  
The CDC released the Public Health Emergency Response Guide for State, Local, 
and Tribal Public Health Directors, version 2.0 in April of 2011. It is intended to assist 
public health professionals in starting response within the first 24 hours of a crisis, to be 
used in tandem with existing plans and procedures. Like most plans in use today, the 
guide (CDC, 2011) conforms to the processes of the NRF and NIMS. It begins with a list 
of assumptions for preparedness, including the establishment of close working 
relationships with various actors, from local medical care providers and law enforcement 
to private businesses and academic institutions, and the development of objectives for 
response and systems for surveillance. The guide gives a detailed timeline of response. 
Immediate response, which happens in the first 2 hours, involves situational assessment, 
including affected geographical areas and critical infrastructures and consideration of 
other response organization, contact with key health personnel from administration, 
epidemiology, and medical staff, developing initial objectives, and participation in the 
nearest EOC. Immediate response, which takes place up to 6 hours after the beginning of 
a crisis, involves verification of operating health surveillance systems and laboratories, 
consideration of special needs citizens and volunteers, and updating of initial risk 
communication messages. Further response from 6 to 12 hours involves the collection 
and analysis of data available through surveillance and labs, the preparation of said data 
for coming assistance, and the assessment of health resource needs. The rest of the 
response period involves addressing the needs of mental and behavioral health support 
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and preparing for transition to the next stage, whether it be extended operations or 
disengagement. 
The Kansas Department of Health and Environment has established a set of 
guidelines for investigating bioterrorism that can be used regardless of geographic 
location (KDHE, 2010). The document stresses the need for an educated public in order 
to reduce the time for decision-making and initiate the response. The document also lists 
a set of protocols for the general public and officials to investigate anthrax, which include 
diagnosing the disease, finding the source, identifying additional cases, determining 
public health concern, controlling/preventing further outbreak, communicating, and 
educating as well as distributing a number of prescriptions and vaccinations. The plan 
also stresses the need for interoperable communication between emergency personnel, 
police, National Guard, media, political leaders, and the general public. Plans on several 
levels of government suggest a similar need for coordination. 
2.2.4 Responding 
Many of the actors during a response would communicate through radio and 
conference calls, and programs such as the Homeland Security Information Network 
(HSIN) and Web EOC. However, not every actor has a presence in all of these means of 
communication. 
The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) contains prophylaxis and medical 
supplies with the purpose of being distributed in times of public health emergencies on a 
massive scale. The CDC has authority over the SNS, but each state and Washington, D.C. 
has an allotment that it can request to the CDC for distribution during an emergency. 
DCDOH also has its own allotment of supplies that could be used to treat responders 
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prior to the distribution of the SNS. Following the distribution of SNS to PODs, 
employees of the DCDOH, the volunteer agency DC Responds, the MRC, and various 
private sector charities such as the American Red Cross would help to dispense the 
prophylaxis to the public. Potential contacts, casualties, and missing persons would be 
tabulated and recorded. Meanwhile, in accordance with ESF #8, private sector actors and 
the United States Postal Service (USPS) could have individuals deliver prophylaxis to the 
homes of people who may be disabled or otherwise unable to go to a nearby POD. 
PODs would allow for a single member of a family to come and pick up medicine 
and information. The families would know where to go because of public announcements 
initiated by HSEMA. It is also likely that all government employees would be made 
aware through announcements by the Office of Personnel Management and 
announcements through government channels. 
 State and federal officials agree that when an emergency response is required, 
medicines will be dispensed within 12 hours (CDC, 2008). The CRI encourages a 48-
hour deadline to establish PODs at 72 CRI cities and distribute prophylaxis antibiotics 
and counter-measures throughout the country, with the prophylaxis supplies coming from 
the SNS (Hupert et al., 2009; Prevention, 2010). If the POD network is found to be 
inadequate in servicing all of the population in need, the USPS will be authorized to 
expedite the POD distribution of supplies (CDC, 2004). 
New efforts have been made to prepare physicians for treating patients during an 
attack. The CDC developed online educational resources to help doctors identify anthrax 
and other potential bioterrorist agents, and studies showed significant improvement in 
diagnosis and management of all diseases (Cosgrove et al., 2005). The study was limited 
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to physicians with interest in learning about bioterrorism and it did not address long-term 
retention. Nevertheless, it showed the new focus on improving the response to 
bioterrorism on the most direct level and the potential for medical professionals to speed 
up the response if properly trained. 
A quantitative analysis also exists for the CRI where a time-transition model was 
utilized to describe the dynamic interaction between the progression of B. anthracis 
symptoms and the rate of dispensing and utilizing prophylaxis under CRI guidelines. 
Using a multitude of parameters, the model produced detrimental results for the 
hypothetical post exposed population if the CRI campaign is delayed or not coordinated 
properly (Hupert et al., 2009). Research was also performed utilizing models taking into 
account the pattern of airborne spore dispersion, disease progression, and queuing 
systems for prophylaxis and hospital care. The results of the models addressed concerns 
in the response from a need for more aggressive prophylaxis campaign to a need for 
responder training (Wein et al., 2003). 
Kathleen Sebelius, HHS Secretary, presented the HHS’s take on Biopreparedness 
(Sebelius, 2010). She began her term as Secretary with the H1N1 scare, giving a detailed 
description of the steps taken to mitigate disaster. HHS’s supervision of CDC and 
coordination with NIH was of the utmost importance, with the CDC managing the receipt 
of lab kits by public health labs, and the NIH co-developing a vaccine. The state and local 
levels were instrumental in the distribution of the vaccine. Sebelius expressed that they 
were “lucky,” especially since they had a new system in place, noting that “over-
prediction” may have led to success. She noted that CDC reports indicated recent 
progress, from health departments to labs, but ultimately, vaccination rests with scientists 
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on the field and doctors with vaccines. Even with progress, much remains to be done. She 
advised that more investments be made in countermeasures. Some of the fundamental 
problems rest in the dated technologies for vaccines, many not updated since the 1950s. 
In the years since, new ideas had been dropped and investment, especially from the 
private sector. In the end, much work must be done in innovating both vaccines and 
equipment. Sebelius outlined further plans, from upgrading the regulatory science 
pipeline to creating a non-profit corporation to provide support to and make investments 
in small medical companies. 
Outside of the NCR, other efforts for emergency preparedness have demonstrated 
the developing capabilities of relevant actors and the general public. In Tucson, Arizona, 
a 2002 conference and training exercise included analysis of a multi-level response to an 
emergency (Caid, 2003). Over 500 of the attendees were from fire departments, police 
agents, physicians, pharmacists, private citizens, and private sector business across the 
United States. The CDC, U.S. Public Health Service, state and local emergency 
management and health departments, and people from as far away as Hawaii and 
Kazakhstan attended as well. The specific exercise involved a covert biological release in 
Mesa, Arizona, and an intentional anthrax release in Tucson. MRC volunteers and the 
Arizona National Guard worked with the community to receive, store, and stage (RSS) 
the “push-packages” shipped from the SNS. The participants intended to process 1,000 
people during a six-hour clinic, and they managed to process 2,015 with the knowledge 
that they could have served as many as 10,000 given the same parameters. The exercise 
demonstrated capabilities and discrepancies, and such exercises give remarkable insight 
regarding a jurisdiction’s emergency preparedness. 
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2.3 Information Technology 
Both the government and the private sector have made efforts to enhance 
information-sharing through innovation. On the government level, multiple agencies have 
been developing and discussing implementation of Virtual USA (vUSA), a government 
effort to unify all coordination and communication while maintaining the necessary 
security. Stakeholders believe that in order for vUSA to be effective, it must create 
visuals for the geographic locations of jurisdictional emergency vehicles actively 
participating in a response as well as provide tracking of mutual aid equipment calls that 
involve interjurisdictional cooperation (NCR Geospatial Data Exchange 2011). vUSA has 
not been implemented officially in the NCR, but it has been tested in other parts of the 
U.S. More specifically, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate has operated a pilot 
version in Virginia, where vUSA “has reduced response times to incidents involving 
hazardous materials by 70 percent” (National Public Safety Telecommunications 
Council, 2011). Discussions regarding security clearance for specific pieces of 
information and linking multiple components of the response protocols (epidemiology, 
hospital care, criminal investigation, prophylaxis dispensing, etc.) continue with the hope 
of eventually using vUSA in the NCR. 
The private sector has also provided innovative options for information-sharing 
purposes. IBM has a number of IT systems and products that have aided military efforts 
and could possibly contribute to civilian causes. Service oriented architecture (SOA) 
equally delivers information relevant to decision-making to people on scene (e.g., in 
battle) and to those in the office (IBM, 2009). The goal is to establish interoperability 
among previously separate systems and transition from “need to know” to “duty to share” 
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(IBM, 2008). Productive IT must provide real-time, authentic, and relevant information 
to its users. In order for IT to have a significant impact, changes in equipment must be 
complemented by changes in the processes and procedures necessary for using them 
(IBM, 2004). Technological innovation that cannot be used serves little purpose in the 
effort to improve timeliness, coordination, and communication. 
Other efforts to improve information sharing include the Geo-spatial Common 
Operating Picture (GEOCOP) which we have learned about from one of our IT systems 
contact. GEOCOP is a website that integrates social networks in real-time to provide 
actors with updates within five minutes. The site has thirty-second reporting capabilities 
and has both an unsecured interface for the general public and a secure interface for the 
U.S. This private sector innovation can either be viewed as support or competition to 
existing information-sharing systems, and can be compared to Virtual USA. TACTrend is 
another website used by 500 police agencies as well as public health, medical, and 
military personnel to see and reveal information. While all IT innovations can be 
considered improvements by different experts, the users must have established 
identification keys in order to maintain credibility while using an IT product. Another 
potential problem is power failure during an incident. If there is no phone or Internet 
during an anthrax attack, the response effort faces severe problems and delays from 
detection to prophylaxis. One IT product attempting to address this issue is the flyaway 
kit, which connects as many as ten IP addresses from laptops to a satellite. Such 
technology has just been developed and is not currently in use while other projects may 




2.4 Quantitative Models for Team BIOCOUNTER 
2.4.1 Plan for Team BIOCOUNTER 
 In preparing for our research, we examined methods by which the team could test 
out the recommendations developed in SSM. These quantitative methods mostly involved 
graphing and mapping the spread of an anthrax dispersal cloud. Doing so would help the 
team more fully understand the scope and consequences of an aerosolized anthrax attack, 
from the range of infection to the chance of massive casualties. For this, we researched 
various plume modeling programs, as well as equations to determine the chance of 
infection among the population given the amount of anthrax released. 
We also researched a method by which we could easily and accurately depict a 
visual representation of the entire system of interactions among the various actors 
involved in response and investigation. For this, we were directed to graph theory, a 
mathematical method of organizing data into an organized visual representation. In a 
visual representation, in addition to displaying the information, we sought to organize the 
data in tiers and groups, visualizing specific relationships and determining the more 
important agencies, which of course would have the most connections in the graph. 
Furthermore, we ran different algorithms to determine the shortest and most frequent 
subpaths between actors. 
The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
(START) is an academic institution centered at the University of Maryland, College Park. 
It was established in 2005 with the express purpose of researching the various fields and 
issues involved the study of terrorism, from methods and means to psychological 
profiling and community action (START, 2010). START provides a number of articles 
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and research projects on bioterrorism, as well as healthcare and communication studies in 
response to an attack. 
START also hosts the Global Terrorism Database, a service that provides basic 
information on all terrorist attacks from 1970 to the present, offering a wide range of 
information for each attack, from the perpetrator and target to the method and means 
(GTD, 2012). The site also provides these statistics using very organized visual 
representations. We gathered basic information on past anthrax attacks from this 
database. 
2.4.2 HYSPLIT 
HYSPLIT is a dispersion model developed by the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration. HYSPLIT can map the trajectory of airborne particles. 
Other models discussed included the CALPUFF model. However, due to CALPUFF’s 
steep learning curve and non-user-friendly interface, HYSPLIT was chosen due to its 
functionality and user-friendliness. 
2.4.3 ArcGIS 
ArcGIS is a mapping program developed by ESRI, a company dedicated to the 
development of geographical information systems. We chose this program to map 
because of the level of detail that ArcGIS is capable of producing, which would help us 
map changes on a smaller scale, as well as the ease of access, as opposed to more 
expensive programs. 
2.4.4 Graph Theory 
The numerous local, state, and federal agencies, private sector actors, individuals, 
plans, technologies, and systems have specific roles in prevention, detection, 
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investigation, decision-making, and response to an aerosolized anthrax. In order to best 
represent all of these people and resources, BIOCOUNTER has implemented graph 
theory in order to offer an organized visual representation of the interactions among 
actors during all phases: detection, investigation, decision-making, and response. Each 
entity is represented as a node, and their communications and superiors are represented 
by edges that connect the nodes accordingly. Using a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to 
represent all of the information as a matrix, the graph was constructed using the program 
yEd Graph Editor. Analysis of the graph involved distinguishing which sets of actors 
interact with one another in some capacity and identifying paths that may not include 
certain relevant agencies (Trudeau, 1993). BIOCOUNTER used the analysis to identify 
discrepancies in the real-world response protocols. 
2.4.5 MATLAB 
MATLAB is a mathematical computing program that allows users to design and 
run M-files. These M-files can include mathematical functions, algorithms, and input data 
from matrices. MATLAB can, therefore, analyze our matrix used for the graph and 
determine subpaths between actors and the most frequent subpaths possible. 
2.5. Summary 
The literature review provided insight regarding detection technologies and 
methods, investigative protocols, federal and localized policies guiding decision-making, 
and forms of response. By understanding the history of the anthrax threat and studying 
both current protocols and the principles behind them, we were able to develop rich 
pictures and root definitions of the current system and idealized models of interactions. 







3.1  Overview of Soft Systems Methodology 
       We found Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) to be the most appropriate 
methodology with which to conduct this study. Researchers utilize this methodology to 
describe and understand complex issues, specifically those that involve managing 
multiple human parties. These parties can hold multiple perspectives of various issues 
relating to the system, and can have many problems involving the multiple interactions 
throughout the system. These are true for the case of counter-terrorist methods; there is a 
different method of response for each actor (although they may resemble one another) 
that can cause confusion within the interaction. Mingers (2009) states that SSM addresses 
“messes” that require improvement rather than traditional scientific inquiries that usually 
require both a simpler solution and mathematical calculations. 
SSM consists of seven steps, as Figure 3.1 demonstrates: (1) describing the 
problem situation, focusing on its history and scope; (2) forming a rich picture of the 
issue at hand, and understanding how parties perceive other parties (Checkland, 2000); 
(3) establishing the root definition, or the brief description of the system in which it 
includes what, why, and how the system operates (Ibid.); (4) developing models of 
interactions between the multiple parties involved in the process,  based on the root 
definitions; (5) using the models as a guide to relate the rich picture to the root 
definitions, and clarify discrepancies in the system; (6) determining what changes will be 
feasible and desirable; and (7) reaching an agreement with all parties to adopt new 





Figure 3.1 – Soft Systems Methodology (Ho & Sculli, 1994) 
 
The first two steps of SSM are largely complementary. The problem situation in 
step one refers to a list of real world issues, which are then expressed in the form of a 
“messy” sketch, the rich picture. The methodology then switches from the real world to 
systems-thinking (Checkland, 2000). Here, the problem situations are condensed into a 
series of root definitions that are defined through their place in the system. Systems-
thinking continues during the process of modeling the concepts of the root definition. The 
interviews that we conducted with individual actors were used to advise steps one 
through four, as well as to compare with the resulting models of interaction. In SSM, 
however, the models are primarily compared to the problem situation, in the real world. 
Feasible and desirable changes are then made based off discrepancies found in these 
comparisons, leading to the final step, taking action. 
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A central part of SSM is referred to as the acronym CATWOE: Customers, 
Actors, Transformation, Weltanschauung, Owner, and Environment.  CATWOE supplies 
the guidelines on which the root definitions, and thus the entire methodology, rely. When 
looking at a mess, CATWOE provides a means to analyze the systems objectively. The 
customer of each goal was the party that benefits from the accomplishment of the goal. 
The actor of each goal was the party who facilitates the accomplishment of the goal. The 
transformation was the description of the state of things from the start point to the 
achievement of the goal. The Weltanschauung described the worldview of the goal; in a 
sense, it was the context of the goal. The owner was the single party to whom the 
achievement of the goal could be ultimately attributed. Finally, the environment consisted 
of the factors that affect but do not control the achievement of the goal, such as financial 
and ethical constraints. The use of CATWOE will be further explained throughout this 
chapter. 
3.2 This Study’s Methodology 
For our study, we amended SSM to include elements of graph theory and 
computer simulations. As displayed in Table 3.2, we included instruments of graph 
theory subsequent to formulating the standard root definition of SSM, and prior to 
designing the standard models of interaction. We also included computer simulations 
following the models of interaction and prior to the comparisons. Each step of our study 
will be elaborated further in this chapter. In addition to these chronological steps, we also 
conducted numerous interviews throughout the course of this study. Our interview 
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Figure 3.2 – Analysis Schematic 
 
We also constructed an analysis schematic (Figure 3.2) to further integrate the 
SSM as we continued our research. The main two areas of focus were (1) the actual setup 
of the response process between the numerous agencies involved as it is now, and (2) the 
science behind an aerosolized anthrax release that led into the creation of our simulation 
models. For the first area, study of the “as-is” situation came from interviews with key 
individuals well as extensive literature review. These would then go into constructing our 
rich pictures network of shortest paths between the interconnection agencies ), and our 
root definitions. The lattermost aided in construction our models of interaction and CPA 
of all of the interagency intercommunication, and the conceptual model of desirable and 
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feasible changes for a more apt and streamlined response process. For the second, all of 
these scientific fields contributed to our understanding of how anthrax spores affect the 
body, how they travel across a large area over a 5-day period, and how meteorological 
patterns affect said travel. All of these were critical to the construction of our numerous 
simulation models. 
3.3 Problem Situation 
Based on existing research such as the ominous World At Risk report (Graham & 
Talent, 2008) and the expertise of inside actors we’ve spoken to, it was clear at the 
beginning of our research that we were dealing with what Checkland would consider a 
mess. We recognized that multiple adjustments could potentially be made to improve 
response time and coordination among actors. 
We addressed what has been identified as the inefficiency of ready emergency 
response during an aerosolized anthrax attack (Hupert et al., 2009). With a lack of a clear 
chain of command that was expressed to us by a few of our interviewees, and poor 
coordination (Bush, 2004), this could potentially slow response time and place people at 
higher risk in the event of an attack. 
When determining our problem situation, we made a list of twelve potential 
problems relating to the response to an aerosolized anthrax attack. To gather this list, we 
explored our literature review for known examples of issues pertaining to the topic, 
conducted our first interviews and searched for discrepancies among written response 
plans. These problems included the following: 
 Redundant notifications of emergency events, 
● Lack of communication at certain levels of the chain of command, 
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● Miscommunication at different levels leading to misunderstandings or false 
information, 
● Lack of understanding of role capacity and responsibilities, 
● Overlapping of role responsibilities, 
● Lack of standardized guidelines among varying actors for a particular situation, 
● Confusion as to who takes the lead or incident command in certain situations, 
● Inconsistency in risk communication leading to public confusion as well as 
disrupted agency operations, 
● Detection not rapid enough to elicit a response within 48 hours of exposure, 
● Not enough time to perform prophylaxis for a large area or from repeated attacks, 
● Cuts in funding thus changing logistics to adapt to new budget, 
● Volunteers for POD sites who are not committed at all times 
This large list had included many similar issues, and the sheer size of the list 
presented what could be an unmanageable situation for us to tackle. To move to the next 
step, the rich picture, we needed to decrease the number of problems we initially 
identified. As a result, we were able to sort many of the problems into more general 
issues, which resulted in the following list: 
● Inefficient and unclear lines of communication and control among actors 
● Managing interactions among agencies, volunteers, and the private sector 






3.4 Information Gathering Interviews 
In order to gather enough information to design the rich picture in the next step of 
our methodology, and later the models of interaction, we spent twelve months 
comprehensively researching the details and interactions of the numerous actors involved 
in emergency planning, management, and response of such an attack. First, we read 
several academic papers detailing and evaluating current response plans and past 
responses, and numerous response plans drafted by federal, state, and local agencies.  
Second, we made many contacts with the aforementioned individual actors, and 
conducted both informal and informational interviews with them. 
Prior to conducting our interviews, we submitted an application to the University 
of Maryland institutional review board to ensure that our interviews would be approved 
by this university. The response we received stated that we did not need official approval 
of the board, as our research did not use personal information for our data. 
We made contacts with individual actors through various means. First, we 
contacted many experts whose work we had previously found and reviewed. Through this 
means of contact, we were able to get in touch with an author of the CDC field guide for 
an anthrax attack. The second means was through personal contact. Our mentor, Dr. 
Jeffrey Herrmann, was able to get us in contact with a program manager at the 
Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services. Personal connections 
we already had with some experts allowed us to speak to officials in the Maryland House 
of Delegates, the FBI, MedStar Health, and Johns Hopkins Hospital. Additionally, we 
attended the Northern Virginia Medical Reserve Corp monthly meeting in August 2011, 
where we came into contact with officials from the Virginia Department of Health. 
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Finally, we were able to contact the majority of our interviewees directly. Actors that we 
contacted in this way included officials and experts in the Maryland Department of 
Health and Mental Hygiene (MD DHMH), CDC, the Alexandria Department of Health, 
the Laboratory Response Network (LRN), the Frederick County Health Department, the 
District of Columbia Fire Department, the Washington Regional Threat and Analysis 
Center (WRTAC), the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, the MRC, the 
D.C. Homeland Security Emergency Management Agency (HSEMA), the Montgomery 
County Department of Health and Human Services Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness and Response Program, and the D.C. Health Emergency Preparedness and 
Response Administration (HEPRA). We also spoke to an expert on NIMS, a senior 
epidemiologist for the Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Servicesh, 
and an IT systems expert at HMS Technologies. In addition, we received additional input 
from subject-matter experts from Rutgers University and the Wyatt Technology 
Corporation. 
Most interviews occurred over the phone, but a number were executed in person. 
We asked each interviewee prior to his or her interview for permission to record the 
interview. If the interviewee denied the request, we took thorough notes of the interview. 
The vast majority of interviews were recorded, however, and subsequently transcribed. 
During the interviews, we asked questions specifically selected for the position of the 
respective interviewee. Generally, however, we used a series of standard questions for 
most of the interviews: 
● What is your official title and what are your main duties? 
● What do you do on a daily basis for your position 
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● How and in what way would your agency/organization/department be involved in 
the response to an aerosolized anthrax attack? 
● Could you guide us through a time-referenced explanation of you and your 
agency/organization/department’s activities when you are notified of a possible 
aerosolized anthrax attack? 
● What is your main means of communications within your 
agency/organization/department and with other actors on a regular basis, as well 
as during an emergency? 
● Are there any lingering issues you have witnessed in your capacity, including, but 
not limited to, issues with communication or chain of command? 
We asked certain interviewees questions that we wrote as a reflection of publicly 
released response protocols and plans, including their role in certain planning and 
response exercises. 
An issue we did not anticipate with our interviewees was the departure of officials 
from their positions subsequent to the interviews. Two vital emergency response officials 
within the D.C. government left their positions within six months of their respective 
interviews. We contacted their offices to discuss changes with their respective agencies, 
but both of their interim replacements were unwilling to speak to us. 
3.5 Rich Pictures 
After gathering as much information as feasibly possible from literature review 
and the interviews, we created a visual representation of the response protocols in the 
form of an overarching rich picture and three sub-rich pictures. The rich pictures were a 
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means by which we could display the environment in which the problem situation would 
arise. 
The rich pictures marked the entry of the methodology from the real world to 
systems-thinking. In this respect, they did not require elaborate details, but instead 
sketched the overall relationship among actors. We paid close attention to the structure, 
processes, climate, people, conflicts and issues surrounding the problem situation. 
Specifically, as our topic of study had three main realms—detection, investigation 
and decision-making, and response—we split our rich pictures correspondingly.  Within 
each realm, which we placed in chronological order, we inserted sketches of general 
departments, agencies, and concepts, which would then feed into larger actors. We 
represented this feed with arrows. These three categories were displayed by each of the 
sub-rich pictures. The overarching rich picture provided an overall schematic of the 
current process that would occur from pathogen release to prophylaxis dispensing. Our 
rich pictures had the ability to display a coherent visualization of the complicated mess. 
3.6 Graph Theory 
We used several different applications of graph theory in the course of this study. 
Firstly, the models of interaction we constructed were based on preliminary diagrams that 
we formed with the software yEd and NodeXL. Secondly, by analyzing these preliminary 
diagrams with graph theory, we were able to use the results of our analysis to assist later 
in determining feasible and desirable changes to the system. 
We consulted University of Maryland professors Dr. Justin Wyss-Gallifent of the 
Department of Mathematics and Dr. Michelle Girvan of the Department of Physics for 
guidance with regard to graph theory. Upon their guidance, we first compiled all of the 
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information about the system we could gather into a single Microsoft Word document, 
and converted the information into a 401 by 401 grid Microsoft Excel matrix  (our 
number of actors totaled 401). Each actor that is involved in emergency response—
agency, department, and individual—is represented in one of the 401 columns and rows. 
This document then marked communications among these departments. Each 
communication that occurred between a selected row and column—two actors—was 
represented in the corresponding cell with a “1.” All other cells were then represented 
with a “0.” The matrix also provided directionality of communication. As shown in Table 
3.6, a cell in row “m” and column “n” with a “1” indicates that entity “m” communicates 
with entity “n.” This communication was not necessarily mutual. In order to establish 
mutual communication, the cell in row “n” and column “m” would also need a “1.” 
 
Sample Matrix M n 
m 0 1 
n 1 0 
  
Table 3.6 – Matrix with Directed Communication 
 
yEd and NodeXL have the ability to form graphic visualizations of large systems. 
We used both of these programs to display the interactions that would occur among 
actors during the preparedness planning, detection, investigation, decision-making, and 
response to an aerosolized anthrax attack, as they both had advantages. Both yEd and 
NodeXL accessed the Microsoft Excel matrix and represented every actor as a 
node/vertex on a graph. These programs converted the numeral indications of interactions 
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within the matrix (“1” and “0” data entries) into directed edges between appropriate 
nodes. 
yEd is a free application capable of generating high-quality diagrams (“yEd 
Graph Editor,” 2012). The diagram it created emphasizes overall interactions, and 
showed us a basic outline of how truly messy the system is. NodeXL is another, similar 
diagram generating program that works within Microsoft Excel to provide a graph of the 
data (“NodeXL,” 2012). Through grouping clusters together, we were able to divide the 
graph into smaller sub-sections to look at specific areas in the response process. 
We later used graph theory analysis to obtain relevant information regarding the 
response protocols, e.g. NRF and NIMS. First, yEd and NodeXL ran “betweenness 
centrality” analysis on the graph. Betweenness centrality weighs each node based on the 
number of occurrences it appears within a path connecting two end nodes provided that 
the “between” node is not one of these “end” nodes. The nodes with the most occurrences 
were assigned the greatest weight, emphasizing its necessity within the network. By use 
of the Microsoft Excel matrix and MATLAB (version 7.12.0.635) via the University of 
Maryland A. James Clark Virtual Computer Lab, we were able to write an M-file to find 
the shortest path between any two selected nodes. The M-file implemented Dijkstra’s 
Shortest Path Algorithm (Kirk, 2007). Our manipulation of this algorithm incorporated an 
“adjacency matrix” comma separated values (CSV) file that had only the binary code of 
directed communication, a separate CSV file with a list of corresponding entity names, 
and an output that identified the number of nodes in the shortest path, their order, and 
their names. Our shortest path M-file determined the path between two particular nodes 
that required the fewest number of total nodes; however, this file did include “end” nodes 
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in the analysis even though betweenness centrality did not. This algorithm provided 
quantitative analysis of which actors can contact one another directly and if not, who else 
must be involved to establish communication or relay information. 
Next, we developed another M-file that could sort all subpaths by number of 
nodes and frequency. We wanted to see the five most frequent subpaths of each possible 
length. The output provided the number of possible occurrences of each stated subpath 
and listed the nodes in chronological order. Since these subpaths were determined based 
on mathematical possibility, some paths were expected to have relatively high 
frequencies compared to expectations. The longest subpath(s) identified by this M-file 
represented the diameter of the graph. Complicated networks need the diameter to be as 
small as possible to ensure efficient communication. All of the quantitative data from the 
graph and M-files were used to compare with other components of the research, and we 
were able to use these comparisons to identify previously subtle discrepancies and 
propose feasible and desirable changes. 
3.7 Root Definitions 
The root definitions are a group of underlying goals to be achieved during the 
course of the mess. In order to form the most thorough root definitions possible, we 
needed to organize our researched information. For every piece of studied literature, we 
made notes containing information relevant to the communications among actors. 
Likewise, we transcribed the interviews with subject-matter experts, which revealed 
important connections among relevant actors. Information from notes and transcriptions 
were organized by hazards, time, departments/agencies/regions, methods of protection, 
and supplies/programs into a single Microsoft Word document, with a supplementary 
64 
 
document for additional interviews and pieces of literature examined after the first round 
of sorting. This compilation of all relevant facts allowed for a second sorting of 
information. All relevant facts pertaining to a particular organization, individual, plan, or 
system were placed under a heading for their respective entity. This single document 
contained all connections among actors for the purposes of transmitting qualitative and 
quantitative data. This database served both as a reference point in the formation of the 
root definitions and the basis of a Microsoft Excel matrix we later used in our 
applications of graph theory. 
After compiling our database, we set out to define our goals. We applied 
CATWOE to each goal. The result was the description one broad goal in saving lives, 
and three descriptive goals that were part of the first. 
3.8 Models of interaction 
3.8.1 Overview 
Models of interaction display how the actors would respond and interact with 
each other during the anthrax response if every procedure were followed ideally. Our 
models include information about how actors interact with one another, the procedures 
each actor follows, and how all actors involved with the response process rely on others 
in order to perform their associated tasks. 
Based on the visual aids we constructed with our rich picture, yED, and NodeXL, 
we were able to easily construct four models of interaction, one for each root definition. 
As our models are each based off of one of the five root definitions, the specialized 
diagrams formed by NodeXL were particularly helpful. 
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In the formation of our models of interaction, we included all involved actors. We 
represented interactions with arrows pointing from one actor toward the actor to which 
the original actor reports. We also included time estimations for each interaction. These 
time estimates were based on required maximum time limits for certain interactions, 
originating in official response plans, as well as estimated timeframes we learned during 
our information gathering interviews. 
The models were designed using Microsoft Project, which allowed us to easily 
display the data as a Gantt chart. We also included CATWOE information on each task 
along the chart. Model 1, based on the root definition to “save lives,” was essentially a 
comparison of response times calculated in the other models with information acquired 
from the computer simulations. Specifically, it compared a single simulation from the 
Total D.C. Sick Hourly computer simulation with the response scenarios examined in the 
models of interaction. 
3.8.2 Primary Discrepancy Identification 
While the focal point for identifying issues related to an attack’s response would 
be during the comparison step of our methodology, we did begin to identify some 
discrepancies as we formed our models of interaction. We listed the independent actions 
each actor is capable of running and placed those activities on a timeline. From this 
timeline, we noted odd overlaps in responsibilities. We then rearranged the 
responsibilities listed on the timeline in a more logical and efficient fashion by paying 
special attention to overlapping arrows, as recommended by Checkland (2000). In this 
step, we noted the environment limitations for each action, as included in the CATWOE 
for the relevant root definition. These changes were simply primary attempts to identify 
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discrepancies, and were not our final conclusions. These discrepancies are referred to as 
primary because of the time at which they were identified, not because of the intensity or 
reach of the actual discrepancy.  
The following analysis recommendations by Checkland (2000) served as 
guidance during this step: 
1.     An ongoing purpose – For each action taken by these actors, we investigated each 
for their particular reason and how that contributes to the response process. 
2.     A means of assessing performance of the action – Determining how effectively and 
in what capacity all of these actions were in performing their described duty. 
3.     A decision-making process – Figuring out how each of these actions is triggered to 
occur, and how/where/when. 
4.     Components that also function as systems (sub-systems) – Each of the actions that 
happens subsequently. 
5.     Components that interact – How that particular action’s aspects and components 
interacted with others. 
6.     Environmental and area constraints – Built upon CATWOE, in how the environment 
and other limitations are imposed on the actor. 
7.     A boundary between the system and environment – Determining if there are 
limitations that exist that can separate the action from the environment it acts upon. 
8.     Resources required – Measuring the amount of resources, which includes funds, 
employees, as well as supplies, and how they contribute. 
9.     Continuity – What occurs afterwards? 
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We also maintained a document listing discrepancies as we came upon them 
throughout our research. This document included officials referring to outdated response 
plans, and discrepancies specifically pointed out by actors who we interviewed. 
3.8.3. Determining Critical Paths 
We rearranged our models based on root definitions into models based on release 
scenario in order to construct four complete chronological models. As it acted as the 
endpoint on each model, we only included information pertinent to the completion of the 
setup of PODs. This allowed us to determine the critical path in each scenario. After 
determination of critical paths, we focused especially on minimizing extraneous time 
spent on the tasks along the paths, during our subsequent analysis. 
3.9 Computer Simulations 
3.9.1   Overview 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are several studies that have examined 
aerosolized anthrax releases in Washington. While these studies focus on factors such as 
the expected number of casualties for a certain release of aerosolized anthrax, none of the 
studies present exactly what we require for our study. Our study is concerned with the 
decision-making of officials within the first several hours after an anthrax release. The 
actors will be getting data about the scale of the attack, as well as who exactly is at risk, 
during the CAP. Consequently, we developed a model that will predict on an hour-by-
hour basis the location of individuals who will begin experiencing symptoms of anthrax 
exposure, based on past meteorological data and varying release scenarios. 
Aside from BioWatch and intelligence, the only information actors will be able to 
access during a response is that which is acquired via syndromic surveillance. At the start 
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of our research, we concluded that in order to display information akin to that which 
would be supplied to the actors in an actual attack, we would need an active map that 
would mark in time the location of people who would begin to exhibit these symptoms. 
Results from this simulation were incorporated directly into our models of 
interaction. The models of interaction analyzed the response to an attack through a time 
by time basis; therefore, this simulation provides information as to what the actors might 




 Figure 3.9 – Simulation Overview 
 
Figure 3.9 demonstrates the simulation process for this study. Each simulation 
began with situational inputs that we entered into the launcher we formulated specifically 
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for these simulations. Into this program, we were able to enter dates and release points for 
the anthrax to be released, as well as other parameters, which we will further clarify in 
the results chapter of this paper. HYSPLIT created the concentration file through 
simulations that are put into a gridded cell form of latitude and longitude. These files 
were then passed to our Anthrax Incidence model, via the same launcher. The Anthrax 
Incidence model took the data from HYSPLIT and calculated the number of sick persons 
in each cell. The population of the cells originated from the US Gridded Census Data 
2010. The file generated by the model was a Comma-Separated Values (CSV) file, 
viewable as a spreadsheet in Microsoft Excel. Latitude, longitude, and hour are given for 
each ill person. ArcGIS took this file via a Python script and placed it on a visual map of 
Washington, as well as other affected parts of the East Coast. The map was then able to 
display the location of individuals who had become sick with reference to time. 
The basis for these simulations comes from specific case studies that we have 
gathered from our research. The first case study is the anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk, 
Russia. While the results of the accident were tragic, they still provide us with a wealth of 
information for our simulations, providing us with helpful meteorological and 
geographical data. They included data of incubation periods, number of people infected, 
the direction that the anthrax traveled in, and an expansion of previous research. The 
formula we used for our simulations was based off of research on the Sverdlovsk case 
study (Brookmeyer et al., 2005). We found that his model to be the most ideal and 
effective for our research. 
The first model designed in the Sverdlovsk case study was the competing risks 
model, which defined the cumulative attack probability function of disease, F(t), to be the 
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cumulative probability that a person develops disease in less than t days following 
exposure. Following this, they create a model for the incubation period distribution, 
defined as F(t). This resulted in the formula: 
            
   
   
                
  
There are three parameters described in the cumulative attack probability function 
shown in the above figure: the germination rate λ, the clearance rate θ, and the dose of 
inhaled spores D.  The function F(t) increases as either the dose or germination rate 
increases, or the clearance rate decreases. 
The research on these formulas also developed constants for us to use for our 
model. By using the estimate of the clearance rate derived from animal studies, the 
research was able to predict the incubation period of disease observed in humans in a low 
dose outbreak such as in Sverdlovsk. The median incubation period based on the 
competing risks probabilistic model with θ = 0.07 per day was 9.9 days. The germination 
rate λ was solved to be at 5 x 10
-6
. We incorporated the formula F(t), as well as the 
constants, in our simulation, which we used in our anthrax incidence model which will be 
discussed in Section 3.9.3. 
3.9.2       Dispersion Model 
One of our team members met with Dr. Tim Canty in the University of Maryland 
Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Science on a weekly basis during the summer 
of 2011 to discuss how to approach modeling the dispersion of anthrax in the atmosphere. 
We considered in an instantaneous release of anthrax, as opposed to a steady state model. 
According to the EPA’s recommendations, CALPUFF Modeling System is the preferred 
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model for a non-steady state dispersion model (CALPUFF, 2012). After researching 
CALPUFF, we found that the model had a steep learning curve and did not have a user 
friendly GUI. Because of this, we decided to use the HYSPLIT model. That same team 
member also attended a three-day HYSPLIT workshop hosted for the NOAA Air 
Resources Laboratory by Earth Resources Technology, to learn how to use the software. 
HYSPLIT is a comprehensive system for calculating aerosol trajectories within a 
dispersion simulation (HYSPLIT, 2012). The HYSPLIT program is capable of creating 
plume model simulations over a particular area and tracking the concentration of anthrax 
by latitude and longitude. It can then generate a CSV file showing the anthrax 
concentration after release over a gridded map at varying hours and days. 
The HYSPLIT model requires various pieces of information about the particular 
simulations in order to run successfully. For our HYSPLIT model, we used archived 
NAM12 meteorological wind pattern data, which is freely available for download in 
single day formats and can be found on HYSPLIT’s website. HYSPLIT also requires 
particle properties, release properties, and dispersion properties in order to trace proper 
trajectories. The particle properties describe the properties of anthrax, such as the size of 
an anthrax spore. The release properties describe the starting time, location, and amount 
of pollutant released. The dispersion properties adjust the options for the manner in which 
HYSPLIT runs its computations. HYSPLIT reads in dispersion properties from a SETUP 
file, and all of the other properties from a CONTROL file. For a complete list of the 
parameters that were kept constant for each simulation we ran, see Appendix D. 
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We performed a set of simulations, varying time of release, and amount of 
anthrax released. See Appendix D for a list of the parameters we varied. These 
simulations will be discussed in more depth in the results chapter of this paper. 
As described earlier in the flowchart, in order to automate the dispersion 
simulations, the HYSPLIT program was run from C++ instead of from its GUI. The C++ 
program is referred to as the “launcher.” The launcher allowed us to run many 
simulations in a row while changing one variable at a time. The launcher also ran the 
other components of our simulations such as the Anthrax Incidence Model. Through the 
launcher, the different components of the simulation can communicate with each other. 
The source code for the launcher can be found in Appendix D. 
3.9.3       Anthrax Incidence Model 
The results of the anthrax dispersion model were used in conjunction with the 
Gridded 2010 Census Data as data used by the Anthrax Incidence Model. This model 
analyzed each grid cell. Based on the number of people in each cell and the concentration 
of anthrax in the atmosphere at each specific time, the model calculated the point in 
elapsed time at what time each person in the grid cell developed symptoms. 
Although there are several pre-existing models of anthrax incubation and the 
chance of developing symptoms as a function of anthrax dosage, few of these models 
work for exactly our purposes. These models only provide a function that considers the 
amount of anthrax introduced to the body when determining whether a subject will 
develop symptoms. In our model, the anthrax was inhaled on an hourly basis, whereas the 
other models assume that all of the anthrax is inhaled at one instant.  As a result, we used 
Brookmeyer, Johnson, and Barry’s model of anthrax incubation as the basis of our model. 
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This model accounts for the biology of spore clearance and germination, and thus 
considers the introduction and exit of spores to and from the body. We were able to 
modify the model to account for anthrax inhaled at specific time intervals. 
The aforementioned equation for F(t) is a Poisson approximation to a binomial 
distribution. The equation equals 1 – the probability that no spores have germinated after 
a certain amount of time. Instead of considering a value of t on the order of our entire 
simulation, we considered only a small timestep ∆t. Therefore, F(∆t) gave the probability 
that at least one spore has germinated within the timestep). We used the function F(∆t) in 
a stochastic model of anthrax dispersion that is applied to an individual person. This 
model acted using the following algorithm: 
1 Determine how much anthrax D is in the body at the current time T. D changes 
with time, so it is assumed that D = D(T) 
2 Calculate the probability of getting sick in a certain timestep F(∆t) 
3 Generate a random number between 0 and 1 
4 Compare the random number to the probability F(∆t). 
5 If the random number is less than F(∆t), then a spore has germinated. In this case, 
the person will become sick and the algorithm ends 
6 Else, no spores have germinated. Therefore, increment T by ∆t, and go to step 1 
Step 1 was computed using the formulas below. These formulas assumed that all of the 
anthrax inhaled during a timestep was inhaled at the start of the timestep. 
 c(T, latitude, longitude) = anthrax concentration [pg/m^3]. This value has been 
determined from the dispersion model, and there is a value for each timestep, and 
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for each grid cell. For this set of equations, however, we only looked at a specific 
grid cell, so we will consider c(T). 
 breathing rate = volume of air inhaled per unit time [m^3/h] 
 spore weight = weight of an individual spore [pg] 
 ∆t = timestep [hours] 
 T = current time [hours] 
 SporesInhaled(T) = c(T) * (1 /spore weight) * breathing rate * ∆t   [spores] = 
number of spores inhaled at time T 
 SporesCleared(T) = D(T-∆t)*ϴ*∆t = number of spores leaving the body at time T 
 D(T) = D(T-∆t) + SporesInhaled(T)  - SporesCleared(T) = Total number of spores 
in the body at time T 
As this algorithm ran, there was a chance that all of the anthrax could have 
cleared before any germination. The probability that this would occur was given by 
            which Brookmeyer gives as the attack rate AR, where: 
          
   
  ϴ
   
For implementation purposes, we could only run the stochastic model for a finite 
amount of time. Since the focus of this study was the immediate response to an 
aerosolized anthrax attack, we could assign an end time to the stochastic model to 
determine if the person developed symptoms by the end time of the simulation. 
The stochastic model was applied to every person within a grid cell to create a 
binomial distribution. This binomial distribution algorithm looked at every person in a 




1 At the start of the simulation, everyone in the grid cell is not sick. The total 
number of people in the grid cell is given by the 2010 Census Data. 
2 Determine how much anthrax D is in the body at the current time T. D changes 
with time, so it is assumed that D = D(T) 
3 Calculate the probability of getting sick in a certain timestep F(∆t) 
4 For each person not yet sick in the grid cell at the start of this step 
a Generate a random number between 0 and 1 
b Compare the random number to the probability F(∆t). 
c If the random number is less than F(∆t), then a spore has germinated. In 
this case, the total number of people sick in the grid cell is incremented, 
and the total number of people not yet sick is decremented. In addition, the 
number of people who got sick at this hour in this grid cell is incremented. 
d Else, no spores have germinated 
5 Increment T by ∆t and go to step 2, unless there is no one not sick in the grid cell 
or T == end of simulation time, in which case end the algorithm 
 
The binomial distribution algorithm was applied to each grid cell that we 
analyzed. The results of one grid cell did not affect the results of another grid cell, and 
the binomial distribution was used to analyze each grid cell individually. The binomial 
distribution algorithm applied to every grid cell was our Anthrax Incidence Model. This 
model is implemented in Ruby, and the Ruby code for this is shown in Appendix D. 
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The end result of the Anthrax Incidence Model was a 3D array of people who 
became infected during the course of each simulation, based on grid cell latitude, grid cell 
longitude, and time. 
3.9.4       Mapping the Potentially Sick Population 
The Anthrax Incidence model generated a Comma-Separated Values (CSV) file 
that was passed along to ArcGIS. It was a geographic information systems program that 
was capable of putting a point on a map at the location for every person who could 
potentially become sick according to the CSV file (ESRI, 2012). These points are exact 
coordinates calculated along the latitude and longitude of each person. However, to 
prevent persons from overlapping with the same latitude and longitude, the Population 
Model adjusted the location’s latitude and longitude by a small, random amount between 
0 and 1, multiplied by 0.0083 (the size of each cell). We used this to visually demonstrate 
the effects of an anthrax attack on the population according to the simulations ran. 
3.9.5       Experiments 
The launcher program allowed us to keep most of the inputs constant and varying 
only the ones we want to vary individually. We specifically varied the date, amount, and 
location of anthrax release. We used 4 days and 4 varied amounts, and 1 location within 
Washington, D.C., resulting in 16 total simulations. A detailed list of variations can be 
found in Appendix C. 
3.9.6  Total D.C. Sick Hourly 
For use in Model 1, we made a case study in which we analyzed on an hourly basis 
how many people would be infected, roughly within the beltway. This specific study was 
referred to as “Total D.C. Sick Hourly.” 
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 We took as an example Simulation #7, the release on June 9, 9am 2010, 1kg release. 










W). We then plotted the number of people infected versus time for 
Simulation #7.  
3.10 Comparisons 
Because each of our models of interaction were based on a corresponding root 
definition, which in turn is a systems-thought representation of the real world, our models 
of interaction are part of systems-thought. Consequently, we were able to compare these 
models to the real world. 
When we approached our comparisons, we first determined and examined the 
critical paths in each model of interaction. We then compared the most important tasks on 
each critical path to the most interactive nodes on our yEd and NodeXL models, to search 
for major differences. Next, we compared the critical paths to our rich pictures, to see if 
the paths along the rich pictures actually corresponded to the critical paths. Finally, we 
examined Model 1, which was in and of itself a comparison of our models of interaction 
and our computer simulations. We named the discrepancies we identified in this phase 
the secondary discrepancies. Our secondary discrepancies are those that we identified as 
a result of comparisons, as opposed to through prior review. Secondary discrepancies are 
not any less important than primary discrepancies, and are so named because of the 
timing of their identification. The results of our comparisons gave us a large list of 
discrepancies between the real world and optimal efficiency, between actors, and within 
the overall system. 
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3.11 Feasible and Desirable Changes 
We considered both our primary and secondary discrepancy identifications to 
generate our suggestions. We analyzed discrepancies through the perspective of 
CATWOE so that each analysis gave us a different idea about how to improve the 
response process and gave us different systems to work with while designing our 
suggestions to the numerous actors involved.  
In order to determine an optimal path, we looked again at our critical paths, to see 
what the most critical tasks are currently. This gave us an overview to determine where 
events could be streamlined or removed for redundancy in order to form a more efficient 
method of response. Numerous models were made and each of these were examined to 
determine what changes could feasibly be made to reach the desirable outcome of a 
refined system.  
3.12 Taking Action 
 
Our conceptual model outlining our feasible and desirable changes is discussed at 
length in Chapters 4 and 5. Overall these changes display which agencies would 
participate in specific actions and included times necessary for each action. We have 
agreed to send our thesis to HSEMA, D.C. Fire EMS, Montgomery County Health 
Department, VDH, MRC, and CDC for evaluation and critique. Upon thorough 
discussion of the proposed changes, the conceptual model and thesis will be sent to 
relevant actors including the previously listed agencies as well as the Metropolitan Police 





4 Analyses of Quantitative and Qualitative Data 
Our fourth chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 describes our analysis of 
the communication network in the system, first organized in matrix form on Microsoft 
Excel, then more fully visualized utilizing graph theory, which helped us identify key 
agencies. We used algorithms such as betweenness centrality (BC) to determine the 
shortest paths in the communication network as well as existing redundancies. Section 
4.2 describes our development of rich pictures, as suggested by SSM. These rich pictures, 
visuals of the system as it is, were compiled using information from our literature and 
interviews. Section 4.3 describes the next step in SSM, the development of root 
definitions, which lay out the purposes and goals of the entire system. Each of these, 
detailed using the CATWOE elements, contributed to the development of an idealized 
model of interaction. Section 4.4 describes our simulation work. We simulated the 
hypothetical dispersion of aerosolized anthrax from Washington, D.C. and estimated the 
range and concentration of the aerosol cloud. We also predicted the number of people 
who would likely become ill from a dispersion using a model that matches population 
data and dispersion information. Section 4.5 describes the development of models of 
interaction, another step in the SSM. Each model deals with a different scenario of 
detection, each with varied times, actors, and varying efficiencies. In determining the 
critical paths of each model, we were able to isolate further discrepancies and 






4.1 Communication Network 
We established a communication network of all actors involved in detection, 
investigation, decision-making, and response through the compilation of information 
from the literature review and interviews. Implementation of an adjacency matrix, which 
represented directed communications between actors, and its analysis using both graph 
theory software and MATLAB produced rich pictures that represented the passing of 
information in systems, actors, and individuals throughout the CAP. 
4.1.1 Matrix Representation 
We used the categorized information from our literature review and interviews 
with experts to establish a matrix on Microsoft Excel. 401 actors were identified and 
included. The names of the actors were placed in corresponding order along the first 
column and first row of the matrix. Every cell in the matrix had either a “0” to represent 
no direct communication from the row actor to the column actor or a “1” to represent 
direct communication from row actor to column actor. This binary code identified who 
communicated with whom, and it also established the direction of communication. Some 
actors could interact directly with one another, whereas others only relayed or received 
information (but not vice versa). This matrix, known as an adjacency matrix, became the 
quantified input data for network analysis. 
4.1.2 Network Visualization 
        The first objective was to obtain a visual of the communication network via graph 
theory. The yEd Graph Editor (version 3.9) converted the binary adjacency matrix into a 
graph, which displayed the actor titles along the first row and column as nodes and the 
direct communications as edges with arrowheads to represent directionality. By using the 
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yEd Graph Editor, we were able to select specific nodes of interest and view the edges 
and nodes directly associated with them. 
 
 
Figure 4.1a – Node XL Clustered Communications Network 
 
In addition to yEd, the NodeXL program was used to group the nodes. NodeXL 
implemented the Clauset-Newman-Moore Cluster algorithm to assign each node to a 
specific group. In Figure 4.1a, the groups are differentiated by color and by boxes. The 
Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm was used to lay out the graph. A more detailed version 




The cluster algorithm divides the nodes into groups that are highly interconnected 
with each other. The nodes in the center of each group have the most of these 
connections. We expect that the center nodes would be responsible for the surrounding 
nodes in their group. Therefore, we can compare the organizational structure predicted by 
NodeXL with that of the structures outlined the literature review. 
The grouping that is outlined in NodeXL corresponds to color categorizations. 
The orange group handles the response, the red group handles the threat, and the blue 
group handles investigation. 
4.1.3 Network Analysis 
        Although the graph provided a significant visualization of the communication 
network, mathematical algorithms such as the shortest path and the redundancy of 
subpaths were able to provide an insightful analysis of the network. 
We first incorporated betweenness centrality (BC), an algorithm that identified 
how many times each node was within a specific path in the graph. Through an algorithm 
in yEd, every node was assigned a weight between 0 and 1 BC to represent their 
betweenness relative to other nodes. Any node that was independent of all the others was 
assigned a 0. The nodes with the largest BC values are shown in Table 4.1a. DHS was 
assigned a 1.00 weight and therefore had the most communications with other actors. The 
CDC (0.72 BC) and FBI (0.64 BC) had the second and third most BC, which 
corresponded to their roles in the unified command established by NIMS and further 
outlined by the Joint Criminal and Epidemiological Investigation Handbook (CDC and 
FBI, 2011). The HHS, the department that oversees the CDC, had a BC of 0.56, and 
HSEMA, which has responsibility for contacting other agencies in Washington, D.C., the 
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federal government, and private sector actors, had a BC of 0.47, the largest of any local 
level actor. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which analyzes possibilities 
of terrorist threats based on intelligence reports from the DHS, FBI, military, and the 
DoE, had a 0.33 BC (Graham and Talent, 2008). WRTAC, the fusion center responsible 

















Table 4.1a: Betweenness Centrality ≥ 0.20 
 
The ARC (0.25 BC) had the highest BC among private sector actors, which 
corresponds to its significance to the response phase and its work alongside public health 
agencies. Although ESF #15 and NIMS are plans as opposed to actors, they were 
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included in the analysis because they represent unified efforts by relevant federal, state, 
and local actors during a bioterrorism attack. ESF #15 focuses on the need for additional 
support during a response to a crisis, and NIMS is the overarching system for emergency 
management initiated by the DHS. A source of systematic error in these values is the 
selection of literature and interviews. Since it was not feasible to contact all relevant 
actors, details of communications and conference calls came only from chosen 
documents and the subject-matter experts with whom we spoke. A continued study of the 
current system could lead to more direct communications that could not be accounted for 
in this model. 
        We also recognized that these assigned weights did not directly correspond to 
overall significance in the response protocols. Programs such as BioWatch (0.11 BC) had 
relatively small weights because they do not have two-way communication with actors. 
These systems only provide information and therefore have significantly fewer paths than 
leading actors. Nevertheless, BioWatch provides essential data for the understanding of 
pathogen levels in given locations. Additionally, individuals such as the President of the 
United States (0.06 BC) have a significant role in the establishment of the protocols 
conducted by relevant actors even though the individuals have few specific actions during 
the actual CAP. 
4.1.3.1 Shortest Paths 
Our MATLAB program provided the flexibility to identify the passing of 
information from detection systems to agencies and local counties as well as 
communication exchanges between response actors such as the MRC and relevant public 
health and security actors. These specific paths allowed for a more insightful depiction of 
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the communication network via rich pictures (to be discussed in section 4.1.4). This 
algorithm provided insight on the relations among different local counties. Although the 
WRTAC could forward information to the Washington, D.C., DCDOH directly, such 
information could not be sent immediately to local counties. The WRTAC would engage 
in a conference call with the FBI and other national security and public health actors to 
discuss threat credibility before information could be passed beyond Washington, D.C. If 
the actors deemed the threat credible, the FBI would inform surrounding counties of the 
impending attack. Shortest paths also outlined how detection systems such as the 
Autonomous Pathogen Detection System (APDS), Bio-event Advanced Leading 
Indicator Recognition Technology (BioALIRT), Biohazard Detection System (BDS), 
Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System (BASIS), BioStorm, BioSense, 
BioWatch, Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-
based Epidemics (ESSENCE), ESSENCE II, NCR Syndromic Surveillance Network, 
Real-time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance (RODS), and Virtual USA (vUSA) would 
pass on collected samples or initial data to relevant actors and inform local counties that 
would have to respond. 
The response phase suggested a diverse set of two-way communications. At 
certain times throughout the phase, the President of the United States has information that 
is relevant to the MRC, and at other times, the MRC collects data that is of use to the 
President. The President has discussions with the NCTC, which passes relevant 
information to HHS, which then passes information along to actors on the ground such as 
the American Red Cross and then the MRC. However, the MRC conducts both 
prophylaxis dispensing and field epidemiology. If the MRC were to identify new 
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information, it would communicate with the CDC, who would relay the information to 
FEMA, who would then inform the President. A number of other examples demonstrated 
that two-way communication was not always for the same reasons and also had different 
paths. In order to better understand the common subpaths, or portions of a path that 
occurred repeatedly, we developed a separate M-file that incorporated this redundancy. 
4.1.3.2 Diameter and Redundancy 
Upon initial analysis of the shortest paths, we determined that a number of 
communication exchanges were showing similar subpaths. In order to account for this 
observation, we wrote an M-file based on Dijkstra’s algorithm that could analyze all 
possible shortest paths in the matrix and identify how many times a particular subpath 
occurred in other paths. Our M-file then sorted the most common subpaths by number of 
nodes so that we could specifically identify common chains of communication within the 
network. The output listed the five most frequent subpaths for each number of nodes 
(from one to eleven). As expected, the single-node subpaths were consistent with the BC 
analysis from the graph. The five most frequent occurrences of single-node subpaths 
were DHS (18,296), CDC (16,835), FBI (16,591), HHS (12,303), and DoD (9,887). DHS 
has numerous oversight responsibilities throughout the CAP. CDC and FBI lead the 
investigative effort and are critical members of the unified command. HHS and DoD 
have great influence in planning procedures as well as in conference calls during an 
incident. The single-node subpaths are not to be confused with BC. The DoD (0.32 BC) 
had the seventh highest BC and the fifth most single-node subpaths (9,887). The BC 
indicated the DoD’s placement in the shortest paths between two other actors. However, 
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the single-node subpaths were the number of times the DoD appeared in any (non-
cyclical) path between two actors. 
The output also provided insight on longer paths of communication that required 
reasonable extrapolations. The most frequent three-node subpath (2,714 iterations) was 
the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) → Virginia Department of 
Health Northern Virginia Regional Team (VDH NVRT) → CDC. This subpath implied 
that certain documents and interviews provided specific communications for particular 
portions of metropolitan Washington, D.C., but the information was not explicitly a 
generalization of the communication throughout the region. We could infer from this 
subpath that the COG could go to any regional public health office within the NCR, and 
these offices could then report to the CDC. The most frequent five-node subpath (351 
iterations) was JAHOC → EOC → WebEOC → Northern Virginia Regional Planner → 
DoD. Realistically, this subpath makes little sense since WebEOC is not the primary tool 
for an operations center to forward information to relevant actors. Additionally, the 
Northern Virginia Regional Planner is not the individual who would report updates from 
an operations center to the DoD. This “error” occurred because interviews and literature 
revealed that the regional planner has communications with the DoD on a regular basis 
and has access to information from WebEOC. The M-File did not account for specific 
scenarios but only whether or not two actors communicated. We saw the true value of 
this subpath as the communication between the JAHOC and the DoD. A number of local 
actors, ranging from D.C. Public Schools to the D.C. Department of General Services, 
provide information to the JAHOC. This information-gathering capability emphasizes the 
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significance of the JAHOC and EOC, as well as their communications with the DoD and 
eventually the CDC or other actors. 
The JAHOC’s relation between local and federal actors became apparent through 
its frequent appearances in the most common subpaths. The JAHOC appeared in the 
following frequent subpaths, as seen in Table 4.1b. 
 
Subpath Length 
(Number of nodes) 
Number of Times 














Table 4.1b: JAHOC’s Occurrences in the Most Common Subpaths 
 
Longer subpaths have more interactions with the JAHOC than shorter subpaths. This 
emphasizes the JAHOC’s role in communicating local-level information to a wide range 
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of other actors across jurisdictions and on the state and federal level, as well as with the 
private sector. 
        There were a total of eight eleven-node subpaths, and the first five included the 
five-node subpath JAHOC → EOC → WebEOC → Northern Virginia Regional Planner 
→ HHS. This subpath is not one of the five most frequent five-node subpaths, but the 
communication from the JAHOC to the HHS was required in order to reach a number of 
public health actors such as the Office of Attending Physician (OAP) for Congress and 
the Maryland Emergency Management Agency. Figure 4.1b displays the number of 
subpaths with each number of nodes (indicated as “Subpath Length” in the chart) from 
one to eleven. 
 
 




The data indicated that most communications were of 4 or 5 nodes. This result is 
consistent with the expectation since one would expect information to travel according to 
the generic subpath: Local Actor A→ State Actor A→ Federal Actor → State Actor B→ 
Local Actor B (5 nodes). 
4.2 Rich Pictures 
       As we analyzed the compiled information from our literature review and 
interviews, we developed an overarching rich picture, shown in Figure 4.2a, which is a 
depiction of the response protocols. This picture categorized the protocols into “Detection 
and Investigation,” “Decision-Making,” and “Response.” All three categories showed a 
linear progression of events and actions taken by local, state, federal, and private actors. 
The picture provides a broad yet insightful view of the relevant actors during the CAP 
and during the establishment of PODs and follow-up investigations and prophylaxis 
distribution. This rich picture, and the additional rich pictures discussed later in this 






Figure 4.2a – Response Protocols 
 
The actions and communications account for a witness identifying a potential 
threat and established detection systems reporting spikes in symptoms or pathogens in the 
environment. Confirmatory testing via LRN labs and Lawrence Livermore, along with 
threat credibility conference calls, lead to a decision-making phase. At this time, 
Washington, D.C., and state governments can determine the need for federal assistance, 
local and federal actors can request prophylaxis from the SNS, and departments such as 
DHS can implement pre-written response plans. These decisions formally end the CAP, 
and construction of PODs can begin with the assistance of local health department 
employees, the MRC, the National Guard, and/or private sector actors such as the 
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American Red Cross. The MRC’s continuous field epidemiology and EOC updates 
maintain a steady investigation of any further threat. As agencies make specific 
information available to the public, the president also provides the most suitable public 
address under the current circumstances. 
        Since the response protocols incorporated a number of actions within one picture, 
we developed additional rich pictures to provide more information on some of the 
specific actions that take place. We developed pictures for the detection, investigation, 
and response based upon actions identifiable through literature, interviews, and our 
analysis. The “Detection Systems” picture, Figure 4.2b, indicates the actors that receive 
information from several detection systems early in the CAP. The DHS, FBI, and CDC 
receive initial updates from a wide variety of technological and syndromic surveillance 
systems, and information-sharing networks also facilitate the compilation of data from 




Figure 4.2b – Detection Systems  
 
        According to the “Investigation” picture, Figure 4.2c, the initial report of covert 
bioterrorism can lead to three distinct outcomes. After the first threat assessment 
conference call, attended by local public health and law enforcement, the LRN, FBI and 
its local level associates, and the local fusion center, the attendees classify the incident as 
“No Risk,” “Possible Bioterrorism Risk,” or “Likely Bioterrorism Risk.” A “No Risk” 
classification results in a prophylaxis response driven by public health. “Possible 
Bioterrorism Risk” requires additional investigation, which causes the FBI to run a 
criminal investigation while public health runs an epidemiological investigation. In the 
event of a “Likely Bioterrorism Risk,” the FBI initiates a “WMD Threat Credibility 
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Evaluation” conference call along with the CDC, local FBI and public health. This 
conference call leads to a joint investigation establishing unified command between the 
FBI/law enforcement and public health actors. In addition, the FBI opens a case file and 
can choose to establish a JOC. 
 
 
Figure 4.2c – Investigation 
 
        Upon making a decision, the Response picture, Figure 4.2d, provides a case study 
of POD set-up and prophylaxis distribution. The Montgomery County Health Department 
requests assistance via the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (MD 
DHMH), who runs through the legal procedures to forward the request to the CDC. Upon 
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approval, the CDC informs the county of assistance. The county can establish 
coordination with Johns Hopkins for further assistance and information exchange. 
Between 1 and 24 hours after the CDC’s acceptance of the request, county public health 
staff, the MRC, and additional volunteers set up the PODs. If necessary, the American 
Red Cross and, via a request from HSEMA, the D.C. National Guard can also help 
establish the PODs. Individuals can receive prophylaxis through a drive-up, walk-in, or 
delivery to heads of household. During this process, the MRC would conduct field 
epidemiology, or counties with no MRC would conduct the epidemiology with assistance 
from DHMH, and any new information is transmitted to the CDC, who then forwards the 
updates to the EPA, LRN, FBI WMD Coordinator, and FEMA. Through FEMA, the 
president can receive vital updates from the scene. 
 
 
Figure 4.2d – Response 
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4.3 Root Definitions 
As stated in Chapter 3, our root definitions essentially spell out the main goals of 
the system we studied. We defined one overlying goal of the entire system, with three 
subsystems that had to be analyzed individually. The root definitions we determined were 
to (1) save lives, (1a) maintain proper surveillance and intelligence, (1b) have proper 
decision-making and contain the physical threat of the anthrax, and (1c) control and 
manage the public. Each root definition was detailed through CATWOE, and we 
constructed a model of interaction for each definition. These models of interaction are 
described in Section 4.5. 
4.4 Simulation Results 
        Our extensive work of using simulation programs throughout our research has 
given us a wealth of information to use in forming our recommendations for feasible and 
desirable changes in the response to an aerosolized anthrax attack. Our anthrax incidence 
model written in the Ruby programming language as well as the HYSPLIT program were 
used to generate simulation results given a particular area and its population to detect 
how many incidents would generate over the process of a five day simulation. 
4.4.1 Anthrax Dispersion Results from HYSPLIT 
        We conducted four separate sets of simulations, each with their own set of 
meteorological data. These simulations calculated the anthrax dispersion for the first 120 
hours after the anthrax release. Each set of data had its own pattern, and this affected the 





4.4.1.1 9am on January 1, 2010 
 
Figure 4.4a - 10 kg anthrax dispersion over first 5 days 
 
        The anthrax dispersion of January was fairly standard across its four levels of 
concentration. As shown in Figure 4.4a, as the anthrax would spread, it would simply go 
south along the east coast. Most of the anthrax would travel south, infecting residents 
from Washington, D.C., to North Carolina, and increasing the amount of anthrax would 
simply increase the amount of infections. 
        There was a curious development, though, in that some of the spores would 
actually travel north and create germinations in Massachusetts. This occurred during the 
heaviest concentration of 10 kilograms. We believe this could be incorrectly interpreted 
as a second anthrax release, and this led us to consider a false positive in detecting spores 
in areas far-off from the release area. This is highly important to consider depending on 
the amount of anthrax released in a given test. 
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4.4.1.2 9am on June 9, 2010 
 
Figure 4.4b - 10 kg anthrax dispersion over first 5 days 
 
        The second dispersion data set we studied, shown in Figure 4.4b, went in the 
opposite direction from the first. Rather than spores traveling south along the coast, these 
traveled north and had a wide development, reaching as far as Wisconsin and Maine. 
        The locations where we observed high concentrations had certain tendencies. 
While Wisconsin and Michigan as well as other areas surrounding the Great Lakes did 
experience germinations of spores in their areas, there was certainly a heavier effect 
along the coastline. The spores traveled up through Pennsylvania and germinated in 
practically every area of New England. The highest concentrations were in relatively 
small areas near the release point. This wide spread was expected, considering that over 
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three million people were determined sick in the simulation. This simulation 
quantitatively depicts the range and devastation of such an attack. 
4.4.1.3 2am on July 2, 2010  
 
Figure 4.4c - 10 kg anthrax dispersion over first 5 days 
 
This set of simulations had the largest range compared to the others in our 
analysis. As shown in Figure 4.4c, a swirl pattern was created from this meteorological 
data, and it caused the anthrax spores to spread directly inland from Washington, D.C. 
There was a large amount of germinations in the Carolinas, and it decreased as the 
dispersion tended further south before the swirl would turn the spores back up north 
toward the Great Lakes. Essentially, the pattern created a “box” range with the borders of 
just past the Mississippi River, the Great Lakes, the East Coast, and the Gulf of Mexico. 
At the heaviest concentration of 10 kilograms, the simulation counted eight million cases 




4.4.1.4 9am on September 1, 2010 
 
Figure 4.4d - 10 kg anthrax dispersion over first 5 days 
 
        This set of simulations created a set of data similar to the first set (Figure 4.4a), 
but the dispersion had a wider range all along the East Coast. As shown in Figure 4.4d, 
the spores travelled as far south as Georgia and as far north as New England. While the 
second set (Figure 4.4b) displayed a similar inward spread, this set consistently stayed 
along the coastline. 
4.4.2 Anthrax Incidence Results 
        We generated numerous results from our anthrax incidence program. As we 
discussed earlier, our focus was on four specific release times (i.e. year, month, day, hour 
when anthrax is released) throughout the year for which we were going to generate 
results in our simulation. The specific times we picked were during January, June, July, 
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and September. Each formed a different meteorological pattern for us to explore and test 
to generate varying results. These patterns will be discussed later. 
        For our Incidence Model, we tested each of the four release times with a differing 
amount of anthrax, namely 0.01, 0.1, 1 and 10 kilograms, to get four separate results from 
each specific chosen time. See Appendix D for more information on the parameters held 
constant and varied for the simulations. Across these sixteen separate simulations, our 
Incidence Model generated the following results (these results are limited to the 
simulation, month, release amount, and total sick, as our simulations have given us a 





Figure 4.4e – Number of people infected by 120 hours 
 
Figure 4.4e shows the number of people infected in the first 5 days following an 
anthrax release for each of the 16 simulations. As expected, a greater quantity of anthrax 
released results in a higher incidence of anthrax disease. Note that infected individuals 
may not show immediate symptoms in a real-world scenario. Figure 4.4f is a similar 
graph, except it shows the total number of people infected with anthrax as time 
approaches infinity assuming no prophylaxis is administered. Comparing the two figures 
shows that over half of the incidence of anthrax typically occurs more than five days after 


































Figure 4.4f - Total people infected by time → infinity 
  
To account for the stochastic component of the algorithm used in the anthrax 
incidence model, each of the 16 simulations were run five times, and the average values 
of the results were used to create Figures 4.4e and 4.4f. The widths of the 90% 
confidence intervals were less than 1.4% of the sample average for all of the simulations. 
This suggests that the use of random numbers in the algorithm does not strongly affect 
the results. The larger releases of anthrax tend to have smaller margins of error, which 





































4.4.3 Comparison of Simulation Results with Wilkening Research 
        Although our simulations gave us extensive results, we sought to compare them 
with similar research to see how close our studies matched their own. We chose to 
compare our simulations to the results of the “Uncertainties Associated with Atmospheric 
Anthrax Attacks” paper done by Wilkening, and found immediately that there were major 
differences between our model and theirs. First off, Wilkening used a system known as 
ID50, which means that there is a 50% chance of someone getting infected as a function 
of how much is inhaled. We, on the other hand, tested each individual with a percentage 
chance of him or her getting sick to give us more specific results on this broadened scale. 
        The parameters we relied on in our simulation are different as well. We used a 
constant breathing rate of 1.8 m
3
/hour, but in comparison, Wilkening considered 
breathing rate as a function of time of day. This led to our value being about three times 
as much as their average, and therefore we expected to get higher numbers in comparison 
to theirs. We used the 2000 census data, whereas Wilkening used Landscan data, on 
population density. 
        Another difference we encountered was in regards to the spores per gram. 
Wilkening considered 10
11
 spores/gram, while we considered 1.43x10
12
 spores/gram, 
meaning that our 0.1 kg release should be the simulation compared to their 1 kg release. 
Our meteorology data differs as well, using vastly different years. Wilkening used 1990 
in their studies while we used 2010 data.  But one other factor that could affect our result 
comparison is indoor reduction factor, something that only Wilkening used. The indoor 
reduction factor reduces the amount of anthrax inhaled by a factor of about 0.6, which we 
believe accounts for the fact that some people will be outside. Because we did not use 
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something similar in our studies, we found that this too would contribute greatly to 
differences in our data. 
4.4.4 Case Study of Simulation #7 
June 9, 9am  (2010) 1 
As an example of the results of the simulation model, simulation #7 is analyzed in 
more detail. In this simulation, 1 kg of anthrax was released on June 9 at 9 AM. This 
simulation was chosen since it has a medium-sized anthrax release, as well as a 
particularly interesting dispersion pattern (as shown in Figure 4.4b) where the anthrax 
leaves the United States before returning to the Northeast and Midwest United States.   
 




In Figure 4.4g, each point represents a person infected by anthrax. The points are 
color coded to represent the time that the infection occurred. Since no more than one 
person per 30''x30'' grid cell is plotted, not every person is shown, but the general 
distribution can still be inferred. The person plotted in the grid cell is randomly chosen. 
The majority of the points on this plot are gray; signifying that most of people do not 
become infected with anthrax until at least five days after the anthrax is released. This 
incubation period remains true even within the area of initial release. In this case, 67.9% 
of the 129,277 people infected in the U.S. during this simulation were infected more than 
five days after the release. Since the anthrax dispersion was only simulated for five days, 
this percentage might be artificially low because the anthrax was still present in the 
atmosphere after the five days. 
To make the results relevant to immediate response easier to visualize, Figure 
4.4h shows the same plot as Figure 4.4g excluding the people infected after five days. In 
this plot, the people near the release (north of Maryland) were the first population to be 
infected while more people in that region continuously became infected as time passed. 
Another important observation from the simulation is that although the anthrax is 
released in Washington, D.C., a large area of the U.S. is affected. Since not everyone in 
the high density regions is displayed, this figure is slightly misleading. In fact, 22% of the 





Figure 4.4h – Simulation 7 plot of incidence vs. time for first 5 days 
 
4.5 Models of Interaction 
One model was dedicated to each root definition. The models were developed via 
Microsoft Project using information from the rich pictures. Figure 4.5a is an overview of 
the models of interaction. The overall model we constructed is entitled “Model 1” and 
refers to our number one root definition - saving lives. This model had to be completed 
subsequent to the other three models, as it utilized their elapsed time information. 
Ultimately, Model 1 compared the overall timeliness of the three submodels with the 
number of people who could potentially become sick over time, as calculated with our 
computer simulations. Model 1a corresponded to Root Definition 1a, as it displayed the 
surveillance and intelligence surrounding an attack. It detailed the surveillance, release, 
and detection of anthrax. This model ended with authorities investigating and possibly 
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locating the source of the attack (depending on its nature) as well as positively 
confirming the use of anthrax. Model 1b charted Root Definition 1b, the decision-making 
process and containing the threat of the released substance. It followed the decision-
making, management, and containment of the threat and ended with the proper authorities 
making decisions regarding cleanup and public management. A likely end result of this 
model would be the initiation of ESFs. Model 1c corresponded to Root Definition 1c, 
managing the public. After a decision was made in Model 1b with regards to the public, 
this decision would need to be executed. Ordinarily, this could be the actual formation 
and use of PODs. Figure 4.5a below corresponds to the relationship among the three 
submodels. 
Each model was constructed with multiple pathways of tasks, displayed in boxes 
on a Gantt chart. Each task also listed CATWOE information for our critical path 
analysis. As our graph theory analysis indicated, a large amount of time during the 
response would be dedicated to lines of communication. Communication likely to take 








Figure 4.5a: Flow of the models of interaction 
 
4.5.1 Model 1a- Surveillance and intelligence 
        Although all of the information provided for constructing the models was taken 
from our rich pictures, most of the information on this model specifically came from the 
rich picture sources of ESF #8, our interviews, and the ConOps. This model began with 
the task “Release.” This task could represent any scenario of aerosolized anthrax release 
but was then differentiated into three scenarios: direct observation, incubation, and 
recognition via BioWatch. 
Model 1: Saving Lives 
• Comparisons of three sub-models with 
simulation output numbers 
Model 1a- Surveillance and 
Intelligence  
•  Anthrax release, detection, and location 
Model 1b- Decision-making and 
containing the threat 
• Management and containment of threat 
Model 1c- Managing the public 
• Ensuring the health and safety of the 
general public; ends with the dispensing 
of prophylaxis antiobiotics 
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The start time for direct observation remained at the same time as the release, t=0, 
because witnesses would watch the release as it happened. The time frames for 
incubation and BioWatch were taken from rich picture information. Primarily, the 
ConOps and our interviews determined a path for direct observation. Similarly, the 
timeframes for each task were largely taken from interview information. 
Following the incubation of the anthrax and the onset of symptoms in contacts, 
our models indicated two pathways: the astute physician and syndromic surveillance, the 
latter specifically being ESSENCE recognition. The path following the astute physician 
to the confirmation of anthrax in a patient and the subsequent contact interview that 
marked the end of Model 1a. The ESSENCE recognition path followed protocol largely 
spelled out in our literature review. 
      The BioWatch path followed several descriptions of the program that we found 
in our literature review and from our interviews. It should be noted that all of these 
pathways were written in scenarios that were described as normal pathways; the 
timeframes we constructed were not arbitrary but were by no means certitude. Chapter 2 
details how programs such as BioWatch have varied in their ability to positively 
recognize anthrax, and how response has varied in the past.    
4.5.2 Model 1b- Decision-making and containing the threat 
        Model 1b began while the tasks of Model 1a were occurring. The two start points 
of this model were direct observation and the declaration of a BAR. The start point of 
incubation was omitted in this model because of its unpredictability with regards to 
timing and the dependency of response protocols on case-by-case situations (determined 
by the number of people affected, etc.).     
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        The two pathways in Model 1b largely mirrored each other, with the exception of 
timing differences. As with Model 1a, the pathways and timing were taken from our rich 
pictures, especially the ConOps. There was a large amount of overlap with the tasks in 
this model, which later played a part in our critical path analysis. 
4.5.3 Model 1c- Managing the public 
        This model only followed one scenario and could apply to all of the scenarios laid 
out in Model 1a. The starting task for this model was the initiation of NIMS and ESF #8, 
at time t=0. This model was largely based off of ESF #8 and featured specific information 
surrounding PODs taken from our interviews. The model detailed many communication 
lines that were outlined in ESF #8 as well as potential actions that could be taken—but 
were not required—following the initiation of this ESF. Model 1c ended with the 
functioning of PODs but did not detail when each POD would close, as this time would 
vary greatly. 
4.5.4 Model 1- Comparison of models with simulations 
        Model 1 detailed how many lives could potentially be saved, as shown in Table 
4.5 and Figure 4.5b, by comparing timing information from our three submodels with that 
of our computer simulations. We used the aforementioned data from our computer 
simulations and created a new program to detail the hourly number of people who would 
be exposed to enough anthrax to make them sick, roughly corresponding with what is 










0.75 Direct Observation HEPRA Alerted 
3.01 Direct Observation Decision of Response 
13.15 Direct Observation ESF Initiated 
28 BioWatch HEPRA Alerted 
33.85 BioWatch Decision of Response 
36.5 BioWatch ESF Initiated 
40.11 Direct Observation PODs Functional 
58.2 BioWatch PODs Functional 
115 Astute Physician Decision of Response 
120 Syndromic Surveillance HEPRA Alerted 
135 Astute Physician PODs Functional 
141 Syndromic Surveillance PODs Functional 
 
 
Table 4.5 - June 6, release of 1 kg 
  
 
Figure 4.5b - Total number of people infected by 120 hours = 9109 people 
 
Key: 
Direct Observation, BioWatch, Astute Physician, Syndromic Surveillance  
 
HEPRA alerted 
ESF 8 initiated 
HEPRA alerted 
ESF 8 initiated 
PODs functional 
PODs functional 





        We followed the scenarios presented in Model 1a to find the proper timing 
numbers. Using the Gantt charts, we determined for each scenario the timing from release 
of aerosolized anthrax to the commencement of public distribution of prophylaxis 
antibiotics. Milestone information, such as when HEPRA was alerted of an attack, was 
compared with data from the Total Sick Hourly model, in Model 1. Based on the Total 
Sick Hourly simulation of a 1 kg release of anthrax in June, Model 1 displayed in one 
graph the various timings of the milestones. For example, in the direct observation 
scenario, HEPRA would be alerted at 0.75 hours, ESF #8 would be initiated at 13.15 
hours, and the PODs would be functional by 40.11 hours. For a BioWatch scenario, 
HEPRA would be alerted at 28 hours, and the PODS would be functional by 58.2 hours. 
For the astute physician scenario, PODs would not be functional until 135 hours had 
elapsed since release. Most tellingly, a syndromic surveillance scenario would not allow 
PODs to be functional until 141 hours had elapsed. 
These numbers clearly indicated that improvements were necessary to the current 
system. This led us into our next steps, determining the critical paths and secondary 
discrepancies. 
We found the critical path for each of the following release scenarios: direct 
observation, confirmation by BioWatch, syndromic surveillance, and the astute 
physician. In order to find the path, we reorganized the models into chronological Gantt 
charts by scenario. Each of the new four models followed a path from release to the 
formation of PODs. Using Microsoft Project, we calculated the critical path for each 
scenario. We then analyzed each task along each critical path to consider the pertinence 
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and necessary duration. This became part of the overall analysis, to be discussed further 
below. 
4.6 Preparing the Idealized Conceptual Model 
4.6.1 Overview of Discrepancies Influencing Conceptual Model 
 After completing our comparisons, we categorized all of the discrepancies we 
found via direct interviews, literature review, and analysis of our qualitative and 
quantitative data. We made nine categories: Detect Possible Attack, Investigate and 
Confirm Attack, Contain Pathogen, Decide How to Respond, Communication Among 
Actors, Mobilize Responders, Deliver Supplies to PODs, Inform Public, and Open PODs. 
Each category is discussed in detail below. The purpose of this section is to discuss the 
discrepancies and problems that delay detection, investigation, and decision-making. 
Chapter 5 will discuss feasible and desirable changes to overcome these problems. Some 
references came from our interviews, and because of that, we cannot discuss every detail 
related to them. 
 





4.6.2 Detect Possible Attack 
 The initial detection of an aerosolized anthrax attack causes some of the most 
significant delays in the response. The dry filter units are checked every 24 hours, 
causing a currently unavoidable delay between pathogen release and filter collection. 
Since these filters and corresponding assay, associated with BioWatch, do not necessarily 
collect or recognize the pathogen upon release, detection can take as long as two weeks. 
According to the LA Times, there have been over fifty false positives up to 2008 via 
BioWatch (Williams 2012). False positives can reduce trust of the detection system in 
place and can also create hesitation among actors to follow up initial detection if there is 
strong skepticism about its legitimacy. 
 The astute physician can also lead to delays. Although the physician would make 
a judgment based on observation and scientific knowledge, there is still uncertainty until 
the pathogen is confirmed via lab testing. The CDC and FBI already recognize this 
uncertainty. Although it is good that they have the awareness, it can also imply that there 
is hesitation to act in the event of a real anthrax attack because of doubt. Diagnosis of 
anthrax can be difficult since it can appear similar to the flu with the onset of early 
symptoms. Furthermore, the astute physician requires the patient to initiate the 
appointment by choosing to enter the hospital. If the patient believes illness is from 
something naturally occurring, that individual may not decide to go to the hospital until 
the anthrax has caused significant harm. All of these hesitations lead to dangerous delays. 
 Additionally, syndromic surveillance has delays. Since the system is dependent on 
data input from several geographic locations, delays in data entry will slow the analysis. 
If an anthrax attack occurs during a flu season, analysis will be more difficult because, as 
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noted in the previous paragraph, anthrax and flu share similar early symptoms. 
 All of these delays from the various detection methods allow the anthrax pathogen 
to infect individuals without any initiated response. Since response is time-sensitive, high 
casualties can result from the very beginning of the response protocols. To initiate quick 
response, the two most efficient forms of detection are either direct observation or 
technological surveillance. 
4.6.3 Investigate and Confirm Attack 
 After the initial detection of a pathogen and all associated delays, there are delays 
from the confirmation process. The definitive diagnostic testing occurs through a certified 
lab of the LRN, and this process can take hours or days. Also, there are reporting 
ambiguities in the information sharing process. There does not appear to be a definitive 
individual who provides the final report. Additionally, lab testing and confirmation from 
labs not associated with the LRN may face legal boundaries in their reporting of 
information. Part of the ambiguity and legal questions stems from the lack of oversight. 
According to the World at Risk report, “no single entity in the executive branch is 
responsible for overseeing and managing the risks associated with all the high-
containment (BSL-3) laboratories operated by the U.S. government, industry, or 
academia” (Graham and Talent 2008, p. 25). This lack of awareness can lead to 
information coming from previously unexpected sources that will be doubted despite 
legitimate scientific claims regarding anthrax confirmation. 
 The investigation phase includes two simultaneous paths: terrorism and public 
health. These concurrent investigations can lead to confusion regarding leadership. The 
unique and significant roles of the FBI, CDC, and local health departments all contribute 
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to the overall investigation, but there can be delays in information sharing. Actors that 
withhold information citing chain of command may be preventing other actors from 
taking time-sensitive and completely necessary action. Although unified command is 
included in NIMS, real-world scenarios can deviate from the plans on paper. 
4.6.4 Contain Pathogen 
 Containment involves understanding the spatio-temporal spread of anthrax. While 
it is important to develop plume models of the anthrax release, these efforts are not 
consolidated. DC HEPRA, NOAA, and IMAAC all develop their own plume models 
without any explicitly stated collaboration. Although discrepancies and uncertainties are 
important topics of discussion regarding a plume model, having several models of the 
same anthrax spread can create unnecessary delays in the investigative process. 
Furthermore, differing models can create confusion in updating the perimeter of the 
attack, making physical containment difficult for law enforcement and other relevant 
officials. 
4.6.5 Decide How to Respond 
 The specific roles of certain officials involved in the decision-making process are 
ambiguous. During conference calls regarding the confirmation of anthrax, the 
“epidemiological investigator” and “public health surveillance” are considered different 
actors, just as “environmental health,” “public health bioterrorism coordinator,” and 
“health communications” are all considered separate (CDC & FBI, 2011). Without 
clearly defining which agency or individual occupies each role, it can be difficult to 
distinguish between these titles. Since these titles are not well-established, conference 
calls can be delayed or lack necessary production because the confusion over roles can 
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take valuable time away from the decision-making. 
 Specific responsibilities of the President of the United States are also unclear. 
While the president does not directly alter specific decisions, Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive #5 enables the president to place the Secretary of the DHS to 
assume responsibility for managing the incident by utilizing federal resources. This 
seemingly sudden change in command does not have an explicitly stated set of 
conditions. Depending on the scenario at hand, the change in command can create delays 
via briefings and information exchange across different levels of government. 
 Physicians also have a separate set of delays in deciding how to respond. Not all 
physicians have formal bioterrorism training, which means that their ability to respond to 
an attack may not be ideal (Cosgrove et al., 2005). The lack of uniformity in physician 
training can lead to overloading certain medical centers with patients as there is a limited 
number of physicians with the appropriate training. 
4.6.6 Communication Among Actors 
 Communication accounts for a number of discrepancies within the response 
protocols. The vast number of actors involved creates confusion over command and 
information sharing. Following the first 24 to 48 hours after detection, both state and 
federal agencies become involved in several capacities according to one of our 
epidemiologist contacts. This involvement can create competition over turf and resources, 
as tension within and across actors regarding leadership can create hesitation to work 
together (Falkenrath, 2010). This hesitation can cause some actors to hide important 
information from the others. Depending on what the information is, the ensuing delays 
can cause additional casualties from the anthrax attack. Actors such as the LRN are 
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supposed to standardize information sharing across different detection systems, but they 
cannot do the job effectively if important facts are withheld. Additionally, the issue of too 
many communication and information-sharing systems can lead to redundancy. 
Webfusion, HSIN, and the Regional Incident Command and Coordination System are 
only three of many technological communication systems in place, and none of them are 
universal among actors. Furthermore, the redundancy of information comes from the 
structure of the communication network. The HHS Secretary’s Operation Center sends 
information to four different response branches, and all four of these branches report to 
the FBI WMD Coordinator. Although the information may not be the same from each of 
the four branches, this high-volume influx of communications may delay the process and 
possibly create difficulties in tracking the information. 
 Information sharing has been a staple of efficiency improvement plans for matters 
of homeland security since September 11, 2001. However, too many attempts to 
consolidate that streamlining of information may cause confusion and be self-defeating. 
     The NRF calls for coordination systems such as the MACS, in which several 
coordination protocols are taken among a great number of actors. One of these includes 
the several EOCs, generally provided by certain actors such as DC Fire or DC law 
enforcement. At the same time, actors such as HSEMA have their own JAHOCs that 
function when EOCs are not activated. However, once EOCs are activated, the NRCC 
coordinates with the relevant RRCC, which eventually designates powers to the JFO. The 
JFHQ-NCR is another source of regular information sharing. Representing HHS is the 
IRCT, which has a large staff and is also meant for increasing coordination. 
Given all of the teams meant for streamlining information, it is very likely that 
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communications and chain of command could be lost among the clutter. There also seems 
to be no established line of communication for federal agencies to check directly with 
these operations centers for quick and relevant updates. 
     Additionally, there appears to be a discrepancy involving communication with the 
private sector. HSEMA is the actor that would likely establish communication with 
private sector actors following a suspected attack, but HEPRA would likely coordinate 
the private sector’s roles and responsibilities in response to the attack.  
4.6.7 Mobilize Responders 
 A large-scale bioterrorism attack requires a vast number of responders and 
volunteers to be on scene. Unfortunately, organizing these individuals and giving help to 
affected people have several points of confusion. The necessary educational requirements 
for NIMS and ICS are only done once, either at the beginning of the job or whenever a 
new course is introduced and mandatory. Since there is no established, periodic review of 
the information from these courses, the responders may not be in an ideal position to help 
and complete particular tasks if the information is not refreshed. Response protocols and 
uniformity where applicable are both necessities, and the lack of refreshing responder 
education can delay the actual actions on the ground. Additionally, a number of 
responders—professional or volunteer—have other priorities besides their job, such as 
protecting their family. This inherent truth can lead to responders not being available to 
help when necessary. Although the reasoning for absence may be sound, the lack of 
responders will ultimately harm the people in need of assistance at the scene of the attack. 
 The nature of a bioterrorism attack will also create delays in the transition from 
detection to response. Since the aerosol cloud of anthrax will spread, the scope of the 
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scene will expand and require more responders to be involved. The possibly 
overwhelming demand for responders may be too fast for the individuals to mobilize. 
Furthermore, according to a contact associated with HSEMA, the transition to response is 
not uniform across jurisdictions, and the overall effort is not completely standardized 
among agencies and individuals. 
4.6.8 Deliver Supplies to PODs 
State and federal agencies are put in charge of directly supplying local health 
departments and certain hospitals with the necessary materials in the event of an 
aerosolized anthrax attack. While this gives centralized responsibility, it also creates an 
uncertainty on the part of local actors and first responders on scene regarding how long it 
would take these actors to replenish these supplies. Since responding to an attack is time-
sensitive, any actor involved with this delivery process will need to make sure its role is 
streamlined to provide effective and quick support. Furthermore, hospitals are not 
required to follow NIMS protocol, which can result in confusion and delays if the 
agencies and hospitals are not operating in coordination with one another. 
Another issue regarding prophylaxis delivery to PODs is the SNS request process 
to the CDC. The entire request and consideration process appears to be tailored more to 
naturally recurring events rather than a terrorist attack, which requires a much faster 
response than the current procedure can provide. Currently, a local jurisdiction that runs 
out of its own supplies files a request to the state health department. Upon receiving this 
request, the state health department seeks the approval and endorsement of the governor. 
Next, this request is sent to the CDC, where relevant officials decide whether to approve 
the request or not. If the request is approved, then the CDC activates the SNS and informs 
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the relevant local jurisdiction(s). This entire process seems redundant since it coincides 
with information sharing among actors and operations centers. Officials in command 
should already acknowledge the timeliness required in response to bioterrorism and also 
be aware of the supply and demand for prophylaxis in affected areas. 
4.6.9 Inform Public 
Informing the public becomes a top priority in a bioterrorism event. The President 
of the United States has a goal of addressing the public within an hour of a confirmed 
BAR; however, HEPRA will not have even finished their phone consultation until at least 
two hours after the confirmation. This discrepancy cannot currently receive proper 
accommodations because the process of obtaining the necessary information takes longer 
than the allotted time set by the president. Furthermore, actors abiding by the response 
protocols will delay information until they are certain that updates are factually correct. 
Announcements from both government agencies and private sector actors will be vague 
in comparison to what people may expect or demand because of uncertainty in plume 
modeling, confirmatory testing, and information sharing regarding SNS delivery and 
dispensing. By contrast, employees and/or volunteers posting unofficial announcements 
via social networks such as Twitter or Facebook may provide informative updates, but 
the information will not be confirmed as true or endorsed by the relevant actor. 
4.6.10 Open PODs 
 As of now the availability of PODs is limited in numerous ways: location, ability 
to dispense medicine, and inability of some counties (such as Frederick County) to fund 
an MRC. One ambiguity is the process of planning POD location. Although there are 
already pre-established locations for POD setup, closed PODs are not taken into account. 
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Since no current policy requires a hospital or business to report if they are a closed POD, 
supplies may be ordered for locations that do not need the immediate support. This 
redundancy may be one reason why request processes for SNS are so lengthy, but the 
demand for prophylaxis is still high. The system needs a re-routing of prophylaxis 
delivery. 
Currently, there does not appear to be a system for specifically addressing the 
issue of patient triage, which is associated with the lack of across-the-board 
standardization in the response process. Interviews and literature review have not 
established a clear policy on how first responders place priority on patients based on 
time-sensitive conditions such as severe symptoms or age. Actors such as the MRC, 
National Guard, PHCC, local county health departments, American Red Cross, and other 
private sector actors are all part of the response process and have roles within PODs. 
However, these actors may follow different procedures or different training that is not 
standardized even though they all operate under the same incident command. 
Prophylaxis dispensing from PODs also has ambiguities. There are three main 
distribution methods: drive-up, walk-in, and door-to-door. These three are all available 
but can conflict. Although door-to-door prophylaxis can aid individuals who cannot be 
physically present at a POD, there is no explicit mechanism to prevent double counting. 
Some who receive door-to-door prophylaxis could also go to a POD and obtain additional 
supplies. Although it is reasonable for individuals and families to need additional 
prophylaxis over time, the response cannot afford to have an unchecked system where 
people, even with the most honorable intentions, take initial supplies that were supposed 
to be provided to other individuals in need of the first dosages of prophylaxis. On the 
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other hand, solely using door-to-door would also be an arduous process when other 
























5 Discussion and Recommendations 
 In this chapter, we discuss the feasible and desirable changes to improving the 
detection, investigation, and decision-making. These changes are explained through our 
conceptual model that is described in Sections 5.1 through 5.10. Section 5.11 summarizes 
our limitations throughout our research, and Section 5.12 includes discussions of future 
directions and some comparisons of our work to other scholars’ research. 
5.1 Overview of the Conceptual Model 
 Taking into consideration the discrepancies we summarized in Chapter 4, we 
constructed an idealized, conceptual model of the best possible system that could be used 
to respond to an attack. Chapters 5.2 through 5.10 will detail this model, which represents 
our recommendations for feasible and desirable changes.  
5.2 Detect Possible Attack 
 Our first conceptual model represents the response following the release of 
anthrax and prior to the decision-making process. This model, shown below as Figure 





Figure 5.2 – Conceptual Model: Release 
 
The ideal detection method utilizes an automatic pathogen detection system that is 
network linked to a laboratory for constant monitoring. Various options and prototype 
models for such systems do exist yet are not being utilized to the same standardized 
system that is BioWatch, as ineffective as it is. Actors currently funding BioWatch 
should redirect that funding to either research for new detection systems or installing an 
existing, experimentally proven detection system. Ideal automated pathogen detection 
will eliminate the need for syndromic surveillance and will have a sufficiently low rate of 
false positives, which will reduce any complacency and hesitance by those who need to 
respond quickly. Wet lab assays should be eliminated as initial processes of detection, 
concentration based detection should be continuous, and the system should be able to 
discern through ubiquitous morphologies of pathogens and define the pathogen with an 
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extremely low capacity for error in detection. BioWatch should be replaced with an 
automated pathogen detection system that can detect an anthrax spore immediately 
through automated airborne sampling and classify it via a computerized system (Wyatt 
2002).  
            Preliminary technology and methods have been developed to detect and monitor 
threat pathogens with minimal false positives that include UV based systems and 
electromagnetic scattering systems that de-emphasize the biochemical assay (Wyatt 
2002). While such systems have been tested and evaluated by the developers, they need 
to be evaluated and validated by officials in designated outdoor locations of where 
BioWatch filters may have been. While over $100 million has been spent on BioWatch 
(Barnes 2013), such funds could be reallocated in developing and utilizing less costly 
maintenance systems that were aforementioned. It is estimated that approximately $3 
billion will be used in the development of the Generation 3 BioWatch, which would 
involve a more effective detection and less human personnel to operate it (Barnes 2013). 
It is unclear of its reliance on faulty laboratory assays, but an automated system is 
preferred to initiate the response cascade as early as possible.  
The automated system must be designed to send data and analysis directly to the 
LRN. The LRN would receive information on the pathogen itself, number of detectors 
with a positive hit, and time each hit was confirmed by the system. Upon receiving this 
information, the LRN would alert the appropriate officials and agencies. Further 





5.3 Investigate and Confirm Attack 
The detection system should be automatic and with minimal inaccuracies so each 
positive case should be taken seriously. Once LRN obtains confirmation on the pathogen 
presence, they would contact the HSEMA, who would establish the Threat Analysis 
Conference Call with LRN, FBI, CDC, HEPRA, DDoE, the director of DC DOH, DC 
law enforcement, the DC mayor, NRCC, and other NCR localities. This joint call allows 
quick initial decision-making in an inter-agency manner especially with the CDC and FBI 
regarding investigation while establishing NIMS incident command. Suggestions 
regarding further inter-agency communication will be discussed in 5.6. Additionally, 
LRN would contact DC Fire EMS to order HAZMAT to collect a sample from the 
detection site in order to run confirmatory testing. 
5.4 Contain Pathogen 
HEPRA should receive first-hand information regarding the parameters of the 
aerosol release from a follow-up call from the FBI after their investigation or during the 
initial Threat Analysis Conference Call if such information is readily available, and they, 
along with NOAA, should begin making plume models. Epidemiologists of varying 
jurisdiction should share their results to check the likelihood of each of their plumes. 
5.5 Decide How to Respond 
After initial detection of an anthrax attack, the LRN should communicate the 
initial detection and related information to DC HSEMA and DC Fire EMS. Via DC Fire 
EMS, HAZMAT would arrive at the scene of initial detection to collect samples of the 
pathogen to be analyzed by the LRN for confirmatory testing. Meanwhile, DC HSEMA 
would establish the fully operational EOC while also initiating the Threat Analysis 
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Conference Call outlined in Chapter 5.3. The local FBI WMD coordinator would be 
notified of these events as well and participate with HSEMA in the conference call. 
            After this first conference call, which would be an information-sharing forum as 
well as the formal confirmation of roles and responsibilities for a response, some actors 
would have to immediately notify other actors. The CDC, instead of waiting for the 
completed SNS request process from a local jurisdiction, would put SNS on alert to begin 
mobilization of supplies and delivery mechanisms. Additionally, the CDC would forward 
this information to the HHS and the relevant state health department(s). The state health 
department(s) would communicate with NOAA to understand the most recent scope of 
the attack. The NRCC would communicate the conference call information to the DHS, 
which would then notify the President of the United States. 
                When the LRN completes the confirmatory testing, it would notify the FBI 
WMD coordinator and the Initiate Response Conference Call would ensue. This second 
conference call would include the LRN, FBI, HSEMA, HEPRA, the DC mayor, CDC, 
HHS, NRCC, the President of the United States, and other relevant NCR localities. 
During this call, these overarching leaders of the response would use the information 
pertaining to confirmation, scope, and current casualties to determine how to respond. 
Discussion would include topics such as opening PODs, alerting the public, and 
requesting assistance from the National Guard. 
5.6 Communication Among Actors 
     The second conceptual model we constructed details a reorganized system 
from the decision-making process through the dispensing of prophylaxis antibiotics. The 




Figure 5.6 – Conceptual Model: Decision 
 
While all steps of the detection, decision-making, and response are occurring, 
there needs to be standardization of virtual information sharing across all involved actors. 
In Chapter 2, such information sharing networks were delineated including GEOCOP, 
TACTrend, and so forth. None of these systems are universally utilized by all involved 
actors, which further emphasizes the necessity of a standard operating picture 
implementing all such systems. Virtual USA (vUSA) is an example of such a project that 
allows cross-platform information sharing among federal, state, and local actors. This is 
one solution to create transparency and willingness to share first-hand updates and 
information that can be crucial to the overall response, whether it be confirmation of lab 
testing or a specific POD site issue. As mentioned before, the open-source software does 
exist, but not all involved response and public health actors endorse it at this time. 
5.7 Mobilize Responders 
 The top priority for addressing these issues would be to enforce some form of 
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standardization in mobilizing responders. There will be numerous jurisdictions and actors 
working on their own for their part of the response process, but having a uniform 
program and process throughout all of them would standardize the response. It will also 
be necessary to ensure that there will be sufficient responders and volunteers in the event 
of an emergency. It is important that these responders are made aware of the importance 
of their part during the response process; although they may certainly have their own 
goals such as protecting their families, it must be stressed how vital they are to ensuring 
the protection of many others.  
 This ties into needing periodic review of the response process. By having a 
quarterly review, for example, where the information is gone over again, there would be 
opportune times to remind first responders of how important their response is for the 
overall process. 
5.8 Deliver Supplies to PODs 
 The overall prophylaxis delivery to PODs must be streamlined. By implementing 
a standard process between actors and hospitals, the actors and hospitals would be 
required to follow similar protocols that would aid in getting these supplies delivered. 
There needs to be accountability for delivering prophylaxis in a timely manner. A 
delivery tracking system via information technology could be a feasible improvement. 
Within the private sector, there are systems that can provide these updates. Network-
centric operations (NCO) can provide a GPS tracking of relevant vehicles charged with 
delivering prophylaxis so that there is no redundancy or confusion (IBM 2004). This type 
of technology, or systems with similar intent, can keep actors updated instantaneously. 
Additionally, integrating hospitals into the NIMS process will make them standardized. 
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The SNS request process can be integrated into the conference calls designed for 
decision-making. After the Threat Analysis Conference Call, the CDC could put the SNS 
on alert. Officials and first responders would begin organizing prophylaxis supplies and 
loading trucks or other necessary vehicles to deliver to specific jurisdictions. After the 
Initiate Response Conference Call, HSEMA, CDC, and HHS would carry out separate 
actions to aid the establishment of operational PODs. HSEMA (or equivalent actor in 
another jurisdiction) would formally initiate POD setup. The CDC would notify state 
health departments of this decision, outside the NCR, and the state health departments 
would use this information as well as the latest plume models to notify local jurisdictions 
of “at-risk” locations. The SNS would begin its delivery phase to PODs. Furthermore, the 
HHS would initiate necessary ESFs and instruct the MRC and other POD volunteers 
under their command to mobilize. 
5.9 Inform Public 
 The President of the United States could provide more than one set of updates 
through a series of press conferences. It is acceptable for the president to say that some 
circumstances remain unknown as long as that is the honest answer. In that case, the 
president could provide a series of updates on a periodic basis as information vital to the 
public is shared. 
Informing the public in a responsible manner requires efficient information 
technology as well as understanding of how the technology works across actors. A 
number of private sector technologies may serve as feasible systems to share information 
with other actors and the public. Our IT systems contact informed us of how GEOCOP 
includes a series of social networks and looks at geographic coordinates to provide 
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agencies and the public (depending on whether information is input as “secured” or 
“unsecured”) with refreshed updates in a matter of seconds of an event. The contact also 
informed us that one aspect of GEOCOP is TACTrend, which allows actors to 
collaborate and share information online and then search through billions of tweets per 
week through a search of geocoded trends. 
5.10 Open PODs 
 One of the first important reforms to the process of opening PODs would be to 
establish a formal policy that requires actors to report their status as closed PODs (if 
applicable) so that decision-makers can have the most information possible when 
devising a timely response. Additionally, a clear policy should establish the process for 
closed PODs that choose to become open to the public to be recognized as such. These 
private sector actors that have the capability and willingness to open their time and space 
to serving local communities during a bioterrorist attack should be properly evaluated by 
relevant government actors in accordance with established guidelines. 
 PODs currently have three forms of dispensing. All PODs capable of both drive-
up and walk-in dispensing would implement both methods. In addition, door-to-door 
dispensing would be available solely to individuals who cannot access the PODs directly 
to guarantee fairness in distribution. The issues at hand are determining which people 
need door-to-door prophylaxis and avoiding double-counting among the public. We 
propose a national hotline established and operated by volunteers from the state MRC’s, 
who were designated to this task by the federal MRC. The hotline would allow civilians 
to call one consistent phone number across jurisdictions to avoid confusion between 
postal routes and town borders. MRC volunteers would receive requests from civilians 
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and obtain their name, address, and necessary contact information. This data, sorted by 
the contacts’ addresses, would be forwarded by MRC volunteers to the local public health 
departments and the U.S. Postal Service, which would deliver prophylaxis to the 
appropriate people the following morning. The Postal Service would continue on a route 
that mirrors traditional mail routes if there is a high frequency of calls for door-to-door 
prophylaxis. However, if call frequency is low, then the Postal Service would deliver 
prophylaxis in shortened routes that, to their discretion, will dispense more quickly and 
also allow dispensing of prophylaxis on the same day as when the call is received since 
there is not as much call volume.  
5.11 Limitations 
 
The limitations to this project included those of the methodology, the scope, and 
dealing government agencies. 
SSM takes a learn-as-you-go approach toward research. Certain aspects of our 
research and recommendations could not be determined until we understood the problem, 
as the SSM approach is dependent on the information and issues revealed in time during 
the research. For example, certain aspects of a response might only be known by certain 
actors, and this information, in turn, would ultimately alter a potential recommendation. 
However, we might not have spoken to the relevant actor until after other aspects of the 
research were investigated. This process limited the amount of time available to conduct 
these interviews and highlights the importance of time management while using SSM. 
Fortunately, the Gemstone program devotes three years toward each project, giving us 
ample time and opportunity for the various facets of our research. 
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Our models of interaction relied largely on approximated and ranged timing, and 
therefore, may be slightly inaccurate with regards to timing. It is also possible that our 
models of interaction did not include all the factors of an attack. The different factors 
affecting an aerosolized anthrax attack might include weather patterns and human 
movement. 
            The use of 2010 census data in our computer simulations also factored in as 
a limitation. A primary target for a terrorist attack would be in a highly populated area, 
and our research only considered an outdoor, above ground attack. However, census data 
accounts for residential population, and hence nighttime population, as opposed to the 
population data that might occur in daytime while the city is more highly populated. 
However, our simulations still simulated over the span of several days and gave a general 
timeline of the spread of the anthrax plume. 
To analyze the precision of our simulation, we considered several different release 
times. The results of these simulations, shown in Figures 4.4e and 4.4f, give an 
approximate variance of the number of people infected for a specific amount of anthrax 
released. Although the anthrax incidence model is stochastic, we found that it reveals 
closely similar results for the total number of people infected for the same initial 
conditions.  
Determining the accuracy of the simulation is more difficult. We compared our 
results with simulations developed by Wilkening, and found that the results agreed within 
the variance of the simulations. This served as a sanity check to confirm that our 
simulation is functioning appropriately. However, both our simulation and Wilkening’s 
are based on data from the Sverdlovsk. Since there have been very few cases of 
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aerosolized anthrax releases, and laboratory testing of anthrax incubation is infeasible, 
the results of both simulations cannot be confirmed. 
There are some difficulties involved in focusing on such a large issue as the 
response to an aerosolized anthrax attack. It would be unreasonable to interview every 
single person, or even every actor, involved in the response, or consider every scenario. 
Another setback not anticipated was the change in positions of a few of our 
contacts. Although this brought up the issue with changing positions during an anthrax 
attack, it did make following up with our current contacts in their positions difficult, since 
we needed to re-establish such connections. 
In dealing with government documents and agencies, there always existed the 
problem of clearance and classified documents that we could not access. Although this 
was necessary for national security, it was potentially a major block in gaining a fuller 
understanding of how the current system works. For example, we collected little 
information about the BioWatch program because details such as the location and number 
of sensors are not made public. 
5.12 Future Directions 
 
BIOCOUNTER recommends a number of different avenues for continued 
research in the fields of public health, national security, and emergency management. The 
process of using SSM to identify gaps and discrepancies and then recommend feasible 
and desirable changes should be applied to other metropolitan areas of the United States. 
Future studies should also examine the environmental perspective and identify feasible 
and desirable changes to current protocols in order to protect air, water, food, and other 
resources in the country. A number of changes could be made to this thesis as well. 
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 With more time, we could have conducted additional research on the current 
policies and mechanisms of response. Ideally, we would have compared the response 
protocols of metropolitan Washington, D.C., with those of another city. Additional 
interviewees from more local-level actors and the private sector would contribute to an 
enhanced Communication Network. Furthermore, the Models of Interaction would have 
more specific times and, therefore, a more precise set of critical paths. Simulations with 
release points outside of Washington, D.C., would contribute to an analysis of how actors 
respond when an anthrax release occurred outside of the city and eventually entered it. 
This analysis could show distinctions between Washington, D.C., acting as the first 
affected location and as a location that perhaps was already notified and preparing a 
response. All of these adjustments to our research could provide further contributions to 
enhancing the investigation and decision-making in response to an aerosolized anthrax 
attack. 
 BIOCOUNTER’s research has found a number of gaps and discrepancies in the 
response protocols for a bioterrorism attack that do agree with other experts’ findings. In 
agreement with scholars such as Stoto and Morse (2008), we found syndromic 
surveillance systems to be largely ineffective in the detection effort with significant 
delays. However, BIOCOUNTER has outlined feasible and desirable changes that we 
believe can help standardize the detection, investigation, decision-making, and response 
across actors. Kong et al. (2008) indicated via a symptoms-based algorithm that 
improving detection alone could save lives. Although the algorithm required displayable 
symptoms as opposed to ours, which noted immediately when individuals became sick, 
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both of our studies agreed that improving timeliness of initiating a response would reduce 
casualties. 
 Although we shared these research outcomes with other scholars, we could still 
expand our efforts beyond the ones recommended at the beginning of this section. 
Hawkins et al. (2008) focused on how anthrax could spread through HVAC systems 
within buildings. The research found that certain filtration systems could reduce this 
spread despite the manipulation of the HVAC system for bioterrorism. BIOCOUNTER 
could also run a comparative study by having simulations of anthrax releases from within 
buildings and tracking the number of people sick over time. We could apply the same 
Communication Network and understanding of response protocols to revise our models 
of interaction and then develop a new conceptual model on how to improve investigation 









A. Graph Theory 
 
A.1 MATLAB 
 In order to properly analyze the 401x401 adjacency matrix, we needed to 
implement MATLAB code that could determine specified subpaths as well as identify the 
most frequent subpaths of certain lengths. The following code established the matrix 
within MATLAB and allowed us to select starting and ending entities. MATLAB would 
name the entities along the desired path. 
Adjacency = dlmread('Matrix without names 7-9-12.csv'); 
orgNames = textread('Matrix name array v2 7-9-12.csv', '%s', 'delimiter', '\n'); 
  
if length(Adjacency) ~= length(orgNames) 
error('Adjacency and orgNames dont agree') 
end 
  
%Finds the index of the desired start and end node 
startID = strmatch('JAHOC', orgNames, 'exact'); 
endID = strmatch('CDC', orgNames, 'exact'); 
  
C = ones(length(Adjacency)); %Cost matrix 
isWaitBar = 1; 
  
N = length(Adjacency); 
  
Adjacency = Adjacency + eye(N); % Adjacency(i,i) = 1, to make organizations self-
connected 
%(therefore an individual org is a path for the subpath part later) 
  
[costs,Paths] = dijkstra_kirk(Adjacency,C,startID,endID,isWaitBar); 
disp(orgNames(Paths)) 
 
 The “Matrix without names 7-9-12.CSV” file is our adjacency matrix, which 
contains all of the information about which entity communicates with whom. However, 
this file only contains numbers. In order to associate the correct titles to each entity, we 
created a second file, “Matrix name array v2 7-9-12.CSV,” which MATLAB used to 
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assign entity titles with their information within the adjacency matrix. In this sample 
code, MATLAB would display the entities involved in a communication path from the 
JAHOC to the CDC, as indicated by their appearance within the “startID” and “endID,” 
respectively. 
 Next, we needed to develop a subpath matrix that stored all of the subpaths from 
any entity to any other entity within the adjacency matrix. The following code established 
this matrix. 
%Subpaths(i,j): Number of times Paths(i,j) is a subpath of any path 
%(including itself. 
  
%If Subpaths(i,j) = 0 by the end of this nested for loop, then org(i) is not conected to 
org(j) 
  
%Note: Subpaths(i,i) will always be at least 1, because every organization 
%is at least connected to itself 
  
close all force; 
  
Subpaths = zeros(N); 
outerWaitbarHandle = waitbar(0, 'Subpath calculation total'); 




for ii = 1:N 
    ii 
    for jj = 1:N 
        subpath = Paths{ii,jj}; 
        waitbar(jj/N, innerWaitbarHandle) 
        if isnan(subpath) 
            continue; 
        end 
  
        %Sees if Paths(ii,jj) is a subpath of every path 
        for a = 1:N 
            for b = 1:N 
                path = Paths{a,b}; 
  
                if isnan(path) %org(a) not connected to org(b) 
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                    continue; 
                end 
  
                %Is Subpaths(ii,jj) a subpath of Paths(a,b)? 
                isSubpath = strfind(path, subpath); %index where subpath occurs in path. [] if 
subpath is not contained in path 
                if length(isSubpath) > 0 
                    Subpaths(ii,jj) = Subpaths(ii,jj) + 1; 
                end 
  
            end 
        end 
  
    end 
    toc 
    %Display and update waitbar 
    fractionDone = (ii)/N; 





 This code causes MATLAB to save the subpath matrix under the name 
“Subpaths_v1.CSV” and is available for analysis if this code is used with the additional 
analysis. The code is O(N
4
), which means that the amount of time that this code takes to 
run is proportional to the number of entities in the adjacency matrix to the fourth power. 
 Lastly, we needed MATLAB to analyze this subpath matrix and produce the five 
most common subpaths for each possible subpath length. 
Subpaths = dlmread('Subpaths_v1.csv'); 
  
sortedPaths = {}; %at index (count,:). {path length}, {# of times its a subpath}, {path} 
count = 0; 
h = waitbar(0, 'Restructuring data'); 
  
for i = 1:N 
    for j = 1:N 
        count = count+1; 
        path = Paths{i,j}; 




        if isnan(path) 
            sortedPaths(count,1) = {0}; %Saying path = NaN has 'length' 0 
            sortedPaths(count,2) = {0}; %Saying path is never a subpath 
            sortedPaths(count,3) = {[i j]}; %Here, path = NaN. Org i is not connected to org j 
        else 
            sortedPaths(count,1) = {pathLength}; 
            sortedPaths(count,2) = {Subpaths(i,j)}; 
            sortedPaths(count,3) = {path}; 
        end 
    end 




% Sort the sortedPaths array 
%http://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/13770-sorting-a-cell-array 
sortedPaths = sortcell(sortedPaths, [1 2]); %sort first by col 1 (path length), then by col 2 
(subpath appearance) 
  
% Print out top M for each length l 
M = 5; 
L0 = sortedPaths{length(sortedPaths), 1} + 1; 
L = L0; 
j = 0; %for each l, look at top values from 1:j:M 
  
%Goes in reverse order to make sure we're looking at the most commonly 
%occuring 
for i = length(sortedPaths):-1:1 
    length = sortedPaths{i,1}; 
    if length < L %next smallest length 
        if L ~= L0 
            fprintf('\nNumber of subpaths of length %1.0f: %1.0f', L,j) %for previously 
examined L 
        end 
  
        L = length; 
        j = 0; 
        fprintf('\n---------------\nLength: %1.0f\n', L) 
        if length == 0 
            fprintf('\nThese orginizations are not connected to each other:\n') 
        end 
    end 
  
    subpathCount = sortedPaths{i,2}; 
    path = sortedPaths{i,3}; 
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    if j < M 
        fprintf('subpathCount = %1.0f\n', subpathCount) 
        disp(orgNames(path)) 
    end 
  
    j = j+1; 
end 
fprintf('\nNumber of subpaths of length %1.0f: %1.0f', L,j) 
 
 This final code prints all of the most frequent subpaths of each length in terms of 
the number of nodes (entities). For instance, the output’s longest subpath length is eleven, 
which means that eleven entities are listed in order from start to end. 
A.2 Communication Network with Names 
 The image below represents the same Communication Network discussed in 





Figure A.2 – Communication Network with Names  
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B. Models of Interaction 
 
The models of interaction delineate the steps through each path, categorized and 
initiated by the method of detection.  The duration of each task is stated, followed by start 
and finish times. The task that precedes the target task is labeled by their ordered number. 
Shown below are the entry spreadsheets of our models of interaction. For the purposes of 
our research, we used the visualized network diagram format of the below tables which 
are extensive and cannot be fit into this thesis. They are originally .mpp files that can be 
translated from entry spreadsheets to network diagrams. To better understand what is 
meant by a network diagram, a visual screenshot of parts of Model 1 as a network 
diagram is included towards the end of this Appendix section.  
 
Table B.1: Model 1: Direct Observation Path 
 Task Name Duration Start Finish Predecessor 
      
2 Release 0 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12  
3 Direct Observation 0 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 2 
4 911 is alerted 0 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 3 
5 Fire Department/Paramedics arrive 0.18 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 4 
6 Metropolitan Police arrive 0.18 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 4 
7 DCDOH alerted 0.58 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 5 
8 HSEMA alerted 0 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 7 
9 FBI WMD Coordinator alerted 0.35 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 7 
10 HSEMA offficials arrive 0.38 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 8 
11 FBI agents arrive 0.15 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 9 
12 Source investigation 1 hr Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 11 
13 HEPRA alerted 0.75 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 4 
14 President notified 1 hr Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 4 
15 local conference call 1 hr Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 9 
16 WRTAC notified 0 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 8 
17 HEPRA begins to organize for 
BIOWATCH Advisory Committee 0.9 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 13 
18 WebFusion 0 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 17 
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19 HSIN 0 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 17 
20 Regional Incident Command and 
Coordination System activated 0 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 17 
21 Secondary testing confirmation 6 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Thu 12/6/12 39 
22 Federal Conference call 1 hr Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 15 
23 Modeling Visualization team formed 0.3 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 15 
24 Decision of Response 0.4 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 22 
25 Recommendation to Mayor for SNS 0.25 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 24 
26 Request to HHS for SNS 0.2 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 25 
27 CDC evaluation 0.65 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 26 
28 Deploy SNS 1 hr Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 27 
29 SNS distributed from warehouses to 
PODs 9.5 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Thu 12/6/12 28 
30 POD set up 15.5 hrs Thu 12/6/12 Mon 12/10/12 27,43 
31 HSEMA notifications to public 0.5 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 8,13 
32 HSEMA alert regional partners 0.5 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 8,13 
33 HSEMA requests staff from nearby 
jurisdictions 0.5 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 8,13 
34 HAZMAT contacted 0.57 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 5 
35 HAZMAT arrives 0.5 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 34 
36 Joint Terrorism Task Force/National 
Capital Response Squad contacted 0.2 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 35 
37 JTTF/NCRS collects samples 0.5 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 36 
38 Preliminary tests of samples 4.3 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 37 
39 First confirmation of anthrax 0 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 38 
40 HEPRA takes actions 0 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 39 
41 Contact private sector 1 hr Thu 12/6/12 Thu 12/6/12 21,24 
42 Contact FEMA NRCC 0 hrs Thu 12/6/12 Thu 12/6/12 21,24 
43 Activate EOC 0 hrs Thu 12/6/12 Thu 12/6/12 21,24,51 
44 Activate Mobile Command Center 1 hr Thu 12/6/12 Thu 12/6/12 21,24 
45 Recommend potential decisions to 
Mayor 3.1 hrs Thu 12/6/12 Thu 12/6/12 21,24 
46 Contact National Watch Center 0.4 hrs Thu 12/6/12 Thu 12/6/12 42 
47 Contact RRCC 0.4 hrs Thu 12/6/12 Thu 12/6/12 42 
48 Contact Secretary of Homeland Security 0.4 hrs Thu 12/6/12 Thu 12/6/12 42 
49 Alert National Operations Center 0.25 hrs Thu 12/6/12 Thu 12/6/12 48 
50 Recommend activation of NIMS to DHS 0.25 hrs Thu 12/6/12 Thu 12/6/12 49 
51 NIMS and ESFs initiated 0.25 hrs Thu 12/6/12 Thu 12/6/12 50 
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52 National Incidence Communications 
Conference Line 0 hrs Thu 12/6/12 Thu 12/6/12 51 
53 NRCC activated 0 hrs Thu 12/6/12 Thu 12/6/12 51 
54 RRCC activated 0 hrs Thu 12/6/12 Thu 12/6/12 51 
55 Rapid Response Public Health and 
Medical Assets activated 0.35 hrs Thu 12/6/12 Thu 12/6/12 51 
56 Incident response coordination team 0.35 hrs Thu 12/6/12 Thu 12/6/12 51 
57 Distribution of emergency guidance to 
all health officials 1 hr Thu 12/6/12 Thu 12/6/12 56 
58 Put US Public Health Service 
Commissioned Corps on Alert 0 hrs Thu 12/6/12 Thu 12/6/12 51 
59 Activate HHS National Disaster Medical 
System 0 hrs Thu 12/6/12 Thu 12/6/12 51 
60 Completion 0 hrs Mon 12/10/12 Mon 12/10/12 10,12,16,18,19 
     19,20,29,30,31 
     32,33,41,44,45 
     47,52,53,54,55 
     57,58,59 
 
Table B.2: Model 2a:  BioWatch Path 1 
 Task Name Duration Start Finish Predecessor 
      
2 Release 0 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12  
3 Dry Filter Unit lags in recognition of 
aerosolized anthrax 24 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Fri 12/7/12 2 
4 Positive reading of anthrax 3 hrs Mon 12/10/12 Mon 12/10/12 3 
5 Lab director notified and speaks to CDC 0 hrs Mon 12/10/12 Mon 12/10/12 4 
6 Regional Lab Director conference call 0.5 hrs Mon 12/10/12 Mon 12/10/12 5 
7 Biowatch Actionable Result 0.25 hrs Mon 12/10/12 Mon 12/10/12 6 
8 Secondary testing and confirmation 5 hrs Mon 12/10/12 Tue 12/11/12 7 
9 HSEMA alerted 0.5 hrs Mon 12/10/12 Mon 12/10/12 6 
10 HEPRA alerted 0.5 hrs Mon 12/10/12 Mon 12/10/12 6 
11 DCDOH alerted 0.5 hrs Mon 12/10/12 Mon 12/10/12 6 
12 Mayor alerted 0.25 hrs Mon 12/10/12 Mon 12/10/12 11 
13 CDC alerted 0.25 hrs Mon 12/10/12 Mon 12/10/12 11 
14 President notified 1 hr Mon 12/10/12 Mon 12/10/12 9 
 
Table B.3: Model 2b: BioWatch Path 2 
 
Task Name Duration Start Finish Predecessor 
 
     
2 
Release 0 hrs 0.00 hrs 0.00 hrs  
3 Dry Filter Unit lags in recognition of 




Positive reading of anthrax 3 hrs Mon 12/10/12 Mon 12/10/12 3 
5 
Lab director notified and speaks to CDC 0 hrs Mon 12/10/12 Mon 12/10/12 4 
6 
Regional Lab Director conference call 0.5 hrs Mon 12/10/12 Mon 12/10/12 5 
7 
BioWatch Actionable Result 0.25 hrs Mon 12/10/12 Mon 12/10/12 5 
8 
Secondary testing and confirmation 5 hrs 27.25 hrs 32.25 hrs 7 
9 
HSEMA alerted 0.5 hrs Mon 12/10/12 Mon 12/10/12 6 
10 
HEPRA alerted 0.5 hrs Mon 12/10/12 Mon 12/10/12 6 
11 
DCDOH alerted 0.5 hrs Mon 12/10/12 Mon 12/10/12 6 
12 
Mayor alerted 0.25 hrs 28.00 hrs 28.25 hrs 11 
13 
CDC alerted 0.25 hrs 28.00 hrs 28.25 hrs 11 
14 
President notified 1 hr 28.00 hrs 29.00 hrs 9 
15 
WRTAC alerted 0 hrs 28.00 hrs 28.00 hrs 9 
16 
HEPRA plume modeling begins 0 hrs Mon 12/10/12 Mon 12/10/12 10 
17 HEPRA begins to organize for BioWatch 
Advisory Committee 1 hr Mon 12/10/12 Mon 12/10/12 10 
18 
CDC Director's EOC (DEOC) notified 0.5 hrs Mon 12/10/12 Mon 12/10/12 10 
19 
FBI WMD Coordinator alerted 0.5 hrs 29.00 hrs 29.50 hrs 10,26 
20 Epidemiologist checks with EOC every 
half hour 0.35 hrs 41.85 hrs 42.20 hrs 16,55 
21 
WebFusion 0 hrs 29.00 hrs 29.00 hrs 17 
22 
HSIN 0 hrs 29.00 hrs 29.00 hrs 17 
23 Regional Incident Command and 
Coordination System activated 0 hrs 29.00 hrs 29.00 hrs 17 
24 HHS Secretary's Operation Center 
(SOC) notified 0.3 hrs 28.50 hrs 28.80 hrs 18 
25 
Schedules made and publicized 0 hrs 28.50 hrs 28.50 hrs 18 
26 
FBI and NOH notified via NOC 0.2 hrs Wed 12/5/12 Wed 12/5/12 24 
27 HHS Emergency Management Group 
alerted 0.2 hrs 28.80 hrs 29.00 hrs 24 
28 Assistant Secretary Preparedness and 
Response (HHS) notified 0.2 hrs 28.80 hrs 29.00 hrs 24 
29 Incident Response coordination team 
alerted 0.2 hrs 28.80 hrs 29.00 hrs 24 
30 
Federal conference call 1 hr 32.25 hrs 33.25 hrs 8,37 
31 
Contact Private Sector 1.75 hrs 33.85 hrs 35.60 hrs 8,35 
32 
Contact FEMA NRCC 1.75 hrs 33.85 hrs 35.60 hrs 8,35 
33 
Activate Mobile Command Center 1.75 hrs 33.85 hrs 35.60 hrs 8,35 
34 Recommend potential decisions (calling 
in National Guard) to mayor 1.75 hrs 33.85 hrs 35.60 hrs 8,35 
35 
Decision of Response 0.6 hrs 33.25 hrs 33.85 hrs 30,12,13,25 
36 
Recommendation to mayor for SNS 0.25 hrs 33.85 hrs 34.10 hrs 35 
37 BioWatch Advisory Committee 
conference call 2 hrs 29.50 hrs 31.50 hrs 7,19 
38 
Modeling Visualization team formed 0.35 hrs 31.50 hrs 31.85 hrs 37 
39 
Request to HHS for SNS 0.2 hrs 34.10 hrs 34.30 hrs 36 
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Table B.4: Model 3: Syndromic Surveillance Path 
 Task Name Duration Start Finish Predecessor 
      
2 Release 0 hrs 0.00 hrs 0.00 hrs  
3 Incubation 60 hrs 0.00 hrs 60.00 hrs 2 
4 Onset of symptoms 0 hrs 60.00 hrs 60.00 hrs 3 
5 Increased medicinal sales 12 hrs 60.00 hrs 72.00 hrs 4 
6 Increased physician visitations 12 hrs 60.00 hrs 72.00 hrs 4 
7 Increased school absences 12 hrs 60.00 hrs 72.00 hrs 4 
8 ESSENCE pattern reported 48 hrs 72.00 hrs 120.00 hrs 5,6,7 
9 DCDOH alerted 0 hrs 120.00 hrs 120.00 hrs 8 
10 CDC alerted 0 hrs 120.00 hrs 120.00 hrs 8 
11 HEPRA alerted 0 hrs 120.00 hrs 120.00 hrs 9,10 
12 FBI WMD Coordinator alerted 1 hr 120.00 hrs 121.00 hrs 11 
13 Source investigation 0 hrs 121.00 hrs 121.00 hrs 12 
14 local conference call 1 hr 121.00 hrs 122.00 hrs 12 
15 Classification of incident 0 hrs 122.00 hrs 122.00 hrs 14 
16 Federal Conference Call 1 hr 122.00 hrs 123.00 hrs 15 
17 Decision of Response 0.4 hrs 123.00 hrs 123.40 hrs 16 
18 Recommendation to Mayor for SNS 0.25 hrs 123.40 hrs 123.65 hrs 17 
19 Request to HHS for SNS 0.2 hrs 123.65 hrs 123.85 hrs 18 
20 CDC evaluation 0.65 hrs 123.85 hrs 124.50 hrs 19 
21 Deploy SNS 0.45 hrs 124.50 hrs 124.95 hrs 20 
22 SNS distributed from warehouses to 
PODs 1 hr 124.95 hrs 125.95 hrs 21 
23 PODs set up 15.5 hrs 125.95 hrs 141.45 hrs 22,13 
 
Table B.5: Model 4: Astute Physician Path 
 Task Name Duration Start Finish Predecessor 
      
2 Release 0 hrs 0.00 hrs 0.00 hrs  
3 Incubation 60 hrs 0.00 hrs 60.00 hrs 2 
4 Onset of symptoms 0 hrs 60.00 hrs 60.00 hrs 3 
5 Patient visits astute physician 48 hrs 60.00 hrs 108.00 hrs 4 
6 Patients tested for anthrax 5 hrs 108.00 hrs 113.00 hrs 5 
7 DCDOH alerted if positive tests 0 hrs 113.00 hrs 113.00 hrs 6 
8 local conference call 1 hr 113.00 hrs 114.00 hrs 7 
9 Classification of incident 0 hrs 114.00 hrs 114.00 hrs 8 
10 Federal Conference call 1 hr 114.00 hrs 115.00 hrs 9 
11 Decision of Response 0.4 hrs 115.00 hrs 115.40 hrs 10 
12 Recommendation to Mayor for SNS 0.25 hrs 115.40 hrs 115.65 hrs 11 
13 Request to HHS for SNS 0.2 hrs 115.65 hrs 115.85 hrs 12 
14 CDC evaluation 0.65 hrs 115.85 hrs 116.50 hrs 13 
15 Deploy SNS 1 hr 116.50 hrs 121.00 hrs 14 
16 SNS distributed from warehouses to 
PODs 1 hr 121.00 hrs 122.00 hrs 15 
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17 PODs set up 13 hrs 122.00 hrs 135.00 hrs 16 
 
 
Examples of Parts of a Network Diagram of Model 1 
 
Dynamics of these network diagrams could be controlled to follow the critical path and 
each entity was labeled for its task and organization. 
 














C. Computer Simulations 
 
C.1 List of programs used: 
○ Microsoft Visual C++ 
■ anthDispersion, written in C++, is the launcher for the Population 
Spread Model 
○ Hysplit version 4 
■ Models the dispersion of the anthrax in the atmosphere. Creates a 
gridded data file of the anthrax concentration. 
○ Ruby 
■ illMod, written in Ruby, calculates the number of people sick in 
each grid cell. 
○ ESRI ArcMap version 10.0 
■ A Geographic Information System (GIS), used to visualize the 
results of the model.  
○ ArgGIS Data Management Toolbox 
○ Python version 10.6 
■ putXYdataOnMap, written in Python, automates ArcMap. 
 
C.2 Complete List of Variables and Parameters 
 
C.2.1 Variables used in HYSPLIT’s SETUP file 
Note: Any variables not specified are set to HYSPLIT’s default values 
 
Variable name  Value Description 
delt 1 (minute) Integration timestep 
initd 0  Release type: 3D particle horizontal and vertical. 
Can be particle, puff, or hybrid (see HYSPLIT 
Users Guide) 
numpar 10000 maximum number of particles released over 
duration of emission 
maxpar 10000 maximum number of particles 
 









C.2.2 Variables used in HYSPLIT’s CONTROL file 
Note: Any variables not specified are at HYSPLIT’s default values 
 
Variable name Value Description 
Start Position National Mall: 
38°, 53', 22.24" 
Position where the anthrax is initially released 
into the atmosphere 
Simulation 
Duration 
120 (hours) Simulation Duration 
Top of Model 10000.0 (meters) Above this height the simulation does not run 




0.01 (hours) Total time that anthrax is released. Note: 
releasing 100 units/hour for 0.01 hours 
corresponds to a nearly instantaneous release of 1 
unit of anthrax. 
Cell Size 30" x 30" Each cell on the gridded map is 30 arcseconds by 
30 arcseconds 
Grid Size 30° x 30° The size of the entire grid where the simulation is 
calculated is 30 degrees by 30 degrees 
Anthrax diameter 1.5 (um)  
Anthrax density 1.42 (g/cm^3)  
Anthrax shape 
factor 




0.002 (m/s) Rate at which the anthrax particles deposit 
themselves on the ground 
 
Table C.2.2 - Variables used in HYSPLIT’s CONTROL file 
 
C.2.3 Parameters varied 
 Starting time 
o Jan 1, 9am   (2010) 
o June 9, 9am  (2010) 
o Jul 2, 2am   (2010) 
o Sep 1, 9am   (2010) 
 Amount of anthrax released 
o 0.01 kg 
o 0.1 kg 
o 1 kg 




Simulation # Date and time of release Amount of anthrax 
released (kg) 
1 Jan 1, 9am   (2010) 0.01 
2 Jan 1, 9am   (2010) 0.1 
3 Jan 1, 9am   (2010) 1 
4 Jan 1, 9am   (2010) 10 
5 June 9, 9am  (2010) 0.01 
6 June 9, 9am  (2010) 0.1 
7 June 9, 9am  (2010) 1 
8 June 9, 9am  (2010) 10 
9 Jul 2, 2am   (2010) 0.01 
10 Jul 2, 2am   (2010) 0.1 
11 Jul 2, 2am   (2010) 1 
12 Jul 2, 2am   (2010) 10 
13 Sep 1, 9am   (2010) 0.01 
14 Sep 1, 9am   (2010) 0.1 
15 Sep 1, 9am   (2010) 1 
16 Sep 1, 9am   (2010) 10 
 
Table C.2.3 - List of simulations 
 
 
C.2.4 Variables in the Anthrax Incidence Model 
Variable Value Description 
λ: Spore germination rate 5e-6 (1/day) the risk per unit time that a spore 
germinates 
θ: Spore clearance rate 0.084 (1/day) the risk per unit time that a spore is 
cleared from the lung 
Spore mass 0.7 (pg) Mass of a single spore of anthrax 
Breathing rate 1.8 
(m^3/hour) 
Volume of air inhaled per unit time 
 
Table C.2.4 - Variables in the Anthrax Incidence Model  
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C.3 Anthrax Incidence Model Source Code 
 
#FORMAT: ruby illmod<version number>.rb <HYSPLIT DATA> <POP DATA> <CSV 
LAT/LON OUTPUT> <CSV HOUR OUTPUT> <start hour> 
#EX: ruby illmodtest12.rb cdump.txt uspop00.txt csv1.csv csv2.csv 9 
 
in_file = File.new(ARGV[0], "r") #input from HYSPLIT 
us_pop = File.new(ARGV[1], "r") #US Population Gridded Data 
csv_sickfile = File.new(ARGV[2], "w") #Output CSV of sick 
csv_hourfile = File.new(ARGV[3], "w") #Output CSV by hour 
start_hour = ARGV[4] #Starting hour, using an intenger for the 24 hours of the day 
 
simtotal = 0 #total ill during simulation 
looparr = [] #array tracker throughout the look 
popcheck = 0 #simple boolean check if population has been run 
hysplitcheck = 0 #simple boolean check if hysplit data has been run 
pop_grid = {} 
sporesInhaled = {} 
sporesInTheBody = [] 
germ = 0.000005/24 #Germination rate of anthrax (1/hour (div by 24)) 
clear = 0.084/24 #Clearance rate of anthrax (1/hour (div by 24)) 
spore_mass = 0.7 #The mass of an individual spore (picograms) 
breathing_rate = 1.8 #Breathing rate for inhalation of anthrax (.03 m^3/min = 1.8 
m^3/hour) 
sporesInhaled = {} #Hash/Hash/Array that tracks total number of spores inhaled at a 
particular lat/lon for each hour. (spores) 
sporesInTheBody = [] #Array that takes sporesInhaled for each lat/lon/hour and 
calculates total number of spores in the body at that hour (spores) 
cell_sick = {} #Hash that tracks the number of people sick per cell 
tdiv = 0 
 
csv_hourfile.print "Hour," 
1.upto(121) { |i| 






puts "TEST #{z}" 
csv_hourfile.print "TEST #{z}," 
 
lines = in_file.readlines() 
pop_lines = us_pop.readlines() 
curr_lat = 50.00 # = yll + 1/120* number of rows 
curr_lon = -125.00 
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pop_total = 0 
val = 1.0/120.0 #0.00833333333333 
total = 0 #tracker for total sick through the course of the simulation 
if hysplitcheck == 0 then  
 tc = 0 #total cells, to run a progress check in the third section 
 tdiv = 0 #total cells divided by ten, to run to check 
 
 #variables for the formula 
 #Modeling the Incuation Period of Anthrax by Brookmeyer 
 #Simulation Modeling of Antrhax Spore Dispersion in a Bioterrorism Incident 
 germ = 0.000005/24 #Germination rate of anthrax (1/hour (div by 24)) 
 clear = 0.084/24 #Clearance rate of anthrax (1/hour (div by 24)) 
 spore_mass = 0.7 #The mass of an individual spore (picograms) 
 breathing_rate = 1.8 #Breathing rate for inhalation of anthrax (.03 m^3/min = 1.8  
m^3/hour) 
 sporesInhaled = {} #Hash/Hash/Array that tracks total number of spores inhaled 
at a particular lat/lon for each hour. (spores) 
 sporesInTheBody = [] #Array that takes sporesInhaled for each lat/lon/hour and 
calculates total number of spores in the body at that hour (spores) 
 cell_sick = {} #Hash that tracks the number of people sick per cell 
 
 #1.  Calculate spores inhaled from each line in cdump file 
 puts "1. Calculating sporesInhaled from HYSPLIT" 
 low_lat = 0.0 
 low_lon = 0.0 
 hi_lat = 0.0 
 hi_lon = 0.0 
 curr_day = nil 
 last_day = nil 
 lats_used = {} 
 latlon_used = {} 
 lines.each { |line| 
   grid = 
line.scan(/^(\d+)\s+(\d+)\s+(\d+)\s+(\d+)\s+(.......)\s+(........)\s+(......)\E(\+|-
)(\d+)\s+(......)\E(\+|-)(\d+)$/) 
   grid.each{ |year, month, day, hour, lat, lon, antx0, x0_sign, ezero, antx1, 
x1_sign, eone| 
  if x1_sign == '-' 
    antx_1_val = antx1.to_f * 10**(-eone.to_f) #picograms / m^3 
  else 
    antx_1_val = antx1.to_f * 10**(eone.to_f) #picograms / m^3 
  end 
  #Determines max/min lat/lon for getting grid cells 
  if lat.to_f < low_lat then low_lat = lat.to_f end 
  if lat.to_f > hi_lat then hi_lat = lat.to_f end 
  if lon.to_f < low_lon then low_lon = lon.to_f end 
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  if lon.to_f > hi_lon then hi_lon = lon.to_f end 
   
  if curr_day == nil then curr_day = 0 end 
  if last_day == nil then last_day = day.to_i end 
  if last_day < day.to_i then  
    curr_day += day.to_i - last_day 
    last_day = day.to_i 
  end 
  curr_hour = (curr_day) * 24 + hour.to_i - start_hour.to_i + 1 
  if sporesInhaled[lat.to_f] == nil then 
    sporesInhaled[lat.to_f] = {} 
  end 
  if sporesInhaled[lat.to_f][lon.to_f] == nil then 
    sporesInhaled[lat.to_f][lon.to_f] = [] 
  end 
  sporesInhaled[lat.to_f][lon.to_f][curr_hour] = antx_1_val  / spore_mass * 
breathing_rate * 1  
  lats_used[lat.to_f] = true 
  if latlon_used[lat.to_f] == nil then latlon_used[lat.to_f] = {} end 
  if latlon_used[lat.to_f][lon.to_f] == nil then latlon_used[lat.to_f][lon.to_f] 
= true end 
   } 
 } 
 hysplitcheck = 1 
end 
 
#2. Set up population count. 
if popcheck == 0 then 
 puts "2. Generating population data" 
 i = 0 
 n = 1 
 tc = 0 
 pop_lines.each { |line| 
   grid = line.scan(/(\d+\.\d+|\d+)/) 
   grid.each { |curr| 
  if curr_lon >= low_lon and curr_lon <= hi_lon and curr_lat >= low_lat 
and curr_lat <= hi_lat then  
    if lats_used.include?(curr_lat.round(4)) then 
   if pop_grid[curr_lat.round(4)] == nil then 
     pop_grid[curr_lat.round(4)] = {} 
   end 
   if latlon_used[curr_lat.round(4)].include?(curr_lon.round(4)) then 
     pop_grid[curr_lat.round(4)][curr_lon.round(4)] = curr[0].to_f 
     pop_total += curr[0].to_f 
     tc += 1 
   end 
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    end 
  end 
  i += 1 
  if (i / n) == 2208960 then  
   puts "#{n}0%" 
   n += 1 
  end 
  curr_lon += val 
   } 
   curr_lat -= val #Since we're starting at the top left 
   curr_lon = -125.00 
 } 
 puts "-- Pop Total: #{pop_total}" 
 tdiv = tc / 10 
 popcheck = 1 
end 
 
#3. Calculate sporesInTheBody while also doing Formula Loop 
puts "3. Formula Loop" 
csv_sickfile.puts "LAT, LON, HOUR" 
ti = 0 #total cell tracker, to run a similar check as the one in the second loop 
tn = 1 
cell_sick = [] 
sporesInTheBody = [] 
hours_sick = [] 
pop_grid.keys.sort.each{ |lat| 
 if cell_sick[lat] == nil then cell_sick[lat] = {} end 
 pop_grid[lat].keys.sort.each{ |lon| 
  if cell_sick[lat][lon] == nil then cell_sick[lat][lon] = 0 end 
  1.upto(120){ |i| 
   if sporesInhaled[lat][lon][i] == nil then sporesInhaled[lat][lon][i] = 
0 end 
   if sporesInTheBody[i - 1] == nil then sporesInTheBody[i - 1] = 0 
end 
   sporesInTheBody[i] = sporesInTheBody[i - 1] * (1 - clear) + 
sporesInhaled[lat][lon][i] 
   
   if cell_sick[lat][lon] == nil then cell_sick[lat][lon] = 0 end 
   prob = 1 - Math.exp((-(sporesInTheBody[i]) * germ / (germ + 
clear)) * (1 - Math::E**(-(clear + germ)*1))) 
   old_sick = cell_sick[lat][lon] 
   not_sick = pop_grid[lat][lon] - old_sick 
   new_sick = 0 
   1.upto(not_sick){ |j| 
    if rand() < prob.to_f 
     csv_sickfile.puts "#{lat},#{lon},#{i}" 
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     new_sick += 1 
     total += 1 
    end 
   } 
   cell_sick[lat][lon] += new_sick 
   if hours_sick[i] == nil then hours_sick[i] = 0 end 
   hours_sick[i] += new_sick 
  } 
  #Attack rate 
  sporesInhaled[lat][lon][121] = 0 
  sporesInTheBody[121] = sporesInTheBody[120] * (1 - clear) + 
sporesInhaled[lat][lon][121] 
  prob = 1 - Math.exp((-(sporesInTheBody[121]) * germ / (germ + clear))) 
  old_sick = cell_sick[lat][lon] 
  not_sick = pop_grid[lat][lon] - old_sick 
  new_sick = 0 
  1.upto(not_sick){ |j| 
   if rand() < prob.to_f 
   csv_sickfile.puts "#{lat},#{lon},121" 
   new_sick += 1 
   total += 1 
   end 
  } 
  cell_sick[lat][lon] += new_sick 
  if hours_sick[121] == nil then hours_sick[121] = 0 end 
  hours_sick[121] += new_sick 
  ti += 1 
  if (ti / tn) == tdiv then 
   puts "#{tn}0%" 
   tn += 1 
  end 
 } 
} 
csv_sickfile.puts "TEST #{z}, Total: #{total}, " 
1.upto(121) { |i| 
 csv_hourfile.print "#{hours_sick[i]}," 
} 
csv_hourfile.puts "#{total}" 
simtotal += total 









xavg = simtotal / 5 
sampvar = 0 
1.upto(5) { |z| 
 sampvar += ((looparr[z] - xavg)**2) / (5 - 1) 
} 
csv_sickfile.puts "" 
csv_sickfile.puts "Conf. Interval:  #{xavg} +/- #{1.533 * Math.sqrt(sampvar*5/5)}" 
csv_hourfile.puts "" 
csv_hourfile.puts "Conf. Interval:  #{xavg} +/- #{1.533 * Math.sqrt(sampvar*5/5)}" 
puts "Confidence Interval: #{xavg} +/- #{1.533 * Math.sqrt(sampvar*5/5)}" 
 
#Original format 
#0 + 5, 1:51.4 - 24098 
#0 + 48, 7:58.4 - 95661 
#0 + 120, 14:31.1 - 95618 
#Add scan for box limits 
#0 + 5, 2:00.2 - 23735 
#W/ Normal Dist 
#0 + 5, 1:55.0 - 97 NEED TO DEBUG THIS NOMRAL DIST LATER ON 
#0 + 120, 16:59.6 - 295 DEFINITELY NEED TO FIX 
#Added Attack Rate, no Norm Dist 
#0 + 5, 2:00.4 - 43205 
#0 + 120, 14:47.4 - 114642 
#Version 7, re-arrange to combine step 3 (sporesInhaled) and 5 (Attack Rate) and into 4. 
#120 + attack rate, 6:12.9 
#5: 73032 +/- 114.0263 
#10: 73036 +/- 105.1951 
#15: 73048 +/- 105.2236 





#1: 73037 +/- 48.1560 
#2: 73023 +/- 64.1093 
 
C.4 Computer Specifications 
 Model: Dell Latitude E6400 
 Operating System: Windows 7 32-bit 
 Processor: Intel Core 2 Duo CPU P9600 @ 2.66 GHz 
 Installed memory (RAM): 4.00 GB 









Actor: Entity or individual relevant to the response protocols 
 
Adjacency Matrix: A means of representing nodes of data in a graph format to show the 
connections between them 
  
Amerithrax: 2001 anthrax letter attacks 
 
Anthrax Confirmation: Testing conducted by LRN laboratories that confirm a pathogen 
as anthrax 
 
Anthrax Incidence Model: Refers to our in-house simulation designed to simulate the 
overall effects of a dosage of anthrax on a population. Alternatively, “Illness Model” 
 
Anthrax Smoke Detector (ASD): Automated detection device that collects and analyzes 
samples 
 
ArcGIS: A geographic information system (GIS) designed by Esri, used for working 
with map data and geographic information 
 
Argus: Surveillance system developed by Georgetown University to collect online data 
and analyze the information for potential bioterrorism 
 
Assay: An analytical laboratory test to measure certain chemical activities for a variety of 
analytes 
 
Astute Physician: Also known as the “Observant Doctor” or “Observant Physician.” A 
physician who acutely detects and diagnoses the disease 
 
“At-Risk” Location: A high-target location that is a potential target of a terrorist attack 
 
Automated: A means or mechanism that works automatically, most often 
technologically, and with limited human interaction 
 
Autonomous: Functioning independently (i.e. without human interaction) 
 
Autonomous Pathogen Detection System (APDS): Aerosol collector and analyzer 
developed via funding from the DoE, DHS, and DoD 
 
Bacillus anthracis: Bacterium that induces the anthrax disease 
 
Betweenness Centrality: Measure of a node’s centrality in a network equal to the 




BIOCOUNTER: Bioterrorism Inhibition Operating COntainment Unit for the Negation 
of Terrorist Entities and Radicals 
 
Bio-event Advanced Leading Indicator Recognition Technology (BioALIRT): 
Analyzes outpatient visit records using a variety of parameters to detect potential 
bioterrorism 
 
Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System (BASIS): Air collector and filter 
system that demands manual labor but has few false positives 
 
Biological Weapons Convention of 1972: International agreement banning the 
development of biological weapons 
 
Biosafety Level (BSL): Rating of a laboratory’s capabilities to house and analyze 
particular pathogens; a one to four scale with four representing the most potent pathogens 
 
BioSense: A national syndromic surveillance system that collects data from hospitals and 
both DoD and VA facilities 
 
BioWatch: A national technological surveillance system that operates in select cities 
throughout the country. 
 
BioWatch Actionable Result (BAR): An indication that a dangerous pathogen has been 
detected 
 
CALPUFF: Gaussian puff atmospheric dispersion model 
 
CATWOE: A mnemonic device of SSM standing for “Clients”, “Actors”, 
“Transformation”, “Worldview Owner”, “Environmental constraints” 
 
Chain-of-Command: Line of hierarchy of leadership and responsibility of the response 
process 
 
Chief Complaint: The primary symptom cited by a patient during a hospital visit 
 
Ciprofloxacin: Prescription and prophylaxis antibiotic used to treat certain infections 
 
Clearance Rate: Hazard rate or risk per unit of time that a spore is cleared from the lung 
 
Common Operation Picture (cop): An interface containing live data that is shared 
across actors for the purpose of information sharing 
 
Communication Network: Matrix containing all directed communication among actors 





Competing Risks Model: A mathematical model comparing the attack probability and 
incubation period of a pathogen among a population 
 
Conceptual Model: Idealized model displaying the feasible and desirable changes to the 
response protocols from detection to prophylaxis dispensing 
 
Confidence Interval: A number that gauges to the reliability of an estimate in regards to 
a population test, e.g. our incidence model 
 
ConOps: The Concept of Operations for a government health emergency, in this thesis 
specifically the HHS Aerosolized Anthrax Concept of Operations 
 
Critical Analysis Period (CAP): The detection, investigation, and decision-making 
phases following an attack 
 
Critical Path Method (CPM): A statistical analysis that determines the activities in a 
schedule with the longest duration, and thus deems the path with the longest duration as 
the “Critical Path.” This path is then considered the most important independent path for 
completion of the schedule. 
 
Cumulative Attack Probability Function of Disease, F (t): Probability of becoming 
infected by a certain time 
 
C++: High-level and popular, object-oriented programming language 
 
Dark Winter: A bioterrorism preparedness exercise performed in the summer of 2001, 
involving a fictional outbreak of smallpox, and overseen by the National Security 
Council 
 
Decision-Making Phase: Actions within the response protocols in which actors 
determine how to best respond to a bioterrorism attack; usually includes conference calls 
and IT systems 
 
Desiccation: Loss of moisture and into a state of dryness 
 
Detection Phase: Initial actions of the response protocols where pathogens are initially 
detected, prompting confirmatory testing and investigation 
 
Diameter of the Graph: The longest, non-cyclical path in the graph 
 
Dijkstra’s Shortest Path Algorithm: Algorithm designed to find the shortest non-
negative path between two nodes on a graph 
 





Discrepancy: Inconsistencies of the response process found through extensive literature 
review and interviews 
 
Disengagement: Phasing out of response and other various actions 
 
Dispensing: Providing prophylaxis to people on scene or at their residences 
 
Distribution: Refers to the method of distribution of prophylaxis during the response 
process 
 
Door-to-Door Prophylaxis: Distribution method of prophylaxis during the response 
process that would require distribution at residencies 
 
Doxycycline: Prescription and prophylaxis antibiotic used to treat certain infections 
 
Drive-Up Prophylaxis: Distribution method of prophylaxis that would require 
individuals to come and retrieve an allocated amount of prophylaxis for them from a 
POD 
 
Early-Warning System: Concept of having a detection system that provides a prompt 
determination of a biological threat 
 
Edge: A line that connects two nodes on a graph 
 
Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-based 
Epidemics (ESSENCE) II: A system of computer data and statistical analysis that 
collects information on patient symptoms and other qualitative and quantitative data in 
order to determine patterns in the symptoms affecting a population. It is the successor to 
ESSENCE, a program more specifically targeting military and smaller populations 
  
Emergency Management: Policies and actions related to running successful 
investigation and decision-making phases in order to provide an efficient response to an 
event 
 
Epidemiology: A branch of medical studies that focuses on the health conditions of 
populations, with a particular focus on disease and detection 
 
ESRI: A developer of geographic information systems (GIS) software such as ArcGIS 
 
Feasible and Desirable Change: A recommendation that is determined after examining 
the results of our research 
 
Field Epidemiology: Field research and epidemic study of health and disease conditions 





First Responders: The agencies whose response is immediate during the response 
process 
 
Fulminant Stage: Stage following the prodromal stage when a pathogen becomes lethal 
within the body 
  
Gantt Chart: A scheduling chart that displays the tasks on a schedule in the form of a 
bar graph 
 
Geo-spatial Common Operating Picture (GEOCOP): Social network of government 
officials and private sector actors who share information regarding national security and 
public health 
 
Generation 3 BioWatch: The anticipated successor to Generation 2 BioWatch that 
would be able to detect anthrax and other biological threats automatically; however, the 
project has been delayed due to problems with its technology 
 
Germination Rate: Rate at with the anthrax spores experience growth 
 
Global Terrorism Database: An open-source database of terrorist activities from 1970 
to 2011 compiled by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism 
 
Graph Theory: The study of graphs, which are mathematical representations of the 
relations between objects 
 
GUI: Graphical User Interface 
  
HealthMap: Freely available website that compiles all official and unofficial updates 
regarding biological events 
 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD): Orders given by the president in 
order to further reinforce the defense of the USA 
 
Hybrid Single-Particle Lagrangian Integrated Trajectory (HYSPLIT): Atmospheric 
dispersion model developed by NOAA 
 
Illness Model: Refers to our in-house simulation program that models the effects an 
aerosolized anthrax attack; alternatively, Anthrax Incidence Model 
 
Incubation Period: Time between exposure to a pathogenic agent and the onset of 
symptoms 
 





Information Gathering Interview: Interview with a subject-matter expert that only 
focuses on factual information pertaining to the expert’s field and the response to 
bioterrorism 
 
Interoperability: Several IT systems and actors functioning in coordination with one 
another 
 
Investigation Phase: Set of actions within the response protocols pertaining to gathering 
information from actors and the scene of the detected biological pathogen; also includes 
initial conference calls between public health and national security actors in order to 
determine the threat credibility 
 
Jurisdiction: A defined area of responsibility, specific to an organization or agency 
 
LandScan: A geographic information system 
 
“Likely Bioterrorism Risk”: Decision from a threat credibility conference call stating 
that bioterrorism has likely occurred based on pathogen testing and information-
gathering; prompts decision-making 
 
MATLAB: Standing for matrix laboratory, a numerical computing environment that is 
often used for matrix calculations 
 
Mess: Interconnected problems across a complicated society that cannot be distinguished 
easily through immediate analysis 
 
Metropolitan Washington, D.C.: The immediate Washington, D.C. area and 
surrounding counties of the states of Virginia and Maryland 
 
Microsoft Excel: Spreadsheet/database software created by Microsoft as part of their 
Office software 
 
Microsoft Project: Project management software created by Microsoft, intended to be 
used in plan development 
 
Models of Interaction: Maps of systems that display the interconnectivity and often the 
timing of various tasks and actors 
  
M-file: MATLAB file containing a programmable set of commands 
 
NAM12 Meteorological Wind Pattern Data: 12 km archived data of 
meteorological  wind patterns in North America 
 
National Biosurveillance Information System (NBIS): A system of agencies set up by 
the CDC in order to provide extensive biosurveillance, the original goal being the 
creation of a central fusion center 
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National Bioterrorism Syndromic Surveillance Demonstration Program: System that 
analyzes patient symptoms in search of deadly pathogen detection 
 
National Capital Region (NCR): The region, also known as metropolitan Washington, 
D.C., that includes Washington, D.C., northern Virginia (Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, 
and Prince William counties), and Maryland (Frederick, Montgomery, and Prince 
George’s counties) 
 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
(START): Resource center and database on the University of Maryland at College Park 
campus associated with the DHS regarding terrorism and related research 
 
National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS): Online information-
sharing system developed by the CDC 
 
National Incident Management System (NIMS): Overarching response protocols 
outlining roles and responsibilities in the event of a natural or terrorist incident 
 
Network-centric operations (NCO): Interoperable information sharing that coordinates 
technology and actors; developed via IBM 
 
Node: A vertex on a graph 
 
NodeXL: An open-source template program designed for the exploration of network 
graphs 
 
“No Risk”: Determination that an initial detection is not an act of bioterrorism 
 
Pathogen: A biological agent 
 
Plume Model: A model of dispersion of particles in the air, run on a computer simulation 
 
Point of Distribution (POD): Station run by MRC volunteers and other actors to 
dispense prophylaxis to the general public within a jurisdiction 
 
“Possible Bioterrorism Risk”: Determination from a threat credibility conference call 
that national security and public health actors must continue to gather information and 
reconvene to make a definitive decision as to whether a detection is bioterrorism or not 
 
Problem Situation: An unstructured description of the history and scope of a 
complicated problem 
 
Prodromal Stage: The stage in a disease with the onset of early symptoms 
 
Prophylaxis: A means of preventing disease after or before exposure (in this context, 
prophylactic antibiotics are the primary means) 
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Python: A multi-paradigm programming language known for its syntax being clear and 
expressive 
 
Rapid Syndrome Validation Project (RSVP): Online surveillance and communication 
system for relevant actors attempting to determine whether incidents are bioterrorism 
 
Real-time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance (RODS): Computerized surveillance 
system 
 
Redundancy: Repetition of a subpath between two specific nodes within a graph 
 
Response Delay: The delay between deciding on the solution and implementing the 
solution 
 
Response Phase: Actions after decision-making related to establishing PODs, delivering 
supplies to said PODs, and dispensing prophylaxis to the affected population 
 
Response Protocols: All actions related to the detection, investigation, decision-making, 
and response 
 
Rich Picture: Sketch that visualizes a complicated system in a simple yet informative 
manner 
 
Risk Communication: Informing and updating the public of the current risks in a 
location where a bioterrorism attack has been detected 
 
Root Definition: The basic problem(s) that a system presents 
 
Ruby Language: An object-oriented programming language similar to Python 
 
Soft Systems Methodology (SSM): A systematic approach used to describe and 
understand real-world problems 
 
Solution: A resolution determined from feasible and desirable changes that is designed to 
solve particular problems of the current response process 
 
Spatio-temporal: Of or relating to space and time 
 
Standardization: Act of applying the same set of restrictions and requirements between 
numerous agencies 
 
Stochastic Model: A model of a system which involves random processes 
 
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS): The national stockpile of prophylaxis antibiotics, 




Subpath: A particular path in a graph between two nodes 
 
Sub-Rich Picture: Rich picture that describes a specific phase of a complex system 
through a detailed sketch 
 
Sverdlovsk: An oblast of Russia known for an anthrax attack made there in 1979 
 
Syndromic Surveillance: A method of determining that a disease has occurred by 
examining the symptoms of the community 
 
Systems-Thinking: A way of thinking concerned with the relationships among entities in 
a system, an integral part of SSM 
 
TACTrend: Online compilation of Tweets that relate to public health and national 
security; categorized and searched by key terms 
 
Technological Surveillance: Observing the medical well-being of an area through use of 
technology 
 
TOPOFF: A planned exercise conducted by top officials to practice the response to a 
simulated terrorist attack 
 
Total Hourly Sick: A simulation-determined number of individuals who are found to be 
sick due to anthrax germination per hour 
  
Unified Command: Incident command shared by more than one actor 
 
University of Maryland Institutional Review Board: Committee that approves specific 
research methodology that involves human subjects 
 
Virtual USA (vUSA): Pilot project that compiles several information-sharing interphases 
in order to standardize communication 
 
Walk-in Prophylaxis: Antibiotics administered immediately after screening at walk-in 
POD’s 
 
WMD Commission: Group led by former senators Bob Graham and Jim Talent to 
evaluate and suggested changes to the biological and nuclear threat security standards 
 
WMD Center: A non-profit organization dedicated to informing the government and 
private sectors on the threat of bioterrorism and bolstering their preparedness 
 
“WMD Threat Credibility Evaluation” Conference Call: Initial conference call based 
on detection and gathered information between public health and national security actors 
where such actors decide whether a threat is “No risk,” “Possible Bioterrorism Risk,” and 
“Likely Bioterrorism Risk” 
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World at Risk: A 2008 report of the WMD target potential and safety of the USA 
 
yEd Graph Editor: Diagram generating software 
170 
 
List of References 
 
(2004) Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) Guidelines, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC). 
 
(2006) National Incident Management System (NIMS) Implementation Plan, District of 
Columbia Emergency Management Agency. 
 
(2008) National Response Framework, Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA). 
 
(2008) SOA foundation for Network Centric Operations, IBM. 
 
(2009) Community Assessment for Public Health Emergency Response (CASPER) 
Toolkit, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 
 
(2009) Defense solutions: Network-centric strategies and communications technologies, 
IBM. 
 
(2011) NCR Geospatial Data Exchange: Stakeholder Initiation Meeting Summary 
Findings, in NCR Geospatial Data Exchange, KCI Technologies, Inc.TechGlobal, 
Inc.Touchstone Consulting Group. 
 
(2011) Public Health Emergency Response Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Public 
Health Directors, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 
 
(2012) Aerosolized Anthrax Concept of Operations, U.S. Department of Health & 
Human Services, Public Health Emergency (PHE). 
 
(2012) Overview of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), START, College Park, MD. 
 
(2010) National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 
START, College Park, MD. 
 
Barnes, D. (2013) Lawmakers Reaffirm Demand for Biowatch Data. Global Security 
Newswire. 
 
Bentley, T. (1993) Soft Systems Methodology. Financial Management,71, 22. 
 
Brachman, P.S., Kaufman, A.F., and Dalldorf, F.G. (1966) Industrial Inhalational 
Anthrax. Bacteriological Reviews,30, 646-659. 
 
Bravata, D.M., McDonald, K.M., Szeto, H., Smith, W.M., Rydzak, C. and Owens, D.K. 
(2004) A Conceptual Framework for Evaluating Information Technologies and Decision 




Brookmeyer, R., Johnson, E. and Barry, S. (2003) Modeling the Incubation Period of 
Anthrax, Johns Hopkins University. 
 
Bush, G.W. (2004) Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10: Biodefense for the 21st 
Century, in HSPD-10, Office of the Press Secretary. 
 
Caid, L. (2003) Tucson Fire Department's MMRS Exercise: A Bioterrorism Response 
Plan. Public Management,85, 4. 
 
Checkland, P. (2000) Soft Systems Methodology: A Thirty Year Retrospective in 
Systems Research and Behavioral Science, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, Carnforth. 
 
Chen, H., Zeng, D. and Yan, P. (2010) Infectious Disease Informatics: Syndromic 
Surveillance for Public Health and Bio-Defense, Springer, New York. 
 
Chess, C. and Clarke, L. (2007) Facilitation of Risk Communication During the Anthrax 
Attacks of 2001: The Organizational Backstory. American Journal of Public Health,97, 
1578-83. 
 
Cieslak, T. and Eitzen, E. (1999) Clinical and Epidemiological Principles of Anthrax. 
Emerging Infectious Diseases,5, 552-555. 
 
Dance, S. (2010) New Maryland public health lab in East Baltimore gets OK, in 
Baltimore Business Journal, American City Business Journals. 
 
Cosgrove, S.E., Perl, T.M., Song, X. and Sisson, S.D. (2005) Ability of Physicians to 
Diagnose and Manage Illness Due to Category A Bioterrorism Agents. Archives of 
Internal Medicine,165, 2002-2006. 
 
Croft, D.L., Wein, L.M. and Wilkins, A.H. (2005) Analyzing Bioterror Response 
Logistics: The Case of Anthrax. Management Science,51, 16. 
 
DoS (2003) Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative, Bureau of 
International Security and Nonproliferation, Washington, DC. 
 
ESRI (2012) ArcGIS: Mapping and Spatial Analysis for Understanding Our World, Web. 
 
Falkenrath, R. (2010) Contrasting Federal and Local Biodefense Views, Now and in the 
Years Ahead, in The State of Biopreparedness: Lessons from Leaders, Proposals for 
Progress, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, Washington, DC. 
 
Fedorowicz, J. and Gogan, J.L. (2009) Reinvention of interorganizational systems: A 
case analysis of the diffusion of a bio-terror surveillance system. Information Systems 
Frontiers,12, 15. 
 
FEMA (2008) ICS Review Material, FEMA, Web, pp. 28. 
172 
 
Foster, V. (2004) ESSENCE - A DoD Health Indicator Surveillance System, in 2004 
Environmental Public Health Tracking Conference, Philadelphia. 
 
Garza, A. (2010) DHS Biodefense Programs and Priorities, Now and in the Years Ahead, 
in The State of Biopreparedness: Lessons from Leaders, Proposals for Progress, 
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, Washington, DC. 
 
Graham, B. (2010) Strengthening the Chain of Resilience, Now and in the Years Ahead, 
in The State of Biopreparedness: Lessons from Leaders, Proposals for Progress, 
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, Washington, DC. 
 
Graham, B. and Talent, J. (2010) Report Card: Government Failing to Protect America 
from Grave Threats of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism. 
 
Graham, B., Talent, J., Allison, G., Cleveland, R., Rademaker, S., Roemer, T., Sherman, 
W., Sokolski, H. and Verma, R. (2008) World at Risk: The Report of the Commission on 
the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, Vintage Books, New York. 
 
Gray, V.C. and West, M.W. (2008) District Response Plan, Washington, D.C., pp. 28. 
 
Hawkins, B.E., Hofacre, K.C., Wood, J. and Sparks, L. (2008) Final report on theoretical 
and experimental analysis of important parameters for determining the impact of a 
biological attack on a building, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of 
Research and Development, National Homeland Security Research Center, 
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division, Cincinnati, OH., pp. 1 online 
resource ([100] p.). 
 
Hindson, B., McBride, M., Makarewicz, A., Henderer, B., Sathyam, U., Nasarabadi, S., 
Venkateswaran, K., Gutierrez, D., Smith, S., Metz, T. and Colston, B. (2004) 
Autonomous Pathogen Detection System, in Proceedings of the 2nd Joint Conference on 
Point Detection for Chemical and Biological Defense, Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, City. 
 
Holland Jr., E.J., Koh, H.K., Lurie, N. and Shahrigian, R. (2012) FY 2012 Online 
Performance Appendix, Department of Health and Human Services, pp. 43. 
 
Hugh-Jones, M. and Blackburn, J. (2009) The Ecology of Bacillus Anthracis. Molecular 
Aspects of Medicine,30, 356-367. 
 
Hultgren, A. (2008) Putting First Responders First, in Homeland Security S&T 
Stakeholders Conference West, Homeland Security Science and Technology, Los 
Angeles, California, pp. 18. 
 
Hunter, N.D. (2007) “Public-Private” Health Law: Multiple Directions in Public Health. 




Hupert, N., Wattson, D., Cuomo, J., Hollingsworth, E., Neukermans, K. and Xiong, W. 
(2009) Predicting Hospital Surge After a Large-Scale Anthrax Attack: a Model-Based 
Analysis of CDC's Cities Readiness Initiative Prophylaxis Recommendations. Medical 
Decision Making,29, 424-437. 
 
Inglesby, T., O'Toole, T., Henderson, D., Bartlett, J., Ascher, M., Eitzen, E., Friedlander, 
A., Gerberding, J., Hauer, J., Hughes, J., McDade, J., Osterholm, M., Parker, G., Perl, T., 
Russell, P. and Tonat, K. (2002) Anthrax as a Biological Weapon: Updated 
Recommendations for Management. The Journal of the American Medical 
Association,287, 2236-2252. 
 
Investigation, F.B.o. and Prevention, C.f.D.C.a. (2011) Criminal and Epidemiological 
Investigation Handbook, Federal Bureau of Investigation, pp. A27-A31. 
 
Justice, U.S.D.o. (2010) Amerithrax Investigative Summary, Washington, D.C., pp. 92. 
 
KDHE (2010) Anthrax Disease Management and Investigation Guidelines, in Kansas 
Disease Investigation Guidelines, The Kansas Department of Health and Environment, 
Topeka, Kansas, pp. 13. 
 
Kelly, T., Tanielian, T., Don, B., Moore, M., Meade, C., Baker, J., Ccechine, G., Prine, 
D. and Wermuth, M. (2006) Analysis of Department of Defense Plans and Responses to 
Three Potential Anthrax Incidents in March 2005, RAND (Research and Development) 
National Defense Research Institute, Arlington. 
 
Kirk, J. (2007) Dijkstra's Shortest Path Algorithm, MATLAB Central, 
www.mathworks.com, pp. M-File. 
 
Kong, X., Wallstrom, G., Hogan, W., Zeng, D., Chen, H., Rolka, H. and Lober, B. (2008) 
A Temporal Extension of the Bayesian Aerosol Release Detector. 
 
Meselson, M., Guillemin, J., Hugh-Jones, M., Langmuir, A., Popova, I., Shelokov, A. 
and Yampolskaya, O. (1994) The Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak of 1979. Science,266, 
1202-8. 
 
Mingers, J. (2009) Taming Hard Problems with Soft O.R., in OR/MS Today, Institute for 
Operations Research and the Management Sciences.Lionheart Publishings, Inc. , 
Marietta, GA. 
 
National Incident Management System, District of Columbia Homeland Security 
Emergency Management Agency. 
 
Perera, D. (2013) DHS releases draft BioWatch RFP, in Fierce Homeland Security. 
Prevention, C.f.D.C.a. (2010) Cities and Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) 
Participating in CDC's Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI), in Emergency Preparedness and 
Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta. 
174 
 
Rao, S., Mohan, K. and Atreya, C. (2010) Detection Technologies for Bacillus Anthracis: 
Prospects and Challenges. Journal of Microbiological Methods,82, 1-10. 
 
Rolka, H. and O’Connor, J.C. (2011) Real-time public health biosurveillance: Systems 
and policy considerations. Infectious Disease Informatics and Biosurveillance: Research, 
Systems, and Case Studies. 
 
Sebelius, K. (2010) HHS Views on Biopreparedness, Now and in the Years Ahead, in 
The State of Biopreparedness: Lessons from Leaders, Proposals for Progress, University 
of Pittsburgh Medical Center, Washington, DC. 
 
Shea, D.A. and Lister, S.A. (2003) The BioWatch Program: Detection of Bioterrorism, 
Congressional Research Service. 
 
Sternbach, G. (2003) The History of Anthrax. The Journal Of Emergency Medicine,24, 
463-467. 
 
Stephens, M. and Marvin, B. (2010) Recognition of Community-Acquired Anthrax: Has 
Anything Changed Since 2001? Military Medicine,175, 671-675. 
 
Stoto, M.A. and Morse, L. (2008) Regionalization in Local Public Health Systems: 
Public Health Preparedness in the Washington Metropolitan Area. Public Health 
Rep,123, 13. 
 
Trudeau, R.J. (1993) Introduction to Graph Theory, Dover Publications, Inc., New York. 
 
Tsui, F.-C., Espino, J.U., Dato, V.M., Gesteland, P.H., Hutman, J. and Wagner, M.M. 
(2003) Technical Description of RODS: A Real-time Public Health Surveillance System. 
Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association,10, 10. 
 
Vaughan, E. (2009) Communicating Risk of Mass Casualty Terrorism in Diverse 
Communities. START. 
 
Virtual USA, National Public Safety Telecommunications Council. 
 
Wein, L., Craft, D. and Kaplan, E. (2003) Emergency Response to an Anthrax Attack. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,100, 
4346-4351. 
 
Williams, D. (2012) The Biodefender That Cries Wolf. Los Angeles Times. 
 
Wyatt, P.J. (2002) Early Warning and Remediation: Minimizing the Threat of 





Yung, P.T., Lester, E.D., Bearman, G. and Ponce, A. (2007) An automated Front-End 
Monitor for Anthrax Surveillance Systems Based on the Rapid Detection of Airborne 
Endospores. Biotechnology and Bioengineering,98, 8. 
 
Zilinskas, R. (1997) Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past as Future? The Journal of 
American Medical Association,278, 16. 
 
 
